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Printed in Germany INTRODUCTION BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT, 
the Member of the Commission with special 
responsibility for competition policy 
In 1996, as a result of the globalization of trade 
and the internationalization of economic phe-
nomena, there continued to be a considerable 
need for adjustment of the structures of the 
European economy. In a rapidly changing world 
environment characterized by four main factors 
— the speeding-up of technical and scientific 
progress; population growth in the developing 
countries; the increase in the production of 
goods and services; and the intensification of 
trade in goods and of capital movements — the 
policy of the European Union, and more partic-
ularly Community competition policy, seeks to 
promote the indispensable adaptation of the 
Community economy to this new situation. 
Globalization is in many respects an oppor-
tunity to be seized by those economies which 
have the means to do so. The liberalization of 
trade, both worldwide and within the single 
market, is a mainspring of growth that will 
benefit the European economy, European busi-
nesses and European consumers. 
For all that, globalization is also sometimes 
seen as a threat by European citizens faced with 
a society which they perceive as being more 
complex the more global it becomes, less safe 
the more prosperous it grows, and more fragile 
the more open it is. These concerns are under-
standable. They are legitimate. They must be 
accommodated by government policies and 
especially by Community policy. They reflect 
the mounting uncertainties for both structures 
and individuals that stem from the need to adapt 
to a rapidly changing world. 
Competition policy is a structural factor of great 
importance when it comes to helping Europe 
adapt to this new competitive environment 
brought about by globalization. This is because: 
• it seeks to make our economic structures 
stronger and more competitive; 
• it helps, through a policy of balanced liber-
alization, as in the telecommunications 
sector, to safeguard the solidarity and 
equality of treatment to which Europeans 
are so attached and which lie at the heart of 
the European model of society, thereby 
ensuring that European businesses and 
consumers are provided with the best pos-
sible services at the lowest possible prices 
while taking the general interest fully into 
account; 
it plays a key role in the implementation of 
the single market, whose mechanisms 
ensure a better allocation of resources and 
an optimum efficiency of the economy 
while paying due regard to the general 
interest. 
If it is to play this essential role in an optimum 
manner, competition policy must likewise con-
stantly adapt and be able to meet ever more 
exacting requirements in relation to the hand-
ling of competition cases, the scale of the opera-
tions concerned and the speed of changes in the 
markets being such that there is an increasing 
need for expertise and rapid decision-making. 
In 1996 the Commission accordingly pressed 
ahead with its drive to modernize its competi-
tion policy. 
It concentrated its efforts on three areas: 
• First of all, it voluntarily undertook to cre-
ate suitable instruments and structures, 
both multilateral and bilateral, so as to be 
able to deal with competition issues at the 
appropriate level, be it national, European 
or worldwide. The Commission thus pro-
posed, on my initiative, to step up its coop-
eration with Member States' competition 
authorities in order to promote the decent-
ralized application of competition rules 
within the Community. It was with the 
same end in view that we continued to 
work for the gradual development of coop-
eration and minimum rules at world level. 
• Secondly, the Commission applied itself to 
the task of speeding up the work on 
amending Community law so as to bring it 
more into line with economic reality, both 
as regards merger control, the conditions under which Articles 85 and 86 are 
applied, and the monitoring of State aid. 
• Thirdly, it started work on modernizing the 
rules of procedure in many areas so that it 
might be able to handle the numerous 
cases that come before it with the requisite 
speed and efficiency and increase the 
transparency and foreseeability of its de-
cisions, notably in the State aid sphere. 
This intensive modernization work, which will 
equip the Commission in its capacity as a com-
petition authority with the means with which to 
face up to the challenges of a more global, more 
rapidly changing and more complex economy, 
has not diverted our attention from what is, in 
my view, our central task, which is to combat, in 
a manner in keeping with the general interest, 
any attempts to impair the proper functioning of 
markets. 
The campaign against restrictive practices thus 
remains at the forefront of the Commission's 
competition activities. For example, in 1996 we 
penalized the parties to price-fixing agreements 
in the transport sector, and a number of other 
agreements and abusive practices are currently 
under investigation. I intend to step up the cam-
paign against secret cartels even more in future. 
The same holds true for the application of strin-
gent rules on State aid, where the number of 
negative decisions has increased considerably. 
Strict monitoring is needed above all in sectors 
suffering from structural overcapacity such as 
the motor industry, where, far from solving a 
particular problem, the granting of aid may 
simply have the effect of shifting it elsewhere in 
the Community. The Commission has neverthe-
less been mindful of the contribution some 
types of aid may make to the attainment of the 
objectives of other Community policies. 
In the merger control sphere, the number of 
decisions taken by the Commission was again 
up on the previous year and in three cases we 
had to prohibit the planned operation. 
To conclude, I should like to say that I hope this 
report will contribute to the transparency of 
competition policy. It is with such transparency 
in mind and in answer to a request from the 
European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee that the 1996 Report contains 
a final chapter on what the Commission pro-
poses to do in 1997. I should also like to give 
special thanks to all those who took part in 1996 
in the various debates on competition matters: 
the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee, the Council, Member States, 
the business community, consumer organiza-
tions and the Commission's departments. I am 
convinced that their views and comments have 
helped to ensure that our competition policy is 
more clearly articulated, more readily under-
stood and better implemented. I hope I can 
count on their active involvement again next 
year. 
Thus, step by step, the Commission is preparing 
the ground actively and systematically so that it 
will be ready to take up the challenges that will 
be facing Europe in the world in 2000, foremost 
among which will be enlargement. I have set 
my sights on modernizing and developing the 
instruments of a competition policy which is not 
only effective but also transparent and demo-
cratic, while respecting fully the prerogatives of 
the European Parliament and the Council; a bal-
anced competition policy which pays due 
regard both to the pressing need for economic 
efficiency and to the general interest. XXVlth Report 
on competition policy 
1996 
(Published in conjunction with the 'General Report on the 
Activities of the European Union — 1996') 
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10 INTRODUCTION 
1. Objectives of competition policy 
/. The aim of competition policy, through its 
impact on the basic structures of the European 
economy, is to ensure that markets acquire or 
maintain the flexibility they need to allow scope 
for initiative and innovation and to allow an 
effective and dynamic allocation of society's 
resources. This structural action means that 
competition policy interacts with most other 
broadly based policies such as the development 
of the internal market, the policy on growth and 
competitiveness, the policy on cohesion, 
research and development policy, environmen-
tal policy and consumer protection. 
2. Competition policy is thus both a Commis-
sion policy in its own right and an integral part 
of a large number of European Union policies 
and with them seeks to achieve the Community 
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty, 
including the promotion of harmonious and bal-
anced development of economic activities, sus-
tainable and non-inflationary growth which 
respects the environment, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, the raising 
of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion. 
3. In the final analysis, like all other Commu-
nity policies, competition policy aims to 
enhance the economic prosperity of the Euro-
pean Union and the well-being of all its people. 
In a communication published on 11 September 
1996 entitled 'Services of general interest in 
Europe',' the Commission forcefully reaffirmed 
these ideas stating that, 'market forces produce 
a better allocation of resources and greater 
effectiveness in the supply of services, the prin-
cipal beneficiary being the consumer, who gets 
better quality at a lower price'. However, the 
Commission is also well aware that 'these 
mechanisms sometimes have their limits; as a 
result the potential benefits might not extend to 
the entire population and the objective of pro-
moting social and territorial cohesion may not 
be attained. The public authority must then 
ensure that the general interest is taken into 
account'. 
4. The positive interaction between competi-
tion policy and other Community policy areas 
was particularly evident on the employment 
front in 1996. On 5 June the Commission, act-
ing on a proposal from Mr Santer, adopted the 
document entitled 'Action for employment in 
Europe: a confidence pact'.
2 Competition policy 
plays its part in the overall strategy set out in the 
document in order to boost economic growth 
and strengthen the link between job creation 
and growth. In line with the approach pursued 
through the Single European Act and the White 
Paper on growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment,' the pact proposes four types of structural 
action: 'to complete the internal market and 
implement it more effectively; to enhance the 
overall competitive environment in Europe; to 
help small and medium-sized enterprises; to 
open up wider access to the world market', the 
first three of which are closely linked to compe-
tition policy. The first two types of action 
involve essential competition policy objectives 
under Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the Treaty and 
the Merger Regulation. The third was pursued 
this year in the policy on State aid, with the 
adoption of a new, simpler and more broadly 
based de minimis rule, the introduction of new 
guidelines on'aid for SMEs and a notice on the 
monitoring of State aid and reduction of labour 
costs. 
5. If it is to perform its function fully, compe-
tition policy as a structural policy must work 
with and anticipate trends in the economy so as 
to ensure efficient operation of markets without 
acting unduly as a brake on their performance. 
It must in particular: 
— take account of globalization; 
— help to develop the full potential of the inter-
nal market; 
— modernize its instruments. 
2. Taking account of globalization 
6. The quickening pace of technological 
advance and the rapid development of global 
competition in a large number of sectors are 
undoubtedly a challenge to public policies as a 
whole and to competition policy in particular, 
whether pursued by the European Union, indi-
vidual Member States or countries elsewhere in 
the world.
4 In many sectors, the economic con-
ditions prevailing today cannot be compared 
with those which existed even 10 years ago. 
Firms have to adjust to an economy in which 
discriminating consumers can compare daily 
the goods and services available in a world 
which has shrunk with the development of com-
munications and trade. At the same time, the 
OJ C 281, 26.9.1996, p. 3. 
CSE(96) I Final. 
While Paper entitled 'Growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment: the challenges and ways forward into the 2lst century', 
COM(93) 700 final, 5.12.I993. 
See staff report of the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC): 
'Competition in the new high-lech global market place'.  11 12 
internationalization of trade and the growing 
integration of economies between the different 
areas of the world have prompted Community 
firms to shift their strategy towards internation-
al cooperation so as to become global actors at 
world level. These changes have been made 
possible only because they have gone hand in 
hand with extremely rapid advances in technol-
ogy. These have altered the basis on which 
whole sectors operate. One example is the 
telecommunications sector, which it was still 
possible until recently to protect from interna-
tional competition and the process of Commu-
nity integration. 
7. The Commission does not believe that this 
situation calls for less-strict application of the 
competition rules. Its experience, through its 
decision-making practice in all the areas cov-
ered by competition policy, shows that the com-
petition-mindedness and efficiency required to 
be an effective competitor internationally are 
acquired through competition between firms on 
domestic markets. Moreover, although some 
markets are clearly global ones with, in some 
cases, a very small number of players (for 
example, the platinum market in the 
Gencor/Lonrho case), others remain European, 
or indeed national, for a variety of reasons (for 
example, the importance of language in the case 
of audiovisual and cultural products and ser-
vices). Furthermore, even in sectors in which 
global strategies are pursued, competition does 
not necessarily, from the customer's point of 
view, take place at global market level; a 
notable example is telecommunications where, 
from the resident user's point of view, markets 
remain essentially national and are in some 
cases still dominated by monopoly operators. 
8. For these reasons, the Commission's pol-
icy is to promote the competitiveness of Euro-
pean industry as a whole by strict enforcement 
of the competition rules applicable to Member 
States and those applicable to undertakings, 
looking at each market individually and taking 
account of its size. 
Thus, in its policy on liberalization, through 
gradual and balanced liberalization of the net-
work industries that are crucial to the competi-
tiveness of European industry as a whole, such 
as telecommunications, energy and transport, 
the Commission's aim is to overcome the hand-
icap created by the cost of such services for 
European firms, as set out in the second Ciampi 
report.' Parallel to this, in the policy it pursues 
on State aid, the Commission may take a posi-
tive view of aid that allows the rationalization 
of production and the restructuring of a firm in 
order to enhance its competitiveness and in the 
long term safeguard employment. On the other 
hand, it takes a negative view of aid which 
merely bales out a firm without providing any 
guarantee of its future viability. 
In its antitrust and merger control policy, the 
Commission endeavours to prevent the fore-
closure of European markets, and in particular 
of emerging or recently demonopolized mar-
kets, while at the same time fostering the devel-
opment of a powerful European industry that 
can meet the challenges of world competition. 
The decisions taken by the Commission in 1996 
provide numerous illustrations of this approach. 
Examples include the Commission decisions 
under Article 85(1) and (3) in the Atlas/Global 
One and Lufthansa/SAS cases. This concern 
also underlies the Commission's moves to 
assess the impact of the transatlantic air 
alliances on competition on Europe. Similarly, 
the Commission seeks to ensure that effective 
competition is maintained in Europe, to the ben-
efit of European consumers, when it analyses 
merger transactions associated with global 
strategies, whether the relevant markets are 
worldwide (Gencor/Lonrho), European or 
national (Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper). 
3. Developing the full potential of the 
internal market 
9. While globalization is undoubtedly an 
important feature of modern economies, it is not 
a universal phenomenon that affects the whole 
of the economy uniformly. In many areas, the 
dynamics of integration are essentially Euro-
pean. 
The period during which the single market pro-
gramme (SMP) has been completed has wit-
nessed a significant intensification in trade rela-
tions between the Member States. Between 
1985 and 1995, the share of intra-EU imports in 
total manufacturing imports increased from 
61.2% in 1985 to 67.9% in 1995, while trade in 
services expanded by a smaller amount from 
46.9% in 1985 to 50% in 1995. This intensifica-
tion of intra-Community trade has not occurred 
at the expense of third-country producers. 
'Improving European competitiveness', second report of the 
Competitiveness Advisory Group, presented to the Commission 
President and to the Heads of State or Government in December 
1995. INTRODUCTION 
Market share analysis demonstrates that both 
intra and extra-Community trade have expand-
ed their share of consumption at the expense of 
domestic producers. Single market completion 
and globalization are working together to shake 
up established sourcing patterns and market 
structures, and are ushering in a period marked 
by competitive pressure. 
Recent analysis, carried out for the Commis-
sion's review of the impact and effectiveness of 
the single market programme, highlights a gen-
eral tendency towards reduced concentration in 
national markets, coupled with increased con-
centration at Community level.' This pattern is 
consistent with keener competition across fron-
tiers accompanied by some restructuring at 
Community level. The trend is most marked in 
R&D-intensive sectors and sectors producing 
homogeneous goods. The increase in cross-bor-
der competition has also manifested itself in 
erosion of price-cost margins in sectors which 
were previously segmented by discriminatory 
procurement practices and technical barriers. 
Price-cost margins are found to be some 0.5% 
of the value of turnover below what they would 
have been in the absence of the single market. 
Furthermore, markets for consumer and equip-
ment goods as well as market services sensitive 
to the single market programme exhibit a trend 
towards price convergence. Recent evidence 
therefore suggests that the single market has 
successfully unleashed a pro-competitive 
dynamic. Simulations suggest that the competi-
tion and productivity-enhancing effects of the 
single market programme have boosted econ-
omic activity and employment to levels which 
would otherwise not have been observed. Com-
munity income is estimated to be 1.1 to 1.5% 
higher than otherwise, while the SMP is esti-
mated to have created up to 900 000 extra jobs. 
Inflation rates in 1994 were found to be 1.2% 
lower than would have prevailed in the absence 
of the single market. 
The effects measured to date fall short of initial 
expectations regarding the potential growth and 
employment impact of the single market. The 
more modest impact can be attributed to the fact 
that the market-opening effects of single market 
legislation are only beginning to come on 
stream. The unpropitious macroeconomic con-
sequences have also dampened responsiveness 
of operators to new commercial openings. How-
ever, the Commission's review has also identi-
fied shortcomings in the single market frame-
work which must be remedied before the full 
benefits will be reaped. To this end, an ac-
tion plan is currently under preparation and is 
scheduled for presentation at the Amsterdam 
European Council. 
The Commission's review has highlighted the 
need for continued vigilance and commitment 
to upholding the principles of free movement 
and competition in order to optimize the poten-
tial of the single market. Consistent application 
of effective competition policy safeguards is of 
critical importance in this regard. The Commis-
sion is convinced of the need to pursue this pol-
icy and to prevent corporate conduct or State 
measures from excluding certain sectors from 
the advantages of the single market. This is the 
reasoning behind its decision in the Adalat case, 
and also the action it has taken in motor vehicle 
distribution, with the entry into force of the new 
block exemption Regulation on motor vehicle 
distribution, to put an end to practices that arti-
ficially segment the market. It is also the pur-
pose of the steps taken by the Commission in 
1996 to allow second mobile-telephone opera-
tors rapid, effective and non-discriminatory 
access to the licences that have to be issued by 
Member States. 
10. Similarly, the Commission continues to 
pursue an active State aid policy with a particu-
lar view to preventing the granting of aid that 
facilitates or results in the partition of markets. 
On the basis of Article 90(3) of the EC Treaty, it 
also pursues a determined policy of opening up 
markets, both through general measures and 
through specific action against measures taken 
by Member States. In 1996 the Commission 
thus put in place the necessary framework for 
the functioning of a liberalized telecommunica-
tions market by adopting two Directives, one on 
mobile and personal communications and the 
other on the complete opening-up of the 
telecommunications market to competition. 
4. Modernizing the instruments of 
competition policy 
11. If it is to perform its function fully, achieve 
the objectives assigned to it and contribute 
effectively to the well-being of European citi-
zens, competition policy must be able to 
This evidence was gathered as part of an extensive fact-finding 
exercise, entailing the completion of 39 specific studies and sur-
veys. The individual studies are scheduled for publication in 
early 1997. The principal conclusions from this analysis are 
reported in the Commission's communication (C0M(96) 520, 
30.10.1996) entitled 'The impact and effectiveness of the single 
market' and are fleshed out in detail in a Commission working 
document. A detailed presentation of the economic impact of 
single market completion is provided in the Special Edition of 
the European Economy series (March 1997).  13 modernize and adapt to a rapidly changing envi-
ronment. With the integration of markets at 
European level and globalization, firms are 
entering into mergers and cooperative arrange-
ments in order to achieve the critical size 
required, notably in terms of financing, and for 
research and development purposes. This has 
resulted in an increase in the number of cases 
with which the Commission has to deal. Fur-
thermore, the mergers and cooperative arrange-
ments are often entered into on oligopolistic 
markets with substantial entry barriers. Given 
this trend, the complexity and growing size of 
the markets to be analysed, a greater tendency 
for competitors to lodge complaints with the 
Commission and increased transparency 
requirements, there is a risk that cases could 
take longer to process, at the very time when the 
size of the relevant transactions and the speed 
with which changes are taking place on the mar-
kets increase the need for rapid decisions. 
12. In 1996 the Commission accordingly 
endeavoured to carry out the necessary modern-
ization of its competition policy instruments: 
— it endeavoured to take full account of the 
economic context and constraints specific to 
each market in dealing with the cases it 
examined, and this prompted it to look again 
at the concepts and instruments of economic 
analysis which it applies; 
— it took steps to improve the arrangements for 
cooperation with the competition authorities 
of the Member States, and also of non-mem-
ber countries, in order to ensure that each 
competition problem can be assessed within 
an appropriate framework and at an appro-
priate level; 
— it embarked on a major review of the rules 
which it applies, culminating in the drawing-
up and, in some cases, the adoption of new 
legislative provisions. 
whose geographical boundaries are similarly in 
a state of flux, places increased demands on the 
Commission and its staff in terms of economic 
analysis. This applies particularly to market def-
inition, the analysis of market power, the taking 
into account of potential competition and, more 
generally, the economic assessment called for 
under Article 85(3). 
These increased demands apply to the whole of 
competition policy, including vertical and hori-
zontal restrictions of competition, mergers, 
Article 90 cases and the monitoring of State aid. 
They are one of the factors underlying the 
review of vertical restrictions of competition 
being carried out on the basis of the Green 
Paper. 
4.2. Improving cooperation with Member 
States and international cooperation 
14. The Commission endeavours to promote 
the establishment of appropriate institutional 
arrangements for analysing competition issues 
in a framework that is consistent with the nature 
and scale of the problems involved. Such con-
sistency helps to ensure that the analysis takes 
greater account of the constraints and specific 
features associated with each sector. The Com-
mission took a number of steps in this direction 
in 1996. In the first place, it published a draft 
notice on the decentralized application of the 
competition rules. Secondly, it cooperated with 
the competition authorities of non-member 
countries on the basis of existing bilateral 
agreements, and it entered into negotiations on 
new bilateral agreements. Lastly, on 18 June, it 
adopted a communication to the Council 
proposing the setting-up, within the World 
Trade Organization, of a working party to begin 
exploratory work, starting in 1997, on the estab-
lishment of an international framework of com-
petition rules. 
4.3. Modernizing legislative instruments 
14 
4.1. Developing analytical instruments 
13. Defining markets and identifying the key 
factors governing competition are a permanent 
challenge to competition policy, particularly in 
markets which are in a state of rapid transition. 
A changing environment in which technological 
innovation is blurring the traditional distinc-
tions between the various product markets (as is 
the case, in the 'information society', with the 
boundaries between the information technol-
ogy, telecommunications and media markets), 
promoting the emergence of new markets 
15. The Commission believes that, if it is to 
respond properly to the challenges of an econ-
omic environment that is changing more rapidly 
than in the past, it must reassess and, if nec-
essary, recast the legislative and interpretative 
instruments at its disposal. It has accordingly 
taken a number of fundamental steps to mod-
ernize its legislative framework. 
16. Thus, the block exemption Regulations on 
patent and know-how licences, which had 
expired, have been replaced by a Regulation on 
technology transfers. This lays down a more INTRODUCTION 
flexible framework than previously so as to 
facilitate the rapid dissemination of innovation 
within the single market. 
17. Similarly, the Commission adopted on 10 
July a proposed amendment to the Merger Reg-
ulation. The aim of the proposal is to improve 
the division of tasks between the Commission 
and the Member States by lowering the thresh-
olds, establishing arrangements that will allow 
firms to solve the problem of multiple notifica-
tions in cases having cross-frontier effects 
below the thresholds and by introducing more 
flexible arrangements for the referral of cases to 
Member States. The proposal also provides that 
all full-function joint ventures would be inclu-
ded in the scope of the new Regulation. 
18. Lastly, in 1996 the Commission finalized 
its Green Paper on vertical restrictions of com-
petition, which was published in January 1997. 
The Green Paper presents an analysis of the 
trend in vertical distribution agreements and 
sets out several options for reconciling the two 
conflicting objectives of introducing more 
economic analysis so as to assess more fully 
whether Article 85(1) has been infringed and 
maintaining the high degree of legal certainty 
which firms have a right to expect. 
19. As regards air transport in particular, the 
growing number of alliances between the major 
European and non-European airlines prompted 
the Commission to look closely at such 
alliances, particularly those which affect air 
traffic across the North Atlantic. Its analysis 
showed that it lacks a standard means of direct-
ly examining infringements of Articles 85 and 
86 in the case of services provided between the 
Community and other countries and that it has 
to rely on the interim arrangements provided for 
in Article 89 of the Treaty. This is because the 
relevant Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 
3975/87 and 3976/87 do not apply to interna-
tional transport between Community and non-
Community airports. The Commission is there-
fore considering proposals for amending Coun-
cil regulations so as to have similar instruments 
to those available for ensuring the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty on routes 
within the European Union. 
20. The Commission continued its policy of 
focusing on those cases which it regards as hav-
ing a significant market impact and involving a 
real Community interest, dealing with them in 
depth within as tight deadlines as possible. For 
this purpose, it adopted a number of notices, 
some in draft and others in final form. 
On 10 July, with a view to stepping up its action 
against secret cartels, which remains a priority 
objective, the Commission adopted a notice on 
the non-imposition or reduction of fines for 
firms which cooperate with the Commission in 
providing information on certain types of 
unlawful agreements in which they have partici-
pated. 
The Commission also recently adopted a de 
minimis notice on State aid and a draft de min-
imis notice on agreements covered by Article 85 
so as to enable it to focus its action even more 
than previously on cases which are important 
from a competition policy point of view. In 
addition, the Commission continued its policy 
of asking the national authorities to deal with 
complaints that do not have sufficient Commu-
nity relevance. The means of implementing this 
policy are one of the issues dealt with in the 
draft notice on the arrangements for cooperation 
with national competition authorities in hand-
ling cases coming under Articles 85 and 86. The 
main purpose of the notice is to decentralize 
further the application of the competition rules 
so as to make them more effective. 
The Commission also presented to the Council 
a memorandum setting out various legislative 
measures designed to allow State aid projects of 
no economic importance or adequately covered 
by Community guidelines to be exempted from 
Community monitoring. These measures should 
allow the Commission to focus its resources on 
important cases or cases which raise doubts. 
5. Pursuing a policy of balanced 
liberalization that takes account 
of the general interest 
21. On 11 September the Commission adopted 
a communication on services of general interest 
in Europe which reaffirms that 'solidarity and 
equal treatment within an open and dynamic 
market economy are fundamental European 
Community objectives' and that these objec-
tives 'are furthered by services of general inter-
est'. By pointing out that 'the real challenge is 
to ensure smooth interplay between, on the one 
hand, the requirements of the single European 
market and free competition in terms of free 
movement, economic performance and 
dynamism and, on the other, the general interest 
objectives', the communication also makes it 
clear that the Community's approach to liberal-
ization is balanced and takes the general interest 
into account.  15 16 
22. The need to ensure that balance is main-
tained means that the Commission must adopt a 
prudent, gradual and balanced approach in 
applying Article 90 of the Treaty, which pro-
vides that the application of the rules contained 
in the Treaty, and in particular the rules on com-
petition, must remain compatible with the 
performance of services of general economic 
interest. 
In implementing Article 90 in the telecommuni-
cations and postal services sectors in 1996, the 
Commission stuck closely to these policy guide-
lines. The first Directives on telecommunica-
tions services, adopted in 1990, had recognized 
the need for operators to keep voice telephony 
under monopoly control for a certain period so 
as to allow a gradual shift to a system of compe-
tition.' It was only six years later, in 1996, when 
the results of consultations by the Commission 
with the various players in the sector showed 
clearly that a universal service could now be per-
fectly well maintained in the telecommunica-
tions sector without relying on exclusive rights, 
either for infrastructure or for voice telephony, 
that the Commission adopted, with the support 
of the European Parliament, a Directive on full 
liberalization of the sector. Similarly, as regards 
postal services, the Commission accepted as 
early as 1989,
2 well before the Corbeau judg-
ment,
1 that exclusive rights for basic postal ser-
vices were necessary in order to prevent private 
operators creaming off the most profitable activ-
ities and to maintain a universal service. It was 
on this basis that, in line with its policy of seek-
ing broad agreement on liberalization, the Com-
mission in 1996 initiated consultations on a draft 
Directive pursuant to Articles 57,66 and 100a of 
the Treaty and a draft Commission notice on 
Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the Treaty. 
23. Lastly, in its communication on services of 
general interest in Europe, the Commission 
came out against any amendment to Article 90 at 
the Intergovernmental Conference since Article 
90 has proved itself fully capable of ensuring 
positive interaction between liberalization and 
the general interest. By contrast, the Commis-
sion gave its support to the inclusion of a refer-
ence to services of general interest in the Treaty, 
recommending that Article 3 of the Treaty 
should include a new point (u): 'a contribution to 
the promotion of services of general interest'. 
6. Implementing competition policy in 
the new Member States 
24. Two years after Austria, Finland and Swe-
den joined the European Union, it is striking 
that, probably because their previous inclusion 
in the European Economic Area (EEA) enabled 
them, even prior to accession, to incorporate a 
large proportion of Community legislation into 
their national laws, the new Member States and 
their enterprises have adjusted very rapidly to 
Community competition rules. This rapid 
adjustment has been accompanied by the intro-
duction of appropriate legislative measures in 
each of the three Member States in order to 
bring their basic competition rules into line with 
those laid down by Community law, provide 
assistance to Community officials carrying out 
investigations on their national territory and 
transpose the directives adopted pursuant to 
Article 90(3). In addition, in the same way as in 
the other Member States, the Commission has 
established close and fruitful working relations 
with the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish compe-
tition authorities. This situation has allowed the 
new Member States to play their role fully and 
rapidly in Community competition policy. The 
only difficulties which have emerged involve 
the adjustment of monopolies of a commercial 
character to the requirements of Article 37 of 
the Treaty as interpreted by the Court. This is 
particularly the case with the tobacco monopoly 
in Austria, against which the Commission had 




25. The number of new cases in 1996, taking 
all the areas covered by competition policy 
(antitrust, mergers and State aid), is lower than 
in the previous year (down from 1 472 in 1995 
to 1 246 in 1996). It should be borne in mind 
that the 1995 figure is due in large part to the 
cases previously handled by the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority being transferred to the Com-
mission; the number of new cases in 1996 is still 
15% higher than in 1994. In contrast to Articles 
85 and 86 cases (where, nevertheless, the 
upward trend in the number of complaints con-
tinued) and State aid cases, the number of mer-
ger notifications rose again by almost 15%. 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on compe-
tition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 192, 
24.7.1990, paragraphs 18-20. 
Commission Decision 90/16/EEC of 20 December 1989 on the 
provision in the Netherlands of express delivery services, 
OJLI0, 12.1.1990, p. 47. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 May 1993 in Case C-
320/91 Corbeau [1993] ECR 1-2533; see also judgment of the 
Court of Justice of 27 April 1994 in Case C-393/92 Almelo 
[1994] ECR 1-1477. 
More detailed figures on the various areas of competition policy 
are given in the following chapters. INTRODUCTION 
26. The total number of cases closed was down 
on the previous year: 1 064 cases were dealt 
with in 1996, as against 1 210 in 1995. This is 
partly due to the growing complexity of the 
cases (and the time taken by some proceedings). 
In addition, DG IV has had to assume a number 
of additional, important, and resource-intensive 
priority tasks without extra resources, in particu-
lar with respect to the preparation of new legis-
lation measures, the Green Paper on vertical 
restraints and international cooperation. Finally, 
major efforts and time have been spent by DG 
IV staff preparing major reforms of management 
and administration to increase productivity. 
These reforms include increased use of prior-
ity/delegation in case handling, the introduction 
of targets for the speed of handling Article 85 
cases, a new internal mechanism for quickly and 
effectively dealing with 'simple' cases, and the 
preparation of new entry level and ongoing 
training courses. Implementation of these impor-
tant reforms will continue in 1997. 
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A — Changes in the legislative and 
interpretative rules 
1. Competition and the dissemination of 
innovation 
27. On 31 January, following a long consulta-
tion process with representatives of business 
and industry, the Commission adopted a new 
block exemption Regulation on technology 
transfer agreements.' The Regulation represents 
a step towards the creation of a legal environ-
ment that will promote technical innovation and 
its dissemination within the European Union, 
while at the same time ensuring that healthy 
competition and the completion of the single 
market are not affected. 
A number of factors, including in particular the 
recognition that technology transfers are a driv-
ing force in the economic development of the 
European Union, prompted the Commission to 
carry out a substantial simplification of the rules 
which have hitherto governed technology trans-
fer agreements. 
Such rules were contained in two block exemp-
tion Regulations on know-how and patent 
licensing agreements. However, the implemen-
tation of the two former Regulations was not 
without difficulties. These were mainly due to 
the over-interventionist approach of the Regula-
tions and to the uncertain legal arrangements 
applying to mixed agreements. The new Regu-
lation sets out to overcome these difficulties: it 
combines the previous block exemption Regu-
lations into a single legal instrument, with firms 
being covered by a single set of rules for patent 
licensing agreements, know-how licensing 
agreements and mixed patent and know-how 
licensing agreements. 
At the same time, the new Regulation comprises 
a series of improvements and simplifications 
and adopts a more relaxed approach to certain 
types of clause which are current practice in 
contracts and which affect the balance of power 
between the parties rather than the forces of 
competition. 
28. The structure of the new Regulation fol-
lows the established model for block exemp-
tions by drawing a distinction between 'white', 
'black' and 'grey' clauses. In the first place, the 
Regulation grants automatic exemption to all 
licensing agreements that include certain 
restrictions of competition normally caught by 
Article 85(1). These are essentially territorial 
restrictions between parties or between 
licensees, which are exempted for a limited 
period. Secondly, the Regulation contains a 
longer list of obligations that are not generally 
restrictive of competition and provides that, if 
they are caught by Article 85(1) because of the 
particular economic or legal context, they 
should also be covered by the exemption. 
Thirdly, there is a blacklist of clauses or restric-
tions whose inclusion in an agreement pre-
cludes the granting of the block exemption. This 
blacklist is much shorter than that contained in 
the two previous Regulations. It covers restric-
tions on prices and quantities, bans on exploit-
ing competing technologies, customer restric-
tions between competing manufacturers, oblig-
ations on licensees to assign improvements to 
the relevant technology and territorial restric-
tions for a longer duration than those exempted. 
Lastly, the Regulation provides for an opposi-
tion procedure under which exemption may be 
granted to agreements containing additional 
restrictions of competition not specified in the 
Regulation, provided that such agreements are 
notified to the Commission (under a simplified 
procedure) and that the Commission does not 
oppose the application of the exemption within 
four months (as opposed to six previously). Pre-
viously blacklisted clauses, such as the require-
ment that the licensee procure from the licensor 
goods or services which are not essential to 
technically appropriate exploitation of the 
licensed technology, and no-challenge clauses 
are subject to the opposition procedure. 
29. The Commission's concern to promote the 
rapid dissemination of technologies and innova-
tion in Europe is accompanied by a clear warn-
ing to firms holding large market shares on the 
relevant markets. It must be ensured that inter-
ested firms which are very strong on a market 
do not block the introduction of innovations 
which might compete with their own products 
or processes and might benefit other firms, par-
ticularly innovatory SMEs. Accordingly, the 
new Regulation allows the Commission to with-
draw the benefit of block exemption where the 
licensed products are not exposed to effective 
competition in the licensed territory. In its 
assessment of the conditions of competition, the 
Commission will pay particular attention to 
situations in which the licensee's market share 
exceeds a threshold of 40%. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 31, 9.2.1996, p. 2.  19 20 
2. Decentralizing the application of 
competition law 
30. The Commission continued its efforts to 
promote decentralized application of Articles 85 
and 86. 
31. Thus, it replied to questions put by Bel-
gian, French, German and Spanish courts pur-
suant to the notice on cooperation between 
national courts and the Commission in applying 
Articles 85 and 86.' 
32. In September the Commission published a 
draft notice on cooperation between national 
competition authorities and the Commission in 
handling cases falling within the scope of Arti-
cles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty.- The wording of 
the title of the notice reflects the Commission's 
desire to cover not only cases in which the 
national authorities apply Articles 85( 1 ) and 86, 
but also those in which the national authorities 
cannot or do not wish to apply only their nation-
al law. Of the 15 Member States, only seven 
have at present legislation that allows the rele-
vant national authority to apply Community law 
to cases falling within the scope of Community 
law, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal (Portugal cannot, how-
ever, impose fines for infringements of Commu-
nity law). The application of the notice to all ca-
ses falling within the scope of Community law is 
intended to ensure that national authorities do 
not adopt decisions which are incompatible with 
Community law, jeopardizing its uniform appli-
cation throughout the European Union. For this 
purpose, the draft Commission notice provides 
for machinery to ensure close liaison with" the 
national authorities and prevent contradictory 
decisions. However, the prevention of such con-
flicts is much easier if the national authorities 
apply Community law, and the Commission 
accordingly invites Member States which have 
not already done so to adopt legislation enabling 
their competition authorities to apply Articles 
85(1) and 86 effectively. 
The application of these provisions to all cases 
falling within the scope of Community law 
would be of great benefit to firms, since any 
such agreements they conclude or practices they 
enter into would be subject to only one set of 
rules throughout the Community. However, 
even if it does not provide the same legal cer-
tainty, the application of national laws that are 
closely modelled on Articles 85 and 86 may 
provide an alternative, provided that the way in 
which it is effected and the outcome achieved 
are sufficiently close to Community law. In this 
context, the Commission welcomes the contin-
uing move towards alignment with Community 
rules that is evident in the amendments to sev-
eral national laws. 
33. Reactions to the Commission's draft notice 
by professional bodies and law firms have been 
generally positive. Reactions from the Direc-
tors-General for Competition, at their meeting 
on 2 October, were similarly positive, and sev-
eral of the Directors-General presented useful 
written contributions. The Commission also 
welcomes the positive contribution of the 
Economic and Social Committee, which deliv-
ered a substantial opinion on the published 
draft. While welcoming the goal pursued by the 
Commission in its notice, the Economic and 
Social Committee considers that effective 
decentralization requires more incisive action, 
such as the revision of Regulation No 17 and the 
harmonization of national competition laws, 
especially procedural rules. The Commission 
will take careful account of the suggestions 
received in order to improve the clarity, speed 
and legal certainty of the arrangements provid-
ed for in the draft notice. However, it must 
emphasize that the draft notice is intended to 
form part of the current legal framework in 
which the Commission has sole power to grant 
exemptions under Article 85(3). 
3. Notice on the non-imposition of fines 
34. On 10 July the Commission adopted a 
notice on the non-imposition or reduction of 
fines in cartel cases.' 
The notice, which is modelled on successful 
policies pursued in the United States and Can-
ada, adjusted to suit the specific European situa-
tion, is intended to give the Commission an 
additional instrument in its campaign against 
the most harmful types of cartel. It applies to 
secret cartels aimed at fixing prices, production 
or sales quotas, sharing markets or banning 
imports or exports. Such agreements are the 
most harmful to consumers and, generally, to 
the European economy. They result in higher 
prices and less choice for the customers of the 
firms who engage in them and, ultimately, for 
Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commis-
sion in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 39, 
13.2.1993, p. 6. 
OJ C 262, 10.9.1996. See also XXIIIrd Competition Repon. 
points 190-191; XXIVlll Competition Report, points 40-42; 
XXVth Competition Report, points 94-95. 
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the final consumer. Such practices also dissuade 
firms from pursuing technical innovation and 
deprive them of the business dynamism that 
results from normal competition. Lastly, in the 
long term, they lead to a loss of competitiveness 
in those sectors of European industry in which 
they exist and, in an increasingly global market 
place, reduced employment opportunities. 
Combating such agreements is thus a priority 
task for the Commission. However, it is also a 
difficult task and one which is costly in terms of 
human resources. Some firms use highly 
sophisticated methods to conceal such agree-
ments. By reducing or indeed waiving the fine 
which would normally have been imposed, the 
Commission has sought to provide sufficiently 
strong incentives to break down the wall of 
silence surrounding secret cartels. 
35. Following the publication of the draft 
notice inviting interested parties to submit their 
comments,
1 some business organizations ob-
jected that the proposed measures were unethi-
cal since they would institutionalize informing 
and denunciation. The Commission rejected this 
argument, which reversed the order of values. It 
felt that, on the contrary, it was the maintenance 
of silence on the most damaging types of cartel 
that was objectionable. It cited the position ta-
ken by the Court of First Instance, which held 
that, rather than participating in anti-competi-
tive activities, a firm could complain to the 
competent authorities about the pressure 
brought to bear on it and lodge a complaint with 
the Commission under Regulation No 17.
2 Nor 
did the Commission accept criticisms that the 
proposed system was a new one that did not fit 
in with the European legal tradition. The 
absence of any similar provision in Member 
States' competition laws was not sufficient rea-
son for not adopting a new approach that would 
give the Commission greater scope for taking 
action against the most serious infringements of 
the competition rules. In any case, the notice 
consolidates to a large extent an established 
practice which has long been accepted by the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, 
with many Commission decisions taking 
account of the degree of cooperation by firms 
during the investigation in determining the 
amount of the fine. 
Lastly, it should be noted that a number of firms 
have approached the Commission on the basis 
of the notice since its publication. The Commis-
sion hopes that the notice will dissuade firms 
from engaging in the most harmful and repre-
hensible anti-competitive practices. 
4. Agreements of minor importance 
36. On 22 January 1997 the Commission 
adopted a draft revised notice on agreements of 
minor importance which do not fall under Arti-
cle 85(1) of the EC Treaty.' The current 1986 
notice,
4 which was first issued in 1970
5 and last 
amended in 1994,
6 gives tangible expression, 
with the help of quantitative criteria, to the 
established case-law of the Court of Justice 
under which agreements that restrict competi-
tion are not caught by the ban on restrictive 
agreements if they are unlikely to have an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member 
States and on competition within the common 
market.
7 The Commission took the view that 
agreements concluded between firms whose 
combined turnover does not exceed ECU 300 
million a year and whose combined market 
shares do not amount to more than 5% are not 
covered by Article 85(1). 
In practice, the notice has mainly served as an 
administrative instrument allowing the Com-
mission to process rapidly an impressive num-
ber of cases that were of only minor impor-
tance.
8 However, it has not provided firms with 
a satisfactory degree of legal certainty. One of 
the main objectives of the review of the current 
notice is to remedy this shortcoming. 
37. The Commission proposes to abolish the 
turnover threshold which restricted the scope of 
the notice to promoting cooperation between 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
There is no convincing economic or legal argu-
ment for excluding large firms holding modest 
market shares from the scope of the de minimis 
rule. Extending the notice to cover all firms will 
not harm the interests of SMEs. On the contrary, 
their interests will be furthered by the Commis-
sion's undertaking not to take any action in 
respect of SMEs even where their market shares 
exceed the new de minimis threshold that will 
apply in the revised notice. The new notice will 
thus also reflect the new policy on SMEs, as set 
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out in the Commission recommendation of 3 
April 1996.' 
5c?. So as to take account of the economic real­
ities of the single market, the new notice should 
draw a clear distinction between horizontal and 
vertical agreements. In the case of horizontal 
agreements, the market share threshold will be 
maintained at its current level of 5%. In the case 
of vertical agreements, which are generally less 
harmful to competition, the threshold should be 
increased to 10%. However, the applicability of 
Article 85(1) cannot be ruled out in the case of 
certain agreements which, by their very nature, 
represent serious restrictions of competition, 
including the fixing of prices, production quotas 
or sales quotas, and the sharing of markets or 
sources of supply. Even so, the Commission 
would take action on such agreements only, and 
exceptionally, to the extent that the Community 
interest so required, and in particular in cases 
where they affected the proper functioning of 
the single market. It is primarily for national 
authorities and courts to deal with serious 
restrictions of competition below the thresh­
olds. 
39. Before adopting the new notice, the Com­
mission will carry out wide-ranging consulta­
tions with all interested parties, namely repre­
sentatives of business and industry, consumers, 
Member States (already consulted on a pre­
liminary draft) and the other Community 
institutions. 
5. Access to the file 
40. In the light of the case-law of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of First Instance, in par­
ticular the CFI judgments in the Soda-ash 
cases,
2 and in order to provide greater trans­
parency for firms, the Commission decided to 
systematize and clarify its practice regarding 
access to the file by adopting a notice on the 
internal rules of procedure for processing 
requests for access to the file in cases pursuant 
to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Articles 
65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89.
3 
41. The notice deals with two questions, 
namely the scope and limits of access to the file, 
and the practical procedures for access.
4 
As the purpose of providing access to the file is 
to enable the addressees of a statement of objec­
tions to express their views on the conclusions 
reached by the Commission, the firms in ques­
tion must have access to all the documents 
making up the 'file' of the Commission (DG 
IV), apart from the categories of documents 
identified in the Hercules judgment,
5 namely the 
business secrets of other undertakings, internal 
Commission documents and other confidential 
information. 
Thus, not all the documents collected in the 
course of an investigation are communicable, 
and the notice sets out criteria for distinguishing 
between non-communicable and communicable 
documents. 
42. A number of new administrative and prac­
tical provisions are introduced as from the initi­
ation of investigations in order to facilitate sub­
sequent access to the file. Firstly, in order to 
simplify administration and increase efficiency, 
internal documents will in future be placed in 
the file of internal documents relating to cases 
under investigation (non-accessible) containing 
all internal documents in chronological order. 
Some documents obtained by the Commission 
during investigations into firms will normally 
be returned to the firms as rapidly as possible if, 
following a detailed examination, they prove to 
be irrelevant to the case in question. New inter­
nal rules of procedure applied throughout the 
examination of a case are intended to make it 
easier to determine whether documents are 
accessible or non-accessible. Another new pro­
cedural rule relates to the drawing-up of an enu-
merative list of documents; the list will include 
consecutive numbering of all the pages in the 
investigation file and an indication of the degree 
of accessibility of the document and the parties 
with authorized access. 
43. As a general rule, firms are invited to 
examine accessible documents on the Commis­
sion's premises. If the file is not too bulky, 
the Commission may ask the firm whether it 
wishes to have all the accessible documents 
sent by post. 
44. These arrangements for access to files 
should be easily applicable except in the case of 
OJL 107, 30.4.1996, p. 4. 
Judgments of the Court of First Instance of 29 June 1995 in 
Cases T-30/91 Solvay ν Commission, T-36/91 ICI ν Commission 
and T-37/91 ICI ν Commission [1995] ECR 11-1775, 1847 and 
1901. 
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ongoing files already compiled prior to the 
adoption of the new arrangements; such files 
will therefore have to be treated on a case-by-
case basis. 
45. Access to the file is a key element in 
administrative proceedings, enabling firms to 
defend themselves properly, while reconciling 
the need to protect sensitive information and the 
public interest in having infringements of the 
competition rules brought to an end. The Com-
mission believes that the new procedures will 
provide a pragmatic and effective solution to 
most of the problems encountered in connection 
with access to the file, while ensuring that firms 
are fully able to exercise their right to be heard. 
6. Green Paper on vertical restraints 
46. The Commission adopted on 22 January 
1997 the Green Paper on vertical restraints in 
EU competition policy.' With this paper all 
interested parties are invited to participate in the 
discussion on this important part of EU compe-
tition policy by submitting their comments 
before 31 July 1997. 
47. The single market represents an opportu-
nity for EU firms to enter new markets that may 
have been previously closed to them because of 
State barriers. This penetration of new markets 
takes time and investment and is risky. The 
process is often facilitated by agreements 
between the producer who wants to break into a 
new market and a local distributor. 
However, arrangements between producers and 
distributors can also be used to continue the par-
titioning of the market or exclude new entrants 
who would intensify competition and bring 
about downward pressure on prices. Agree-
ments between producers and distributors (ver-
tical restraints) can therefore be used pro-com-
petitively to promote market integration and 
efficient distribution or anti-competitively to 
block integration and competition. 
48. Because of their strong links to market 
integration that can be either positive or nega-
tive, vertical restraints have been of particular 
importance to the Community's competition 
policy. Whilst this policy has been successful in 
over 30 years of application, a review is neces-
sary because: 
— the single market legislation is now largely 
in place; 
— the Commission block exemption Regula-
tions governing vertical restraints are to 
expire by the end of 1999; 
— there have been major changes in methods of 
distribution that may have implications for 
competition policy in the field of vertical 
restraints; and 
— current economic thinking suggests the 
importance of market structure in determin-
ing the impact of vertical restraints. The 
fiercer interbrand competition is, the more 
likely the pro-competitive and efficiency 
effects are to outweigh any anti-competitive 
effects of vertical restraints. 
49. As part of the exercise to collect 'back-
ground information for the Green Paper, the 
Commission conducted a series of interviews 
with manufacturers, retailers, industry, trade 
and consumer associations and specialist aca-
demics. Certain criticisms were made about the 
structure and application of current Commis-
sion policy on vertical restraints and block 
exemptions, as well as several requests for 
changes or adaptations. The most commonly 
heard points were: 
— the current block exemptions lacked flexibil-
ity, have a straitjacket effect and are over-
regulatory; 
— too much emphasis is put on analysis of 
clauses and not enough on the economic 
impact of the agreements. A more rigorous 
policy could be applied through a more 
active policy of withdrawal of block exemp-
tions; 
— one-stop-shopping is vital, as is legal cer-
tainty which might be lost if the block 
exemption approach were abandoned; 
— if the block exemption approach is main-
tained, it should be more flexible, less 
dirigiste and wider in scope. For example, 
one non-exemptible clause should not cause 
nullity of the whole exemption, and block 
exemptions could include intermediate 
goods and not only goods for resale as at 
present. 
The Green Paper is published as document COM(96) 721. 
It is also available in all Community languages on 
the World Wide Web, on the Europa server at: 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm.  23 50. The Green Paper asks for .comments on 
four options:' 
Option I — Maintain current system: 
would preserve the current approach. 
This 
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Option II — Wider block exemptions: This 
option consists of maintaining the current 
approach and the many advantages of block 
exemptions but responding to criticisms made 
by making them more flexible, cover more situ­
ations and be less regulatory. 
Option III — More focused block exemptions: 
Because considerable price differences still 
remain in the single market, because vertical 
restraints can be anti-competitive when at least 
coupled with market power and because intra-
brand competition is important especially when 
interbrand competition is not fierce, this option 
proposes to limit the exemption given by cur­
rent block exemptions to companies with mar­
ket shares below a certain threshold (for exam­
ple 40%). 
Option IV — Reduce scope of Article 85(1): As 
a response to the criticisms that block exemp­
tions have had a straitjacket effect and that Arti­
cle 85(1) has been applied too widely to vertical 
restraints without reference to their economic 
and market context, this option proposes for 
parties with a market share less than, for exam­
ple, 20% to introduce a rebuttable presumption 
of compatibility with Article 85(1) ('the nega­
tive clearance presumption'). 
Β — Applying the competition 
rules to support 
market integration 
1. Partitioning the common market by 
means of distribution agreements 
or practices 
51. A number of Commission decisions in 
1996 bear witness to the fact that Community 
rules on restrictive practices and abuses of dom­
inant positions continue to play a fundamental 
role in the creation and consolidation of the sin­
gle market. In the distribution field, the under­
lying principle is that, while certain restrictions 
may be authorized with a view to improving 
distribution, they must not be excessive and, in 
particular, they must never lead to a total parti­
tioning of markets. 
52. The Commission again applied this well-
established basic principle in a Decision of 4 
December in which it fined Systemform GmbH, 
a German manufacturer of machinery for hand­
ling large computer printouts, for having oper­
ated a distribution system that divided up the 
European market for its products along national 
lines. The distribution contracts between Sys­
temform and its exclusive distributors in several 
Member States contained a total ban on the dis­
tributor selling Systemform products outside its 
allotted territory. Most of the contracts also con­
tained a ban on supplying customers established 
in the allotted territory who proposed to export 
the products. In addition, the contracts limited 
distributors' freedom to set their own resale 
prices. 
53. A partitioning of the common market may 
also be the result of a commercial policy or 
strategy within a group of undertakings oper­
ating in different Member States through 
subsidiaries. 
In such circumstances, the Commission's scope 
for action would be relatively limited. Accord­
ing to the case-law of the Court of Justice,- rela­
tions between undertakings in the same group 
are not covered by Article 85(1) of the EC 
Treaty. That is not to say that some methods of 
organizing distribution within a group of under­
takings which is in a dominant position are not 
to be considered an abuse within the meaning of 
Article 86 where they have the effect of parti­
tioning the common market. For this reason the 
Commission voiced its opposition to that part of 
a draft internal circular of the Belgian brewery 
Interbrew which governed the marketing policy 
to be followed by its subsidiaries in Europe, 
including the obligation on the part of those 
subsidiaries to transfer orders placed by pur­
chasers of products intended for consumption in 
another country to the subsidiary responsible 
for that territory. The Commission considered 
that this commercial strategy would have the 
effect of partitioning the common market, there­
by enabling Interbrew to exploit more readily 
its dominant position on the Belgian beer mar­
ket by protecting that market from price compe­
tition from its own beers originating in other 
Member States. 
These options are not exhaustive and individual elements from 
the different options may be combined. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 October 1996 in Case C-
73/95-P Viho Europe BV ν Commission (not yet reported). I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
2. Vehicle distribution 
54. Since 1 October 1996 the new block 
exemption Regulation relating to the distribu-
tion and servicing of motor vehicles' is fully 
applicable to all selective and exclusive motor 
vehicle distribution and servicing agreements 
described therein, irrespective of their date of 
conclusion. Like the previous one,
: a core prin-
ciple of the new Regulation is the freedom for 
European consumers to purchase a new motor 
vehicle, either directly or through an authorized 
intermediary, wherever they wish in the Euro-
pean Union. Contractual provisions which 
restrict this freedom by the manufacturer, the 
supplier or another undertaking within the net-
work are blacklisted and are automatically void. 
Where such infringements take place, con-
sumers can take action before the competent 
national courts, which can — in contrast to the 
Commission — grant more easily injunctions 
and award damages. However, the Commission 
is likely to intervene where undertakings, 
through anticompetitive agreements or prac-
tices, isolate national markets by restricting par-
allel trade. It will be recalled that, in its biannu-
al studies on car price differentials,' the Com-
mission found that car prices within the Com-
munity still differ substantially. As price differ-
ences are the strongest incentive for parallel 
trade, end consumers increasingly seek to pur-
chase a vehicle in Member States where prices 
and other sale conditions are the most 
favourable. 
55. Since the beginning of 1994, the Commis-
sion has received numerous complaints from 
final consumers who have experienced major 
difficulties in buying cars outside their own 
Member State. As a result, the Commission has 
carried out inspections to find out whether some 
motor vehicle manufacturers have developed a 
strategy, together with their Italian contract 
partners, aimed at hindering German, French 
and, in particular, Austrian final consumers 
from acquiring a vehicle on favourable terms in 
Italy and thus benefiting from the advantages of 
the internal market. On the basis of documents 
collected during these inspections, the Commis-
sion has concluded, on a provisional basis, that 
the undertakings concerned pursued such a 
strategy. It therefore sent, in October, a state-
ment of objections to two car manufacturers, 
charging them with infringement of the compe-
tition rules and giving them the opportunity to 
present their point of view. A final conclusion in 
this case is expected in 1997. 
Apart from complaints concerning the Italian 
market, the Commission has had to deal with a 
number of complaints by end consumers which 
concerned other Member States (such as Den-
mark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Spain), where dealers either refused to sell to 
non-residents or were prepared to sell only at a 
higher price or imposed certain requirements on 
end consumers or intermediaries acting on their 
behalf. Further complaints referred to dealers 
who refused to honour manufacturers' war-
ranties for vehicles imported from other Mem-
ber States. While some of these cases were set-
tled after the Commission's active intervention, 
others required further investigation with manu-
facturers and/or their respective importers. 
56. Manufacturers or suppliers usually give 
clear guidelines to their dealers on the kind of 
authorization which an intermediary, appointed 
by a final consumer, has to present. This is to 
ensure that unauthorized resellers do not mas-
querade as intermediaries. 
Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on motor vehicle 
distribution establishes a balance between the 
supplier's interest in safeguarding its selective 
dealer network and the interest of European 
consumers in buying a car within the Commu-
nity wherever they wish to do so (see Article 
3(10) and (11) and point 7 of Article 6(1) of the 
Regulation). When dealing with individual 
cases, the Commission takes the view that this 
balance has to be reflected in the requirements 
which manufacturers and suppliers demand of 
an intermediary's authorization. Certain 
requirements appear to exceed the limits of the 
block exemption Regulation as they may hinder 
parallel trade. They include limiting the validity 
for purchase and collection of a car together to 
a period of three months; asking for a witnessed 
signature or that the document be certified by a 
notary; and disclosing the amount of the inter-
mediary's commission and the payment for the 
service provided. Thus, if manufacturers or sup-
pliers ask their dealers to accept only authoriza-
tions containing such requirements, they risk 
automatically losing the benefit of the block 
exemption. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories 
of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, 
OJ L 145, 29.6.1995. See also XXVth Competition Report. 
points 31 -34. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 
1984, OJ LI5, 18.1.1985, p. 16. 
Press release IP/96/145, 15.2.1996, and press release IP/96/722, 
29.7.1996.  25 26 
3. Pharmaceutical products 
57. In 1996 the Commission once more inves­
tigated restrictions on parallel trade in pharma­
ceutical products. The differences — often sub­
stantial — in the price charged for the same 
product from one Member State to another, 
which are due to a large extent to the diversity 
of national price control and social security sys­
tems, induce certain operators to make a profit 
by engaging in parallel trade. This may lead to 
cheaper drugs in those Member States where 
prices are high, thereby benefiting consumers, 
social security schemes and, ultimately, the 
exchequer. 
In applying the competition rules in this sector, 
the Commission also follows the logic of the 
single market. It has waged a steady campaign 
against agreements and conduct restricting par­
allel trade in pharmaceutical products. In this it 
enjoys the support of the Court of Justice. In a 
recent case involving the principle of the free 
movement of goods and the protection of indus­
trial and commercial property under Article 36 
of the EC Treaty,' the Court found in favour of 
two British firms, Primecrown and Europharm, 
which wished to import pharmaceutical prod­
ucts sold in Spain with a view to reselling them 
in the United Kingdom. The existence of price 
controls and the lack of any patents in Spain and 
Portugal mean that drugs are cheap in those 
countries. The Court reaffirmed the preemi­
nence of the principle of the free movement of 
goods and rejected the argument to the effect 
that parallel imports should be prohibited where 
national price control measures distort competi­
tion. 
58. The Commission Decision of 10 January 
in the Adalat case exemplifies the application of 
this policy of combating measures which parti­
tion the common market. The price of the drug 
Adalat marketed by the Bayer group varies con­
siderably from one Member State to another. In 
the United Kingdom in particular, the price at 
which it is sold is far higher than in Fiance and 
Spain. Pharmaceutical wholesalers in France 
and Spain used to order larger quantities of 
Adalat than they required for supplying their 
domestic market, the surpluses being exported 
to the United Kingdom. To Bayer, these parallel 
exports were a major commercial problem. It 
reacted by setting up systems for identifying 
exporting wholesalers and by reducing the 
quantities supplied. The wholesalers for their 
part tried by various means to obtain additional 
quantities, for example by spreading orders 
intended for export between their various 
agencies and by placing orders through other 
wholesalers not subject to monitoring by Bayer. 
When one of the wholesalers was found to be 
exporting, Bayer penalized him by imposing 
successive reductions in the volumes supplied. 
In its Decision the Commission found that the 
conduct of Bayer France and Bayer Spain 
showed that they had imposed an export ban 
which formed part of the continuing commer­
cial relations between themselves and their 
respective wholesalers. There was thus an 
agreement within the meaning of Article 85(1) 
which had the object and effect of restricting 
parallel trade.
2 The Commission took account of 
the existence of various national rules and regu­
lations on price formation in the pharmaceuti­
cals sector as an attenuating factor in fixing the 
amount of the fine it imposed on Bayer. 
C — Practices employed by 
dominant firms 
to eliminate competitors 
59. Community law prohibits anti-competitive 
behaviour by firms that are in a dominant posi­
tion on the market. Certain competitive behav­
iour, which would not normally infringe EC 
competition rules, may do so when implement­
ed by firms in a dominant position. This 
approach is justified by the much more signifi­
cant impact which the behaviour of such firms 
has on competition. This is all the more true 
where firms engage in exclusionary practices, 
i.e. conduct which eliminates a competitor or 
restricts or impedes its activities. While a dom­
inant firm is entitled to defend its position by 
competing with rivals, it has a special responsi­
bility not to further diminish the degree of com­
petition remaining on the market.' Exclusionary 
practices may be directed against existing com­
petitors on the market or they may be intended 
to impede market access by new entrants. 
Examples of such illegal behaviour include: 
refusal to deal as a means of eliminating a 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 December 1996 in Joined 
Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95 Merck & Co. ν Primecrown, 
Beecham ν Europharm (not yet reported). 
In an order made in response to an application for interim meas­
ures, the Court of First Instance suspended Article 2 of the Com­
mission Decision, which requires Bayer to send a circular to 
French and Spanish wholesalers stating that exports are permit­
ted and will not cause any penalty to be incurred and to include 
that information in the general conditions of sale (order of the 
Court of First Instance of 3 June 1996 in Case T-41/96 R Bayer 
AG ν Commission [1996] ECR 11-383). 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 9 November 1983 in Case 
322/81 Michelin ν Commission [ 1983] ECR 3461, at 3511. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
competitor by a firm that is the sole or dominant 
source of supply of a product or that controls 
access to an essential technology or infrastruc-
ture; predatory pricing; exclusionary dealing 
agreements; discrimination as part of a wider 
pattern of monopolizing conduct designed to 
exclude competitors; and exclusionary rebate 
schemes. 
60. A look at the cases dealt with by the Com-
mission in 1996 shows that this type of restric-
tive conduct frequently occurs in different sec-
tors. In particular, the Commission has been 
dealing more often with such problems in sec-
tors which are in the process of liberalization 
such as telecommunications,' transport
2 and 
energy.' But other sectors are also concerned. 
61. For example, the Commission intervened 
to establish competition in the Finnish market 
for amusement machines, a previously monop-
olized sector. The State monopoly for the oper-
ation of amusement machines in Finland ended 
at the beginning of 1995. However, Pelika RAY, 
the Finnish State-owned company that operates 
amusement machines in over 2 000 indepen-
dently owned premises in Finland, had conclu-
ded contracts preventing the owners of the 
premises taking amusement machines from any 
of its new competitors. Following discussions 
with the Commission, Pelika RAY has volun-
tary lifted this restriction, so allowing effective 
competition between itself and other operators 
and increasing consumer choice. 
62. Novo Nordisk, Europe's leading insulin 
producer, introduced in 1985 a new method of 
insulin self-injection, the so-called 'insulin pen' 
system. Other companies now also produce 
similar pen delivery systems, including manu-
facture of various components (i.e. injection 
devices, cartridges containing the insulin 
dosage, and disposable needles), some of which 
are compatible with the Novo Nordisk system. 
Following a complaint by a medical device 
manufacturer, the Commission found that Novo 
Nordisk abusively disclaimed liability for the 
malfunction of its pen products, or refused to 
guarantee such products, when they were used 
in conjunction with the compatible components 
of other manufacturers. Following discussions 
with the Commission, Novo Nordisk agreed no 
longer to use disclaimers in such circumstances. 
63. Following a public statement by the Com-
petition Commissioner, Visa International 
decided to abandon an exclusive dealing plan, 
i.e. a rule that would have banned its members 
from issuing competing cards in Europe. 
According to the Commission, the proposed 
rule would have impaired competition among 
banks and credit card systems. 
64. In 1996 the Commission also opened a for-
mal procedure against AC Nielsen Company 
(Nielsen) for infringement of Article 86. Fol-
lowing a complaint by Information Resources 
Inc. (IRI), the Commission found that Nielsen 
abused its dominant position in the European 
markets for retail tracking services in order to 
prevent IRI from establishing a competitive 
presence there. In particular, Nielsen had con-
cluded exclusivity contracts for the purchase of 
market data from retailers as well as contracts 
including restriction of the retailer's freedom to 
supply data to any competing retail tracking ser-
vices provider. Moreover, in relation to the sale 
of services to multinational customers, Nielsen 
applied discounts in exchange for commitments 
from customers to call upon its services in a 
wide range of countries. This involved the 
bundling of countries where Nielsen was in a 
dominant position in countries that IRI was 
entering. 
Soon after receiving the Commission's state-
ment of objections, Nielsen indicated its will-
ingness to reach a settlement with the Commis-
sion. The case was finally settled in Novem-
ber by an undertaking from Nielsen which ad-
dresses the main competition concerns and 
ensures a level playing field in the European 
markets for retail tracking services. It should be 
noted that the Antitrust Division of the US 
Department of Justice was also investigating 
Nielsen's contractual practices. As most of the 
alleged abuses took place in Europe, the Com-
mission took the lead in investigating them. 
This was done in close cooperation with the US 
Department of Justice, which included 
exchanges of confidential information with the 
consent of the parties. In view of the results 
achieved on the European side, the US Depart-
ment of Justice also decided to close its investi-
gation. 
D — Information society 
65. Competition policy continues to play a 
highly active role in enabling the information 
society to grow, both in terms of infrastructure 
See points D.2, D.3 and D.4 of this chapter. 
See Chapter lì.E below. 
See Section F of this chapter.  27 28 
and in terms of services. There were a number 
of significant developments in 1996, not only in 
relation to restrictive practices and dominant 
positions, but also in relation to liberalization' 
and merger control.
2 
The liberalization of most information society 
markets has, depending on the services, already 
been achieved, been set in train or been decided 
on for 1998 (with a few derogations). An 
important factor is the rapid pace of technologi-
cal change, which necessitates substantial 
investment in order to develop products and the 
requisite infrastructure and considerable mar-
keting expenditure in order to convince users to 
adopt the new services. Some aspects of the 
information society are rapidly becoming glob-
alized, and in this context the European Union 
is pursuing a policy of openness (with the 
exception of certain cultural matters) which will 
increase both the growth of the European mar-
ket, external competition and the need for com-
petitiveness on the part of European enterprises 
in this sector. 
1. Restructuring operations 
66. These developments are triggering numer-
ous restructuring operations in the telecommu-
nications and media sectors in the form of mer-
gers, alliances and joint ventures. The Commis-
sion is favourably disposed towards this process 
of adjustment. Such restructuring is on the 
whole necessary if firms are to benefit fully 
from liberalization, carry out the necessary 
research and development, launch new services 
and reduce costs. On the other hand, the liberal-
ization process must not be called into question 
by restructuring operations which would have 
the effect of perpetuating excessive price levels, 
preventing new companies from entering previ-
ously monopolistic markets, or any other abuse 
or strengthening of a dominant position. Com-
petition policy as it relates to the information 
society is therefore a balance between, on the 
one hand, a liberal attitude towards restructur-
ing and, on the other, the need to keep a watch-
ful eye on how such restructuring is carried out, 
or even to impose a ban in some cases. There is 
also a link between the degree of actual liberal-
ization of the relevant markets, which evolves 
over time, and the conditions which may be 
attached to restructuring operations. In particu-
lar, the acceptability of alliances, which are 
often pro-competitive outside domestic mar-
kets, must be assessed in the light of the extent 
to which those markets have been liberalized. 
67. Proceeding on this basis, in July the Com-
mission authorized the Atlas project, a joint 
venture between France Télécom (FT) and 
Deutsche Telekom (DT) aimed at providing 
telecommunications services to large users in 
Europe. The services provided by Atlas include 
network services, outsourcing and very small 
aperture satellite (VSAT) services. The Com-
mission also authorized the proposed Glo-
balOne joint venture, an alliance between Atlas 
and Sprint Corporation for the supply of the 
above services worldwide. Within GlobalOne, 
the parties will also provide traveller services 
and telecommunications services to other 
telecommunications organizations. 
In the relevant markets, the services provided to 
corporate users raise important issues to do with 
competition in the EEA. This is the case, for 
example, with the market for the transmission 
of data via terrestrial networks, DT and FT hav-
ing market shares there well in excess of 70% in 
Germany and France respectively, buttressed by 
a legal monopoly over the supply of infrastruc-
ture. In addition, the Atlas project provided for 
the elimination of a competitor of DT in Ger-
many, namely FT's local subsidiary, Info AG. 
In the course of the proceedings, France and 
Germany first of all undertook to liberalize the 
alternative infrastructures, thereby making 
competitors less dependent on the networks of 
FT and DT. The Commission made the 
Atlas/GlobalOne authorization conditional on 
the granting of the first two infrastructure 
licences in France and Germany. This condition 
was met on l December 1996.' Secondly, DT 
and FT have postponed the transfer of their 
domestic data transmission networks to the joint 
venture pending full liberalization of infrastruc-
ture in France and Germany. Thirdly, FT has 
undertaken to sell Info AG. 
This modified contractual framework, and the 
strict conditions and obligations, will help to 
ensure that Atlas/GlobalOne does not eliminate 
competition. Exemption is also conditional on 
there being no discrimination or cross-subsidiz-
ation. Should these conditions no longer be ful-
filled, the exemption will be withdrawn. More 
generally, the two projects will satisfy the bur-
geoning demand for telecommunications ser-
vices and will compete head-on with the few 
providers of such services worldwide. 
See Chapter II below. 
See Chapter III below. 
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68. The Commission proposes to adopt the 
same approach in its scrutiny of the notifica-
tions of the Unisource and Uniworld alliances, 
which is now under way. 
It has published two notices which indicate that 
it intends to take a favourable view of the 
Unìsource/Telefónica and Uniworld cases, sub-
ject to the comments of interested third parties. 
Unisource is an alliance between PTT Telecom 
of the Netherlands, Telia of Sweden and Swiss 
PTT, which is being joined by Telefonica of 
Spain. The Uniworld transaction is an alliance 
between Unisource and AT&T. The Commis-
sion's favourable view follows discussions with 
all the companies concerned as well as with the 
governments of Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland. 
Both notices explain in detail changes to the 
original agreements and undertakings given by 
the parties to make the transactions acceptable 
under EU competition law. In addition, the 
Unisource-Telefónica notice explains discus-
sions with the governments of the four countries 
directly involved in Unisource. 
The main features of the outcome of the discus-
sions are as follows: 
— full liberalization of the telecommunications 
market in Spain by 30 November 1998, with 
three licences being granted by 1 January 
1998 plus limited licences for the cable TV 
companies to offer telecommunications 
within their areas; 
— full liberalization of telecommunications in 
Switzerland from 1 January 1998; and 
— in respect of the Uniworld transaction, a 
series of undertakings have been offered by 
AT&T in respect of its conduct on intercon-
nection, access and accounting rates. 
2. Telecommunications tariffs 
69. Until 1 January 1998 national operators 
will retain their monopoly over the provision of 
public voice telephony. The Commission has 
already indicated on a number of occasions that 
it will keep a particularly watchful eye during 
the intervening period on such operators under 
the Treaty's competition rules. It will try to pre-
vent them from gaining a competitive advan-
tage over new market entrants by employing 
abusive practices and from imposing unjustified 
price increases on residential customers. 
70. In many European Union countries, how-
ever, a rebalancing of tariffs might be justified 
in the light of costs. Local tariffs are often 
lower than costs and long-distance and interna-
tional tariffs are generally much higher in the 
EU, whereas the nascent competition in interna-
tional communications is forcing the corre-
sponding prices downwards. The Commission 
encourages the rebalancing of tariffs in so far as 
it reflects commercial adaptation to competi-
tion. Nevertheless, until full liberalization is 
achieved, close attention must be paid to the 
effects and motivation of tariff reforms. In this 
run-up period there is a risk that incumbent 
telecommunications operators may restructure 
their tariffs in such a way as to exploit the dif-
ference between increasing price elasticities in 
the competitive markets and the lower price 
elasticity (due* to the absence of competition) in 
the others. This could harm the new suppliers of 
liberalized services, by 'price squeezing' them 
out of the market. Lastly, the rebalancing of tar-
iffs must respect the universal service principle, 
a crucial aspect of the liberalization of telecom-
munications in Europe. 
71. A concrete example of the application of 
this policy concerns the introduction by 
Deutsche Telekom of new business customer 
tariffs. DT originally planned to reduce substan-
tially its tariffs for large users, where it faced 
competition from new market entrants. At the 
same time, it maintained at the same level its 
telephone tariffs for other users and for lines 
leased to new entrants. Following scrutiny by 
the Commission of increases DT proposed to 
introduce on 1 January, a deferral of the tariff 
reform was secured, as were commitments on 
the part of DT and the German Government to 
the effect that the rebalancing would not go 
beyond what was objectively justified and that 
the universal service would be maintained. The 
Commission made the introduction of the new 
tariffs conditional on DT concluding network 
access agreements with its competitors and on 
additional regulatory steps being taken to 
ensure competitive network access in the Ger-
man market. These measures are being closely 
monitored by DG IV, notably through a formal 
request for information from DT and the firms 
concerned and through consultations with the 
German Government. What action is taken will 
depend on the outcome of the analysis of the 
replies. 
3. Access agreements 
72. On 10 December the Commission 
approved a draft notice on the application of the  29 competition rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector.' The draft notice 
will be published in the Official Journal for a 
two-month consultation period, following 
which the final version of the notice will be pre-
pared and published- It does not establish new 
principles of competition law, but gives an 
overview of how the principles existing in cur-
rent case-law apply to the new types of prob-
lems arising in the context of the liberalization 
of the telecommunications sector. 
competitive effects vis-à-vis existing or new 
operators. In particular, the Commission wants 
to take steps to ensure that the feature cannot 
'lock' a mobile phone handset to a particular 
operator or service provider, thereby preventing 
consumers who have purchased the mobile 
phone handset from later choosing which 
mobile phone service best fits their needs. 
5. Satellite communications 
30 
73. The draft notice has three main objectives. 
First, it sets out the relationship between the 
competition rules and the sector-specific regula-
tion of the telecommunications sector. Second, 
it briefly examines relevant markets in the con-
text of access agreements, and particularly the 
distinction between access and service provi-
sion. Third, it sets out the substantive rules — 
most importantly under Article 86 of the EC 
Treaty — relevant to access agreements. 
The draft notice is not limited to physical access 
issues — such as interconnection to the 
telecommunications network of incumbent 
operators — but looks at the notion of access 
generally, i.e. that of access to facilities. 
4. Mobile communications 
74. In this sector competition is progressing 
well and is leading to strong growth rates, new 
services, better coverage and lower prices. 
There is still a need for vigilance, however, as 
regards the conditions governing the granting of 
new licences so as to avoid discriminatory con-
ditions for new entrants which might act as a 
brake on these developments.
2 The interests of 
users must also be safeguarded by guaranteeing 
their freedom of choice. Certain technical or 
commercial processes may be used to 'lock' 
users to a given operator, which means there is 
no longer any incentive for tariff reductions 
once the commercial promotion stage is over. 
Some processes are accordingly being exam-
ined with a view to reducing their anti-compet-
itive effects. 
75. For example, in August the Commission 
wrote a letter to GSM/DCS 1800 handset manu-
facturers and network operators in the EEA to 
ensure that 'SIM locked' handsets are only sup-
plied and used if they can be unlocked upon 
demand by consumers themselves. In fact, 
while the SIM lock feature is beneficial for both 
consumers and operators as it helps to deter 
theft of handsets, it should not have anti-
76. Interpénétration is particularly strong in 
this sector between implementation of the liber-
alization policy, cases notified or investigated 
ex officio, the reforms of international satellite 
organizations such as Intelsat, and the negotia-
tions within the World Trade Organization on 
basic telecommunications. There is a need for 
foresight, given the new technologies and mas-
sive investment that are in the offing, inasmuch 
as these might increase satellite communica-
tions tenfold and bring about a high level of 
concentration in the sector. 
77. With regard to recent satellite alliances, a 
number of ex officio proceedings were initiated 
to see whether they were in keeping with the 
European competition rules. The companies 
involved are Iridium, Globalstar and Odyssey. 
78. In 1996 the Commission authorized the 
creation of Iridium, which intends to provide 
from the last quarter of 1998 global digital wire-
less communications services using satellites, to 
be launched and placed during the next 24 
months. Among the strategic investors involved 
in Iridium, which is led by the American 
Motorola, are Stet (Italy) and Vebacom (Ger-
many). Each of the two has its own gateway ser-
vice territory covering different parts of Europe 
and the associated exclusive right to construct 
and operate a gateway within its respective 
territory. 
In its Decision the Commission concluded that 
the creation of Iridium falls outside the scope of 
Article 85(1) since none of the strategic 
investors could be reasonably expected to sep-
arately assume the huge investments required 
and the high technical and commercial risk 
associated with the new system. In addition, no 
investor has all the necessary licences to operate 
the system. The Commission also considered 
that the exclusive rights granted to gateway 
0JC76. 11.3.1997, p. 9. 
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operators are a necessary incentive for investors 
to assume these risks. However, in view of 
Stet's strong position in the provision of satel-
lite services in Italy, the Commission requested 
the parties to confirm that the Iridium agree-
ments will not affect the ability of third compa-
nies to gain access to the telecommunications 
infrastructure of Stet other than those parts 
specifically developed for the Iridium system. 
6. On-line services and competition 
79. These interactive services are at the fore-
front of the information society. Developments 
today may shape to a large extent the services 
and freedom of choice of tomorrow. In this sec-
tor also, it is necessary to pursue a balanced pol-
icy between preventive action before competi-
tion problems arise, which might slow down the 
new services in Europe, and remedying the sit-
uation after the establishment of dominant posi-
tions leading to abuses, which might be too late. 
So far there have been relatively few notified 
cases, major complaints or ex officio proceed-
ings, but the position could change rapidly. This 
balanced policy therefore consists of (i) com-
munication to draw attention to the conditions 
of competition to be complied with, and (ii) 
close monitoring of certain new practices and 
technologies. 
7. Competition policy in the media 
80. The European audiovisual sector is cur-
rently undergoing profound and rapid change in 
the form of: 
— technological developments enabling an 
increase in the number of distribution chan-
nels (including pay-TV) for products and 
programmes; 
— strategic alliances between operators, and 
agreements between operators, programme 
owners and sometimes even the owners of 
infrastructure (e.g. cable); 
— ever-increasing investment (notably in 
rights). 
81. Faced with this highly volatile situation, 
European competition policy must be particu-
larly vigilant as the sector has a strong growth 
potential and entry barriers may be very sub-
stantial (cost of rights, physical and commercial 
investment and infrastructure). Steps must 
therefore be taken to ensure that the market is 
not foreclosed and that competition is not dis-
torted by certain alliances or concentrations or 
by difficulty in gaining access to programmes. 
82. At present, more and more cross-border 
alliances are being planned or forged, typified 
by a pan-European outlook.' Ifall these projects 
come to fruition, most major television distrib-
utors in Europe may well be linked through net-
works of alliances. The Commission will 
accordingly have to examine these transactions 
carefully. In particular, it will have to evaluate 
the alliances' overall impact at European level, 
going beyond the direct consequences for the 
specific national markets. 
83. The question of content is assuming 
increasing importance in the audiovisual sector. 
Following thé introduction of digital technol-
ogy, numerous special-interest channels may be 
launched on the pay-TV market using digital 
compression. The pioneers on this market are 
currently negotiating the purchase of exclusive 
rights in fiction and sport — the two pillars of 
pay-TV — with a view to amassing vast 
catalogues of rights over particularly attractive 
programmes. 
The problem of content and exclusive rights in 
the media sector is not a new one as far as the 
Commission is concerned. It has already had 
occasion in the past to decide on the compati-
bility with the competition rules of agreements 
involving exclusive rights: while acknowledg-
ing the importance of exclusivity as a means of 
safeguarding the value of a programme, it takes 
particular care to ensure that neither the dura-
tion nor the scope of such agreements restricts 
third-party access to rights for too long a period 
or risks foreclosing the market. 
In relation to sport, the problem of access to 
rights is particularly important owing to the 
ephemeral nature of televised broadcasts of 
sports events, the concentration of rights in the 
hands of sports federations, thereby reducing 
the number of rights available on the market, 
and the relative inelasticity of viewer demand. 
Given the importance of questions to do with 
sporting rights and the growing number of 
cases relating thereto, DG IV has embarked 
upon a wide-ranging consultation exercise 
involving the application of the competition 
rules in this area. 
This is the case, for example, with the Bertelsmann-CLT alliance 
(see Chapter III.D. below).  31 E — Transport 
1. Liner shipping consortia 
84. On 20 April 1995 the Commission adopted 
a Regulation granting a block exemption to 
liner shipping consortia.' This new block 
exemption entered into force on 22 April 1995 
and applies for a period of five years. 
In order to benefit from the block exemption, a 
consortium must fulfil the conditions and obli-
gations set forth in Articles 5 to 9 of the Regu-
lation. These are intended to ensure compliance 
with the provisions of Article 85(3) of the EC 
Treaty and seek above all to ensure that consor-
tia operate in trades where they are subject to 
effective competition, so as to enable shippers 
to obtain a fair share of the benefits resulting 
from these agreements. To qualify automatical-
ly for block exemption, a consortium must pos-
sess a share of less than 30 or 35% of the trade 
depending on whether or not it operates as part 
of a liner conference. A consortium whose share 
of the trade exceeds the 30 or 35% limit but 
does not, however, exceed 50% of the direct 
trade may also, pursuant to a simplified opposi-
tion procedure provided for in Article 7 of the 
Regulation, qualify for block exemption provi-
ded that it fulfils the other conditions laid down 
in the Regulation and that the Commission does 
not oppose such exemption within a period of 
six months from the date of notification. Where 
a consortium holds more than 50% of the trade 
or where it does not fulfil the other conditions 
laid down in the Regulation for the granting of 
block exemption, the agreement in question 
must be notified to the Commission with a view 
to obtaining an individual exemption under 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty. 
86. Five other consortium agreements were 
authorized in 1996. Four of the agreements,
4 
which existed prior to the entry into force of the 
Regulation, were authorized under the simpli-
fied opposition procedure provided for in Arti-
cle 7 of the Regulation and may operate until 21 
April 2000, the date on which the Regulation 
expires. The Commission found that, by helping 
to rationalize the activities of their members, 
each of these consortia had helped in practice to 
improve substantially the quality and frequency 
of the liner transport services offered to shippers 
and, in some cases, to increase the number of 
ports served. The consortia nevertheless 
remained subject to effective competition on the 
trades in which they operated, thereby ensuring 
that shippers received a fair share of the benefits 
resulting from the agreements. 
87. Inasmuch as it is not a consortium agree-
ment falling within the scope of the exemption 
Regulation, the fifth agreement, that between 
Finncarriers Oy Ab and Poseidon Schiffahrt AG 
setting up the Baltic Liner Conference, was 
granted an individual exemption. The agree-
ment provides that the parties are to operate a 
joint service consisting in the provision of regu-
lar ferry services for ro-ro, container and 
rail/ferry traffic between ports and points in Fin-
land and (i) ports and points in Germany (and 
other continental points via German ports), and 
(ii) ports and points in Scandinavia (Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway), with a small volume of 
traffic between Russia and those countries via 
Finland. 
Such an agreement, establishing as it does a 
highly integrated joint service, does not consti-
tute a consortium agreement within the mean-
ing of Regulation (EC) No 870/95 as it is not 
concerned exclusively with the carriage of 
cargo chiefly by container. It is a largely 
32 
85. Since the Regulation entered into force, the 
Commission has received 30 or so notifications 
or prenotifications. In seven cases,
2 including 
five in 1996, it confirmed that the notified con-
sortium agreements qualified automatically for 
exemption under the Regulation given that they 
held a share of the trade of less than 30 or 35% 
and that they fulfilled the conditions and obli-
gations attaching to the granting of exemption. 
It informed the parties in another case' that the 
notified agreement did not constitute a consor-
tium agreement within the meaning of the Regu-
lation but was merely a slot charter agreement. 
The Commission has as yet been unable to reach 
a decision on some of the other notifications that 
have been submitted as they were incomplete. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 870/95 of 20 April 1995 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner 
shipping companies (consortia) pursuant to Council Regulation 
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non-containerized consortium which does not 
therefore qualify for block exemption and must 
accordingly, if it is to be authorized, be granted 
individual exemption. 
The Commission sought the views of third par-
ties by publishing a summary of the applica-
tion.' No comments were forthcoming so the 
Commission considered, at the end of the allot-
ted 90-day period, that the requirements of Arti-
cle 85(3) were met and accordingly did not 
oppose the agreement, with the result that the 
maritime activities carried on under it are 
exempted for a period of six years and the 
inland activities, which are minor in this case, 
are exempted for three years. 
2. Inland rate'fixing by liner 
conferences 
SS. The Commission attaches the utmost 
importance to this question as can be seen from 
the adoption in 1994 of two Decisions prohibit-
ing price-fixing agreements on the land leg of a 
transport operation, the TAA (Trans-Atlantic 
Agreement) Decision
2 and the FEFC (Far East-
ern Freight Conference) Decision,' and from a 
report dated 8 June 1994
4 describing the broad 
thrust of the policy the Commission intended to 
pursue in relation to this practice. 
During the discussions within the Council on 
this report in November 1994, Mr Van Miert 
agreed to report to the Council on the imple-
mentation of the policy, taking as a basis the 
work of a wise men's committee. In February 
1996 the committee, known as the Multimodal 
Group, submitted an interim report to the Com-
missioner which the latter transmitted to the 
Council.
5 
89. The Multimodal Group concluded in its 
report that it had yet to be convinced that the 
joint fixing of inland rates was indispensable for 
the purpose of supplying multimodal transport 
services or fostering closer cooperation between 
shipowners on the inland segment; nor was 
there any reason so far to grant an exemption, 
whether block or individual, in respect of that 
conference practice. 
In the Group's opinion, the joint fixing of inland 
rates by conferences had not in the past led to 
any improvement in the efficiency of the inland 
transport services offered, nor had it induced 
shipowners to invest in the inland segment. 
The argument to the effect that the joint fixing 
of inland rates should be authorized as being 
indispensable for the purpose of facilitating the 
investment needed to enable shipowners to 
establish closer inland cooperation was rejected 
on the ground that it was in shipowners' inter-
ests to undertake investment which might lead 
to closer inland cooperation and to cost reduc-
tions, even if the authority to carry out such rate 
fixing were withheld from conferences. 
In the final part of the report, the Group asked 
the shipping industry to submit to it specific 
proposals for cooperation on the inland segment 
and to explain to it the resulting benefits for 
shippers and the indispensability of the joint 
fixing of inland rates with a view to producing 
those benefits. In the light of these proposals, 
and after analysing their content, the Group 
intends to send Mr Van Miert a final report in 
the summer of 1997. 
90. The interim report firmly supports the 
Commission's drive to establish a new, more 
efficient system for the inland transport of con-
tainers which ensures a better balance between 
the interests of shippers and shipowners while 
being compatible with the Community competi-
tion rules. The Commission is not, of course, 
bound by it in its day-to-day application of the 
competition rules, but it is nevertheless an 
important factor shaping the Commission's cur-
rent policy towards this practice on the part of 
the shipping industry. 
91. On 26 November 1996 the Commission 
decided to lift the immunity from fines in 
respect of inland rate fixing in Europe brought 
about by the notification of the Trans-Atlantic 
Conference Agreement (TACA). The parties to 
the TACA are all liner shipping companies and 
the TACA applies to their operations on the 
trades between northern Europe and the United 
States. 
In its Decision the Commission states that it has 
arrived at the preliminary conclusion that the 
TACA provisions on the joint fixing of prices 
for the inland portions of a transport service 
constitute a manifest and serious infringement 
of Article 85( 1 ) of the Treaty and that there is no 
possibility of individual exemption for the 
TACA provisions as they stand. 
OJC44, 16.2.1996 
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3. Price consultations between 
competitors 
3.1. Consultations on tariffs for the 
carriage of freight by air 
92. On 24 July the Commission adopted Reg-
ulation (EC) No 1523/96' excluding from the 
scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93
2 consul-
tations on tariffs for the carriage of freight. 
Regulation No 1617/93 exempts from the pro-
hibition in Article 85(1) agreements between 
undertakings which have as their purpose inter 
alia the holding of consultations on tariffs for 
the carriage of passengers and of freight on 
scheduled air services. The reasons behind the 
Regulation's adoption were, firstly, the need to 
give airlines time to adjust to the introduction of 
competition and, secondly, the wish to facilitate 
interlining agreements. 
Since Council Regulation No 3976/87 was 
adopted, airlines have had eight years in which 
to adapt to a more competitive environment. 
Over that period market conditions have 
changed considerably owing, among other 
things, to the gradual liberalization of the indus-
try. The Commission accordingly considered 
that airlines had had sufficient time to adapt to 
the new environment and that there was no 
longer any justification for an exemption. 
93. In the case of interlining, information fur-
nished by airlines revealed that the rate of inter-
lining expressed in terms of the number of con-
signments had fallen by more than - 60% 
between 1991 and 1994. It was also established 
that tariff consultations led to the adoption of 
recommended tariffs which were excessively 
high compared with market rates and which 
therefore had as their object a favouring of 
higher tariffs. The information furnished by the 
airlines also showed that interlining operated in 
some cases with tariffs which differed consider-
ably from those set during consultations. 
The Commission accordingly came to the con-
clusion that, in the cargo transport sector, tariff 
consultations were no longer indispensable with 
a view to making interlining work and that the 
exemption enjoyed by airlines in this respect 
should therefore be withdrawn. The withdrawal 
of the exemption will, however, not take effect 
until 1 July 1997. Airlines may still submit an 
application for individual exemption if they 
consider that certain limited forms of tariff con-
sultation fulfil the requirements of Article 85(3). 
3.2. Price fixing 
94. On a more general level, tariff consulta-
tions between undertakings are one of the most 
serious forms of anti-competitive behaviour and 
they can therefore be exempted from the pro-
hibition on restrictive practices only in excep-
tional circumstances. The fact that the resulting 
tariffs are presented as being 'recommended' 
tariffs makes them no less anti-competitive. 
95. The Commission applied this basic princi-
ple when it adopted on 5 June a Decision cen-
suring the Dutch forwarding agents' association 
Fenex for having drawn up and circulated 
among its members recommended tariffs for 
shipping services in seaports and at land fron-
tiers. These recommended tariffs were fixed 
uniformly without regard to any differences in 
firms' cost structures. 
96. During the proceedings Fenex argued that 
the tariffs in question had merely the force of a 
recommendation which did not restrict the free-
dom of forwarding agents to set their tariffs. 
Such a recommendation did not constitute a 
decision by an association of undertakings with-
in the meaning of Article 85(1). In the Commis-
sion's view, the drawing-up and circulation of 
the tariffs recommended by Fenex had to be 
interpreted as the faithful reflection of the asso-
ciation's resolve to coordinate the conduct of its 
members on the relevant market. Fenex had reg-
ularly and consistently engaged in the practice 
of drawing up and circulating recommended 
tariffs for very many years. The association's 
member companies clearly had a common inter-
est in coordinating their behaviour in relation to 
the tariffs for the services in question. The tariff 
recommendations were accompanied by circu-
lars expressing the association's firm desire that 
its recommendations should be put into effect. 
The drawing-up and circulation of recommend-
ed tariffs was, moreover, an activity for which 
Fenex was clearly empowered. In accordance 
with the established case-law of the Court of 
Justice, the Commission considered that 
Fenex's practice of recommending tariffs had 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1523/96 of 24 July 1996, 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93, OJ L 190, 31.7.1996. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 of 25 June 1993, on 
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vices and slot allocation at airports, OJ L 155, 26.6.1993. The 
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Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on 
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an anti-competitive object as it was likely to 
induce firms to align their tariffs irrespective of 
their costs. 
On the other hand, the Commission accepted 
the system for calculating costs henceforth 
employed by Fenex inasmuch as it enables each 
firm to determine its selling prices on the basis 
of its own costs. Trade associations may lawful-
ly give such assistance to their members, espe-
cially where the latter are of modest size. 
97. In another Decision dated 30 October, the 
Commission fined five cross-Channel ferry 
companies, P&O, Stena-Sealink, Brittany Fer-
ries, Sea France and North Sea Ferries, a total of 
ECU 645 000 for having operated a price cartel 
in 1992. The companies had agreed on the 
amount and introduction date of a surcharge on 
freight shipments following the devaluation of 
the pound sterling in September 1992. Although 
the practice had been of short duration, the 
Commission considered that purely symbolic 
fines would be inappropriate given the flagrant 
nature of the infringement. 
4. Cooperation between airlines 
4.1. European alliances 
98. In its XXVth Competition Report, the Com-
mission already mentioned its favourable atti-
tude towards cooperation between airlines pro-
vided it does not rule out opportunities for real 
competition from new operators on the main 
routes.' On 16 January the Commission there-
fore conditionally approved for a period of 10 
years a cooperation agreement between 
Lufthansa and SAS setting up an operationally 
and commercially integrated air transport sys-
tem. The agreement will have the effect of 
appreciably restricting competition, particularly 
on routes between Germany and Scandinavia, 
but it will enable the two airlines to reduce their 
costs and broaden their range of services to the 
benefit of consumers. The Commission never-
theless considered it necessary to impose condi-
tions aimed at allowing other airlines to operate 
services on routes between Germany and Scan-
dinavia. These conditions concern in particular 
the giving-up of slots at certain saturated air-
ports. 
4.2. Transatlantic air agreements 
99. A number of European airlines have 
recently concluded alliance agreements with US 
airlines as follows: British Airways with 
American Airlines; Lufthansa with United Air-
lines; SAS with United Airlines; and Swissair/ 
Sabena/Austrian Airlines with Delta. Prior to 
this, KLM had concluded an agreement with 
Northwest. These agreements are presented as 
being code-sharing agreements on routes 
between Europe and the United States. In real-
ity, they institute close cooperation in the areas 
of capacity, commercial policy, pricing, sched-
ule coordination, revenue sharing, frequent 
flyer programmes, etc. They relate essentially to 
routes between the Community and the United 
States, but intra-Community traffic is also 
affected. The objective of the parties to the 
agreements is to function on certain routes as a 
single entity while retaining their legal auton-
omy.
2 
Although the Commission did not adopt a final 
position in 1996 on the applicability of Articles 
85 and 86, it is felt that these agreements could 
have appreciable anti-competitive effects on 
routes between the United States and Europe 
and on certain intra-Community routes. In 
analysing these cases, account must be taken of 
the regulatory barriers (in particular rights of 
access to the transatlantic and intra-Community 
routes of the parties to the agreements com-
pared with the rights of third airlines) and of the 
existence of non-regulatory barriers, notably the 
scarcity of slots at certain airports or the pooling 
of frequent flyer programmes. It will accord-
ingly have to be considered whether the agree-
ments comply with Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty and, if appropriate, under what condi-
tions they may be authorized. 
100. The Commission initiated proceedings 
based on three separate instruments. 
For services within the Community, Council 
Regulation No 3975/87 determines, for the air 
transport sector, the procedure for applying 
Articles 85 and 86.' Following confirmation by 
the Court of Justice in its Nouvelles Frontières 
judgment of the Commission position that Arti-
cles 85 et seq. are applicable to air transport,
4 it 
was considered necessary to adopt specific 
XXVth Competition Report, points 76-78. 
OJ C 289, 2.10.1996. 
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implementing provisions to the extent that Reg-
ulation No 17 of 1962 was not applicable to the 
sector. Such was the aim of Regulation No 
3975/87 and of Regulation No 3976/87 empow-
ering the Commission to grant block exemp-
tions in respect of cooperation agreements 
between airlines.' However, these Regulations 
apply only to air services within the Commu-
nity.
2 They accordingly do not apply to services 
between the Community and third countries. 
For services between the Community and third 
countries, the Commission must therefore rely 
on the interim arrangements laid down in Arti-
cle 89 of the Treaty. The Court confirmed in 
Nouvelles Frontières that the Commission 
could base itself on Article 89 when checking 
whether these services complied with Articles 
85 et seq. 
In the case of services not directly related to air 
transport (e.g. computerized reservation sys-
tems), the Commission applies Regulation No 
17. 
In parallel with the proceedings initiated by the 
Commission, the United Kingdom authorities 
opened an investigation under Article 88 of the 
Treaty in the ΒΑ/AA case to determine whether 
Articles 85 and 86 had been complied with, and 
the German authorities opened a similar pro-
ceeding in relation to the agreement between 
Lufthansa, SAS and United Airlines. These pro-
ceedings are limited, however, to services 
between the Community and the United States 
since in respect of all other services Regulation 
No 3975/87 (for intra-Community services) and 
Regulation No 17 (for services not directly rela-
ted to air transport) provide that Member States 
may not open or carry on with proceedings 
based on Community law once the Commission 
has decided to initiate such proceedings. 
101. The Nouvelles Frontières and Ahmed 
Saeed ' cases pointed out the difficulties inher-
ent in the current arrangements for the applica-
tion of the competition rules to agreements on 
services with third countries. 
These difficulties show there is a need to extend 
the scope of Regulations Nos 3975/87 and 
3976/87 to include all services between the 
Community and third countries. Such an exten-
sion would confer on the Commission powers 
to apply Articles 85 and 86 directly to restrictive 
agreements concerning such services rather 
than indirectly through the Article 89 procedure. 
The Commission thus proposes to present two 
proposals for Council Regulations in 1997. The 
first seeks to extend Regulation No 3975/87 to 
third countries, and the second is an ad hoc 
Regulation, broadly similar to Regulation No 
3976/87, extending the Commission's power to 
grant certain block exemptions so as to cover 
third countries. The latter Regulation should 
also help to increase legal certainty for airlines. 
102. The extension of the scope of Regulation 
No 3975/87 must also be examined in the light 
of another factor. On 17 June the Commission 
was authorized by the Council to negotiate with 
the US Government an agreement establishing 
between the EU and the United States a com-
mon airspace. If such an agreement, in which 
competition would play a significant part, were 
to be concluded, it would enable the airlines of 
both parties to carry on their activities freely in 
the EU and in the United States on the basis of 
commercial principles which ensure that they 
operate under fair and equivalent conditions of 
competition. " 
F — Energy 
103. The Commission investigated several 
cases in this sector (agreements for the sale to the 
network of electricity generated by independent 
power stations and contracts for the supply of 
gas to fuel power stations in Italy and Portugal). 
As regards electricity, the Commission auth-
orized, during the current run-up to a liberalized 
market,
5 long-term contracts for the sale of elec-
tricity produced by independent generators to 
the national network inasmuch as the producers 
had, in fact, few alternative takers for their out-
put and the scale of the investment necessitated 
a stable outlet. The Commission will, however, 
have to take into account in future such alterna-
tive possibilities for independent generators as 
may present themselves in the countries 
1 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport 
sector (OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 9), as amended by Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90 of 24 July 1990 (OJ L 217, 
11.8.1990, p. 15) and by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2411/92 
of 23 July 1992 (OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 19). 
2 Originally, they applied only to international flights between 
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transport liberalization measures they were extended with effect 
from 25 August 1992 by Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 
2410/92 and 2411/92 of 23 July 1992 to cover flights within a 
Member State (cabotage). 
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concerned following implementation of the 
electricity liberalization Directive. 
ι 
As regards gas, the Commission authorized a 
long-term contract for supplying a high-capac-
ity power station inasmuch as the commitment 
guaranteed a stable and sufficiently sizeable 
outlet to enable the emergent gas market in a 
Member State to develop. The emergence of a 
market and the need to secure a basis on which 
a network may develop were taken into account 
by the Commission. Nevertheless, this does not 
prejudge the position it may adopt in respect of 
other long-term agreements which might fore-
close the market. 
G — Sport and competition 
104. Following the judgment of the Court of Jus-
tice in Bosman, ' the Commission has on a num-
ber of occasions expressed its firm intention of 
ensuring, by all the means at its disposal, that the 
principles laid down therein are respected. An 
official warning was thus sent on 19 January 
to FIFA and UEFA in connection with an 
infringement proceeding based on Article 85(1) 
of the EC Treaty and on Article 53(1) of the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area 
concerning rules of the two organizations which 
the Court had censured under Article 48 of the 
EC Treaty. 
The warning letter informed the two organiza-
tions that, in the light of the Bosman judgment, 
their international system of transfers as noti-
fied to the Commission on 28 July 1995 did not 
qualify for exemption under Article 85(3) of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agree-
ment. Moreover, had it been notified, the limit 
on the number of foreign players in national or 
international competitions between clubs (the 
so-called '3 + 2' rule) could not have been 
exempted under the same provisions. 
105. FIFA and UEFA informed the Commis-
sion's departments that the international system 
of transfers would no longer be applied to play-
ers who, at the end of their contract, changed 
clubs (in different countries) within the EEA. 
UEFA confirmed that its Executive Committee 
had decided to abolish formally with immediate 
effect the nationality clauses ('3 + 2' rules) 
applicable to UEFA competitions between clubs 
within the EEA. 
106. Nevertheless, following the abolition of 
the international system of transfers operated by 
FIFA and UEFA within the Community and the 
EEA, the legality of certain situations under the 
Treaty's rules still remains to be clarified. FIFA 
and UEFA had notified the international system 
of transfers to the Commission before it was 
censured by the Court under Article 48 of the 
Treaty. The notification therefore relates to 
decisions (rules and regulations) of FIFA and 
UEFA which implement an international system 
of transfers imposing the payment of transfer, 
promotion or training fees for professional play-
ers or players who have turned professional, 
irrespective of their nationality, who at the end 
of their contract form the subject-matter of an 
international transfer within the Community or 
the EEA. The obligation imposed by FIFA on 
national football associations to implement sim-
ilar systems at national level is contained in the 
notified provisions. 
707. Faced with such a notification, the Com-
mission had to decide on the compatibility with 
Article 85 of situations which the Court has not 
condemned since they do not infringe Article 48 
of the Treaty, namely the making of payments at 
the time of the international transfer, within the 
EEA, of third-country players at the end of their 
contracts with a club from a country of the 
Community or of the EEA, and the obligation 
imposed by FIFA on national associations in the 
Community and the EEA to implement national 
transfer systems. The notification was, how-
ever, withdrawn by UEFA and FIFA. No alter-
native system has been notified or formally 
presented to the Commission. 
H — Financial services 
70S. On 24 June the Commission authorized for 
a period of 10 years a full and, in principle, 
exclusive cooperation agreement at world level 
between Banque nationale de Paris and Dresd-
ner Bank. Although it is concerned mainly with 
international business, the agreement provides 
that, in France and in Germany, each party will 
make its products available to the other in order 
that it might distribute them through its net-
work. On this point, the Commission insisted on 
an amendment of the clause of the agreement as 
originally notified which gave each party an 
unlimited right to veto any cooperation agree-
ment which the other wished to conclude with a 
competitor present on its domestic market. 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of 15 December 1995 in Case 
C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football associa-
tion ν Bosman [1995] ECR 1-4921.  37 109. Last year the Commission adopted a notice 
concerning the applicability of the competition 
provisions of the EC Treaty to cross-border 
credit transfers.' It will be recalled that the 
notice deals with non-price competition as well 
as price competition issues. 
As to the former, rules concerning membership 
of cross-border credit transfer systems raise 
antitrust concern, in particular when the system 
constitutes an essential facility. In the course of 
1996, the Commission's departments scruti-
nized the ECU Banking Association's clearing 
and settlement system for ecu transactions in 
the light of the requirements set forth in the 
notice. They concluded that the system met 
these requirements and closed the case by way 
of a comfort letter. Two other systems dealing 
specifically with cross-border credit transfers, 
namely IBOS and Eurogiro, though containing 
restrictive membership rules, were cleared by 
way of a comfort letter because they did not 
appear to constitute an essential facility within 
the meaning of the notice. 
For these two cases, as well as for a third case 
notified by the Danish Bankers' Association, the 
Commission's departments also considered 
whether they raised price competition concerns. 
They queried, in particular, whether the banks 
participating in these payment systems had mul-
tilaterally agreed on an interchange fee and, if 
so, whether such a fee was exemptable. In IBOS 
there appeared to be no such fee. In Eurogiro, 
there was initially a multilateral interchange fee 
(MIF) to be paid by the sender's bank to the 
beneficiary's bank in case of urgent transfers 
but parties decided on their own initiative to 
drop this fee. Finally, in the Danish case, the 
system did contain a multilateral fee (paid by 
the beneficiary's bank to the correspondent 
bank) but the view was taken that it did not 
restrict competition to an appreciable extent 
within the meaning of Article 85(1). 
I — Statistics 
770. During the year the Commission registered 
471 new cases, including 209 notifications, 168 
complaints and 94 cases opened on the Com-
mission's own initiative. Although the number 
of new cases is lower than in 1995, it exceeds 
the average number of incoming cases over the 
last nine years by more than 10%. In 1996 noti-
fications were sharply down, whereas com-
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A — Introduction 
113. Liberalization of the traditionally mono­
polized sectors is a crucial step in the establish­
ment of a real single market for the benefit of 
European consumers. Nevertheless, the Com­
mission is aware that the particular way these 
sectors are organized very often reflects legiti­
mate concerns to ensure social cohesion; in its 
liberalization strategies it therefore seeks to 
keep in view objectives of public service whilst 
ensuring that the means by which they are 
achieved entail the minimum possible restric­
tions for competition and trade. 
As the Commission pointed out in its notice of 
11 September on services of general interest in 
Europe,
1 its approach is pragmatic and gradual 
and respects the special characteristics of each 
sector. It tries to reach broad consensus with the 
other Community institutions, the Member 
States and the parties concerned as to the proce­
dures and pace of liberalization. This consensus 
is often reflected in a parallel basic approach for 
both the liberalization measures adopted by the 
Commission and the harmonizing directives 
adopted by the Council and the Parliament. The 
Commission naturally intends to make use of all 
the legal instruments available to it, particularly 
the competition rules laid down in the EC 
Treaty, to ensure that the attainment of the 
objectives of liberalization as expressed by the 
directives is not impeded by anti-competitive 
practices on the part of Member States or 
operators.
2 
114. The Commission is of the view that the 
objectives of liberalization and of public service 
can be kept fully compatible under the existing 
Community rules. It has therefore opposed the 
proposals to amend Article 90 of the Treaty put 
forward within the framework of the Intergov­
ernmental Conference. Any such amendment 
would not in any way meet the real needs of 
protecting the public service; indeed, it would 
risk exempting certain operators in key sectors 
of the European economy from all Community 
control, thereby creating unfair competitive 
conditions between operators in different Mem­
ber States and between public and private oper­
ators, which might have an adverse effect on the 
competitiveness of European industry and on 
the price and quality of services provided for 
consumers. 
The Community has also a positive role to play 
in the development of the public service, of 
course. As the Commission pointed out in its 
notice of 11 September, many Community 
initiatives taken on the basis of existing powers 
are already making a positive contribution to 
attaining public service objectives, in parallel 
with the Member States. This is the case with 
sectoral initiatives seeking to specify a mini­
mum level for universal service for all citizens 
of the Union; determination of these minimum 
levels can only be meaningful in the light of the 
circumstances of each sector at a particular point 
in time and logically be done by provisions con­
tained in directives, not in the EC Treaty. This 
also applies in the case of numerous initiatives 
concerning the environment, consumer policy 
and trans-European networks. The Commission 
has undertaken to continue and develop these 
initiatives and has indicated that it favours the 
insertion in Article 3 of the EC Treaty of a new 
point (u): 'a contribution to the promotion of ser­
vices of general interest'. This proposal would 
enable Community public service initiatives to 
be gradually developed without running con­
trary to the logic of the division of powers 
between the Community and the Member States 
or altering the current balance between Com­
munity objectives of economic integration and 
national public service objectives. 
Β — Telecommunications 
775. The directives adopted on the basis of the 
competition rules (Article 90) determine the 
essential principles for the liberalization of 
telecommunications. The Article 100a direc­
tives, founded on the principles applicable to 
open network provision, prepare the way for 
and/or supplement the Article 90 directives, 
ensuring that new applicants can obtain leased 
lines, licences and interconnection, and de­
termining their contribution to the universal 
service. 
1. Mobile telephony liberalization 
Directive 
776. On 16 January the Commission adopted 
a Directive
J opening up to competition the 
European market in mobile and personal 
Commission notice of 11 September 1996 on services of general 
interest in Europe, OJ C 281, 26.9.1996, p. 3. 
This chapter is basically focused on Community initiatives deal­
ing with State measures affecting competition. The behaviour of 
businesses is dealt with in other chapters of the Report. 
Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal com­
munications, OJ L 20, 26.1.1996. XXVth Competition Report, 
point 104. 
41 communications along the lines set out in the 
Green Paper on mobile and personal communi-
cations. The Directive followed consultations 
with interested parties on the basis of a draft 
adopted in August 1995. The Directive, which 
was adopted on the basis of Article 90 of the 
Treaty, requires the Member States to abolish 
special or exclusive rights still remaining in this 
field and to establish licensing procedures 
which are in accordance with Community law. 
It makes provision for the abolition of regulato-
ry restrictions applicable, on the one hand, to 
the use of operators' own infrastructure or the 
infrastructure of third parties (such as that of 
electricity and railway companies) for the estab-
lishment of mobile networks and, on the other, 
to direct cross-frontier interconnection between 
fixed and mobile systems on the basis of Article 
4 of the Directive. Member States with less-
developed networks (Portugal, Greece, Spain 
and Ireland) were given the opportunity to 
request an additional implementation period for 
the abolition of these restrictions. Only Ireland 
and Portugal did so.' 
The introduction of competition in the mobile 
market is particularly important in the run-up to 
the complete liberalization of the telecommuni-
cations sector on 1 January 1998 since it will 
reduce the potential for increases in local fixed-
network charges to consumers. In view of the 
cost of establishing fixed local loops for voice 
telephony networks, new entrants will be able to 
use mobile technologies like DECT or DCS 
1800 to reach their clients without passing 
through the former monopolies' local loops. 
Current operators of fixed networks will prob-
ably be tempted to make the most of their local 
loop monopoly before the effects of full net-
work competition make themselves felt. Here, 
the rapidly decreasing price of mobile services 
will set an effective ceiling for wire-based local 
tariffs. 
2. Full competition Directive 
777. On 13 March the Commission adopted a 
Directive opening up to competition the entire 
European market in telecommunications ser-
vices and infrastructures.
2 
provide voice telephony and public telecommu-
nications networks must be eliminated before 
that date. The Directive also provides that by 1 
July 1996 the use of alternative infrastructures 
(such as the telecommunications networks of 
railway and power and water distribution com-
panies) must be liberalized for the provision of 
telecommunications services other than public 
voice telephony, for which the deadline remains 
set at 1 January 1998. Under Article 2 of the 
Directive, additional transitional periods may 
be granted for Member States with less-devel-
oped or smaller networks. Ireland, Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece and Luxembourg have requested 
derogations.' 
The Directive also defines the principles with 
which the national rules must comply from 
1998, in particular concerning interconnection, 
the granting of licences and the financing of 
universal service. These rules must be transpa-
rent, non-discriminatory and restrict competi-
tion as little as possible, while enabling impor-
tant public service objectives to be achieved. 
775. On 13 March, the date of adoption of the 
full competition Directive, the Commission also 
issued a communication on the concept of uni-
versal service and its development in the new, 
fully liberalized telecommunications environ-
ment.' 
The communication defines 'universal service' 
as the obligation to provide access to the public 
telephone network and to deliver an affordable 
telephone service to all users reasonably 
requesting it. The Commission is aware that, 
despite the progress made with universal ser-
vice, legitimate concerns remain, particularly 
regarding the affordability of prices, universal 
service in less-developed and less-densely pop-
ulated regions and the need to set quality stan-
dards. These concerns could justify the estab-
lishment of specific mechanisms. In this regard, 
the Directive provides that the Member States 
must notify to the Commission the measures 
envisaged to ensure universal service. 
779. On 27 November the Commission pub-
lished the criteria it will apply in assessing 
national schemes for financing the provisions of 
42 
This Directive, which was adopted on the basis 
of Article 90 of the Treaty following widespread 
consultations, provides for the implementation 
of full competition in the last monopoly seg-
ments of the Community telecommunications 
market by 1 January 1998, with improved pro-
vision of universal service. Exclusive rights to 
On 27 November the Commission granted Ireland an additional 
period (see below, point 4). 
Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications markets. OJ L 74, 22.3.1996. 
p. 13. 
Commission communication on a universal service for telecom-
munications in the perspective of a fully liberalized environ-
ment, COM(96) 73 final. Il — STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS 
universal service.
1 Some Member States may of 
course consider that such schemes are unneces-
sary, either because universal service obliga-
tions do not result in a net cost or the net cost 
does not represent an unfair burden for the 
operator or operators concerned. In cases where 
universal service obligations do represent a 
burden, Member States can opt to finance them 
directly themselves or to establish a specific 
financing scheme. Such financing schemes 
may cover only the net costs of universal ser-
vice obligations as defined in Community law. 
Regarding the bodies which are required to 
contribute to the financing of these costs, Mem-
ber States must justify any extension of the 
obligation to new entrants or mobile telephony 
operators. The national schemes must appor-
tion the burden of the contributions equitably 
among the various operators according to their 
activity on the relevant market, and in particu-
lar their substitutability with the universal tele-
phone service. The Commission will ensure 
that the operation of the mechanisms is ob-
jective, non-discriminatory, transparent and 
proportionate. 
3. Decision on mobile telephony in 
Spain 
120. On 18 December the Commission adopted 
a Decision on the basis of Article 90 of the 
Treaty addressed to Spain concerning the initial 
licence fee imposed on Airtel Móvil for the 
granting of a second concession of GSM ser-
vices in Spain. Airtel Móvil, which began oper-
ations in October 1995, was selected on the 
basis of a tendering procedure requiring it to 
pay ESP 85 billion while the public operator, 
Telefónica, was granted its GSM licence with-
out an initial licence fee. The sum of ESP 85 
billion corresponds to one third of the invest-
ments necessary to cover the whole of Spain. 
The Commission therefore considers that Tele-
fonica has a competitive advantage allowing it 
to strengthen its dominant position to the detri-
ment of the second GSM operator. With this 
cost advantage, Telefónica will be able to delay 
the deployment of its network, thereby limiting 
production, markets or technical development 
regarding GSM or to lower its tariffs and 
extend its dominant position on the GSM mar-
ket since Airtel will not be able to match it. The 
Commission considered that the measure dis-
torted competition, infringing Articles 90 and 
86 of the Treaty, and therefore requested the 
Spanish Government to refund the ESP 85 bil-
lion paid by Airtel or to take equivalent correc-
tive measures. The Commission's action 
follows on from similar cases in Austria, Bel-
gium, Ireland and Italy.
2 
4. Decision to grant Ireland a 
supplementary transitional period 
for certain aspects of the liberalization 
of telecommunications 
727. In its Decision of 27 November, the Com-
mission responded to a request presented by Ire-
land for a longer transitional period for the lib-
eralization of its telecommunications.
3 Ireland's 
application was made on the basis of the scope 
for derogation which the Directives on mobile 
telephony and full competition allow the coun-
tries with less well-developed networks. Fol-
lowing wide-ranging consultations, the Com-
mission decide'd to accede to part of the request 
put forward. The alternative infrastructures will 
have to be liberalized from 1 July 1997 and full 
liberalization must be in place by 2000. Direct 
international connections for suppliers of GSM 
mobile telephony will be liberalized from 1 Jan-
uary 1999 and voice telephony will be entirely 
liberalized from 1 January 2000. 
In adopting its Decision, the Commission con-
sidered the comments it received from inter-
ested parties, almost all of whom opposed 
granting the derogations. It also gave careful 
consideration to the Irish Government's argu-
ment that the development of telecommunica-
tions networks carried out had required signifi-
cant capital investment, leading to high levels of 
debt for Telecom Eireann. 
722. The Commission is examining other 
requests for derogations presented by Portugal, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Spain. 
C — Energy 
1. Directive on common rules for the 
internal market in electricity 
123. On 19 December the Council adopted the 
Directive on common rules for the internal mar-
ket in electricity/ The Directive provides for a 
gradual opening of the electricity market over 
COM(96) 608 final. 
XXVth Competition Report, points 109 and 110. 
OJL41, 12.2.1997. 
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the inter-
nal market in electricity, OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20.  43 six years. The first opening, to be effective by 
the beginning of 1999 at the latest, provides for 
the market in each Member State to be opened 
for a proportion which is represented by the 
share of Community consumption accounted 
for by customers using more than 40 GWh/year 
per site in 1997. This threshold will be reduced 
progressively until reaching 9 GWh/year after 
six years. The required percentage market open-
ing is expected to be of the order of 23% ini-
tially, reaching 33% from the sixth year. A fur-
ther opening will be proposed later by the Com-
mission, to be given effect in the ninth year. 
The provisions relating to the protection of pub-
lic service obligations have been brought 
together within a single article of the draft 
Directive. It allows Member States to define 
public service obligations imposed upon elec-
tricity undertakings. These obligations may 
relate to security, including security of supply, 
regularity, quality and price of supplies, as well 
as environmental protection. The article only 
allows Member States to derogate from the 
rules of the Directive if the performance of 
those public service obligations would other-
wise be obstructed. 
44 
As regards the method of opening the market, 
the Directive incorporates the option of a sin-
gle-buyer system as an alternative to negotiated 
third-party access to the network. The single-
buyer system in effect allows electricity buyers 
to benefit from differences between the prices 
offered by their supplier and those available 
from an alternative supplier, inside or outside 
their Member State, while remaining a customer 
of the monopoly supplier. In electricity systems 
for which a Member State chooses the single-
buyer option, independent producers and auto-
producers can use third-party access to supply 
their own premises and those of their sub-
sidiaries situated within the system and to sup-
ply any eligible customer outside the system. 
There is also provision for supply through direct 
lines by any producer or electricity supplier 
(where these are authorized) of their own 
premises, subsidiaries and eligible customers 
under certain conditions. 
The categories of electricity buyers who will be 
able to choose a supplier under the Directive 
('eligible customers') will be decided by the 
Member States. The Directive provides that 
customers using more than 100 GWh/year must 
be included. It also provides that distributors 
will be eligible to purchase electricity from 
alternative suppliers in order to supply it to their 
own customers who are themselves eligible. In 
order to meet the market opening thresholds 
provided for in the Directive, it is likely that 
certain Member States will enlarge the cate-
gories of major customers which are eligible. 
The Directive provides that customers may be 
prevented from obtaining electricity in another 
Member State if they would not be eligible 
there. However, the Commission may overrule 
such a refusal at the request of the Member 
State where the customer is situated. This pro-
vision will be valid for nine years, though the 
Commission will review its application after 
half this period. 
The Commission considers that the initial mar-
ket opening provided for in the Directive is a 
positive step as it is expected to create a dyna-
mic towards the completion of a fully competi-
tive single market for electricity in the Commu-
nity. At all events, the Commission is prepared 
to use also the powers conferred upon it to apply 
the competition rules of the Treaty in order to 
achieve this objective and to ensure that compe-
tition in this sector is not restricted by the action 
of undertakings in a manner contrary to the 
Treaty. In this respect, the recitals to the Direc-
tive specifically state that it will affect the appli-
cation of the competition rules of the Treaty. 
2. Proposal for a Directive on common 
rules on the internal market in gas 
724. Following its adoption of a common posi-
tion on the electricity Directive, the Council 
turned its attention to the proposal for a Direc-
tive concerning common rules for the internal 
market in gas. The Irish Presidency proposed a 
compromise text after consultations with Mem-
ber States and interested parties. 
The discussions at the Energy Council on 3 
December focused on some key issues. They 
resulted in unanimous conclusions. It was agreed 
that public service obligations may be imposed on 
undertakings provided they do not unduly hamper 
competition. The principles of unbundling and 
transparency of accounts were also accepted but 
must be considered with regard to issues of com-
mercial confidentiality and the imposition of 
unnecessary administrative processes. As regards 
access to the system, the Presidency proposed that 
it should be effected either through a system of 
regulated third-party access or negotiated third-
party access. Further work is needed on other 
issues related to the opening of the market and to 
long-term supply contracts ('take or pay' con-
tracts). The Council stated that it would adopt a 
common position in May 1997. Il — STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS 
D — Postal services 
1. Proposal for a Directive on common 
rules for the development of postal 
services 
725. An agreement in principle on the key ele-
ments of the proposal for a Directive based on 
Articles 57, 66 and 100a of the Treaty establish-
ing common rules for the development of postal 
services was reached at a Council meeting held 
on 18 December. The reserved sector is to 
cover, in so far as necessary to maintain the uni-
versal service, items of correspondence weigh-
ing less than 350 grammes and/or costing less 
than five times the basic tariff, including domes-
tic mail, cross-border mail and direct mail. The 
size of the reserved sector will be reviewed in 
the year 2000, for adjustment as from 2003, on 
the basis of new proposals which the Commis-
sion is required to present before 1999. The new 
proposals are to be drawn up taking account of, 
inter alia, economic, social and technological 
developments and may result in more extensive 
liberalization of postal activities. Unless the 
Directive is subsequently amended, it will cease 
to be applicable on 31 December 2004. 
Discussions on other aspects of the proposal 
are currently under way. The proposal will also 
be discussed in the European Parliament in 
accordance with the usual legislative proce-
dures. 
measures and must be examined in the light of 
Article 90 of the EC Treaty. 
2. Draft notice on the application of the 
competition rules to the postal sector 
726. In order to secure transparency and 
improved legal certainty for the various parties 
concerned, the Commission is considering pub-
lishing a notice on the interpretation which it 
will place on the competition rules of the EC 
Treaty as applied to the postal sector. The notice 
will take account of the progress in discussions 
on the proposal for a Directive and comments it 
has received after publication of the draft notice 
in 1995.' 
E — Transport 
727. In the transport sector, the Commission 
attaches particular importance to ensuring that 
the benefits of liberalization are not jeopardized 
by monopolistic and/or discriminatory practices 
regarding infrastructure and essential services. 
Such practices very often result from State 
1. Airports 
72& On 15 October the Council adopted a 
Directive on ground-handling activities at air-
ports in the European Union.
2 It provides for 
opening up to competition ground-handling ser-
vices in airports, including self-handling by air-
lines. In the case of certain services (baggage 
handling, ramp handling, fuel and oil handling), 
Member States may limit operators to two, of 
whom at least one must be independent of the 
airport and the dominant carrier. In any event, 
suppliers of ground-handling to third parties 
must maintain transparency as to accounts· and 
the airport may not finance ground-handling 
services from income deriving from its monop-
oly position. 
The various parts of the Directive will enter into 
force gradually, depending on the type of activ-
ity involved and the size of the individual air-
ports. The Commission may authorize deroga-
tions, after it has examined the position, in the 
case of serious problems concerning capacity 
and available space in particular airports. 
729. The Commission is also continuing its 
application of the competition rules to the activ-
ities of enterprises and State measures involving 
airport activities, such as landing charges and 
ground-handling. With particular reference to 
ground-handling activities, it initiated proceed-
ings under Articles 90 and 86 against Greece 
concerning the exclusive right granted to 
Olympic Airways to provide services to third 
parties. As a result of the proceedings, the 
Greek Government undertook to liberalize air-
port services a year earlier than envisaged under 
the Council Directive and to introduce quality 
standards and quality control, tariffs more 
closely linked to cost, separate accounting for 
ground-handling activities and improved infra-
structures. 
130. Regarding landing charges, the Commis-
sion instituted infringement proceedings under 
Article 169 of the EC Treaty against Belgium 
for its continued failure to notify it of the meas-
ures adopted to terminate the system of 
OJ C 322, 2.12.1995, p. 3. See also XXVth Competition Report, 
point 118. A summarized version of the comments was pub-
lished on 17 October in C0M(96) 480. 
Council Directive 96/67/EC of 15 October 1996 on access to the 
ground-handling market at Community airports, OJ L 272, 
25.10.1996, p. 36.  45 discounts operated at Brussels-National Airport. 
In a Decision adopted in 1995 under Article 90, 
the Commission considered that this was con-
trary to Articles 90 and 86 of the EC Treaty.' 
2. Ports 
7J7. Following a complaint by a Danish ferry 
company, Mercandia, the Commission secured 
an undertaking from the Danish Government 
that competition between car ferries between 
Denmark and Sweden would not be restricted 
unjustifiably by State measures. The measures 
involved took the form of a refusal by the 
authorities to grant access to the harbour facili-
ties at Helsingør to other operators able to com-
pete against ScandLines A/S, a company jointly 
controlled by the Danish State enterprise DBS 
and the Swedish enterprise SweFerry, which 
enjoyed exclusive rights to carry motor vehicles 
by ferry between Helsingør and Helsingborg in 
Sweden. 
134. Since the exclusive rights of importation, 
exportation, wholesale distribution and produc-
tion were discontinued in Sweden and Finland 
in 1995, the Commission has concentrated on 
retail sales. It does not consider that the exclu-
sive rights regarding retail sales in these two 
countries are contrary to Community law, ta-
king account of the objectives pursued, provid-
ed that there is no discrimination between 
national products and products imported from 
other Member States.·' 
Monitoring arrangements have been developed 
in the two countries in order to ensure compli-
ance with this basic objective. Periodic reports 
on retail-sales activities are drawn up by the 
Swedish competition authority and the Finnish 
product-control agency. The Commission is 
monitoring the activities of those monopolies 
on the basis of the reports while reserving the 
right, in response to any complaints submitted 
to it, to initiate formal proceedings if non-dis-
crimination is not being secured effectively. 
The Commission considered that the refusal to 
grant access to essential infrastructure constitu-
ted a State measure protecting and strengthen-
ing the position of a public operator and a 
breach of Articles 90 and 86 of the EC Treaty. 
The Commission's conclusions broadly con-
curred with those of a recommendation present-
ed by the Danish Competition Board to the 
Danish Government in 1993. Following discus-
sions with the Commission, the Danish Govern-
ment agreed to provide access to the harbour 
facilities at Helsingør to a new ferry operator 
selected on the basis of a tendering procedure. 
F — Other State monopolies of a 
commercial character 
132. The Commission continued its efforts to 
secure compliance with Article 37 of the EC 
Treaty. The adjustment of national monopolies 
of a commercial nature in the new Member 
States received particular attention. 
2. Austrian manufactured tobacco 
monopoly 
135. Under Article 71 of the Act of Accession, 
Austria is required gradually to adjust its 
monopoly of manufactured tobacco so that, by 
31 December 1997 at the latest, all discrimina-
tion between nationals of Member States in the 
conditions of supply and outlets is eliminated. 
The Commission considers that the gradual 
opening-up has not been progressing satisfac-
torily. Although Austria has already repealed the 
exclusive rights of importation and wholesale 
marketing of Community products from the 
beginning of 1996, the new legislation lays 
down unjustified conditions for new operators, 
entailing discrimination in favour of the former 
national monopoly.
4 The Commission therefore 
initiated infringement proceedings against 
Austria. 
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1. Austrian, Swedish and Finnish 
alcohol monopolies 
133. The adjustment of the Austrian alcohol 
monopoly was completed by the discontinuance 
with effect from 1 January 1996 of the exclusive 
rights of importation and wholesale distribution 
of alcoholic beverages originating in other 
Member States.
2 
XXVth Competition Report, point 120. 
Section 106(1) and (2) of Law No 703/1994 of 31.8.1994. 
XXVth Competition Report, point 126. 
Law No 830 of 21.12.1995 (BGBl. 279). Ill — MERGER CONTROL 
A — Introduction 
136. This year, concentrations falling under the 
Merger Regulation' increased substantially over 
1995. This indicates the continuing trend 
towards further integration of the European 
companies and markets. Notwithstanding this 
development, a number of concentrations with 
cross-border effects are still not caught by the 
Merger Regulation as the undertakings con-
cerned do not meet the required turnover thresh-
olds. 
137. The Commission received 131 notifica-
tions (1995: 114) and took 125 final decisions 
(1995: 109). Activity in 1996 was, again, signi-
ficantly higher (about 15%) than the previous 
year. A total of six second-phase investigations 
were completed compared with seven a year 
earlier. Three operations (Gencor/Lonrho, 
Kesko/Tuko and Saint Gobain/Wacker 
Chemie/NOM) were prohibited compared with 
two in 1995, two operations (Kimberly-
Clark/Scott and Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz) were 
given the green light after an in-depth investi-
gation subject to conditions (1995: three) and in 
one case (Telefónica/Sogecable/Cablevision), 
the operation was aborted by the parties. Also, 
two Commission decisions taken pursuant to 
Article 8 of the Merger Regulation (Shell/Mon-
tecatini and RTL/Veronica/Endemol) were 
amended after significant structural changes 
were made to the two operations. The Commis-
sion referred three cases to the competent com-
petition authorities of Member States and one 
Commission decision was taken on the basis of 
a referral from a Member State. As far as con-
centrations in the coal and steel industries are 
concerned, the Commission took seven deci-
sions under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty. 
138. In the six years since the Merger Regula-
tion's entry into force, the Commission has ta-
ken 508 final decisions. The sectoral breakdown 
of cases indicates that high numbers of notifica-
tions reflected a particularly dynamic economic 
development in some business sectors, notably 
in telecommunications, financial services, phar-
maceuticals, insurance and the media. 
Β — Merger review 
Merger Regulation and hence are not notified 
under it. In order to remedy this situation as 
well as to address other problems identified, 
notably, multiple national filings and the issue 
of cooperative and concentrative joint ventures, 
the Commission initiated a broad consultation 
and published a Green Paper in January 1996, 
which subsequently led to a proposal for a 
review of the Merger Regulation. 
Key issues proposed by the Commission 
include: (i) the lowering of the required 
turnover thresholds (ECU 3 billion instead of 5 
for worldwide turnover and ECU 200 million 
instead of 250 for Community-wide turnover); 
(ii) the introduction of reduced turnover thresh-
olds (ECU 2 billion and 100 million respec-
tively) for concentrations which would require 
simultaneous notification in at least three Mem-
ber States, in order to create a 'one-stop shop' 
for companies; (iii) the extension of the appli-
cation of the procedural regime of the Merger 
Regulation to all full-function joint ventures, 
i.e. both to concentrative JVs and to those 
which raise cooperative aspects (i.e. to which 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty applies); (iv) a sim-
plification of the conditions for referral of cases 
both from the Commission to a Member State 
(Article 9) and from a Member State to the 
Commission (Article 22); (v) the introduction 
of a provision which explicitly foresees the pos-
sibility of commitments in the first phase of 
investigation; and (vi) several other more minor 
elements such as a change of the definition of 
turnover for banks and financial institutions. 
Following the transmission of the Commission 
proposal to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment and the Economic and Social Committee 
in September 1996,
2 discussions have been pur-
sued in the Council working group on the dif-
ferent amendments proposed by the Commis-
sion. On 13 November the Industry Council had 
an exchange of views on the Commission pro-
posal. It came to the conclusion that there was 
no qualified majority on the reduction of the 
turnover thresholds but agreed on the need to 
find a solution to the problem of concentrations 
which currently require simultaneous notifica-
tion in at least three Member States. To this 
effect it agreed a range of criteria to be used to 
define the Commission competence in this field. 
The Commission has been working on these 
139. Six years of experience with the Merger 
Regulation have shown that, despite the effec-
tiveness of the instrument, an important number 
of concentrations with significant cross-border 
effects do not meet the thresholds of the 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 
30.12.1989, p. 1. 
Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings, OJ C 350, 21.11.1996, p. 8.  47 criteria while maintaining its current proposal. 
The Economic and Social Committee issued its 
report on the Green Paper on 17 May and on the 
proposed review on 31 October. The European 
Parliament adopted its report both on the Green 
Paper and on the review on 12 November. Both 
the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee's reports are favourable to 
the Commission's proposal. 
regularly base their prescription decision on 
objective scientific findings about efficacies 
and similarities between drugs. For this reason, 
in the present case the Commission took into 
account whether the pharmaceuticals grouped 
in a particular ATC class, third level, really have 
the same intended use, or whether pharmaceuti-
cals in other ATC classes have similar intended 
use and efficacies. 
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C — New developments 
1. Relevant product market 
140. A number of new developments have 
occurred with regard to product market defini-
tion, particularly in the pharmaceutical and 
retail sectors. In the area of pharmaceuticals, it 
was the first second phase case in this sector, the 
merger between the two large Swiss companies 
Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz into a new entity called 
Novartis, which gave rise to more refined mar-
ket analysis, and which was finally cleared by 
the Commission subject to an undertaking in the 
area of animal health. In the retail field, these 
developments occurred with regard to the 
approved acquisition of the Austrian retailer 
Billa by the German company Rewe as well as 
in the first second phase case in that sector, 
which involved the two Finnish companies 
Kesko and Tuko, and which resulted in a 
prohibition decision. 
141. Following Commission practice, pharma-
ceuticals can be divided according to the 
'Anatomical Therapeutic Classification'· (ATC) 
which is endorsed and used by the WHO. In 
particular, the third level of the ATC classifica-
tion allows for a regrouping of pharmaceuticals 
based on therapeutical indication, i.e. intended 
use. It therefore constitutes a useful tool for a 
first screening of the possible relevant markets. 
In the case Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz the Commission 
addressed for the first time in more depth the 
issue that, while market definition on this basis 
should be appropriate in many cases, the analy-
sis should not necessarily be limited to a delim-
itation according to the third level of the ATC 
classification. Such a delimitation may be too 
narrow in some cases and too wide in others. 
The substitutability of products depends ulti-
mately on the indication for which they are 
approved or prescribed or on their demand-side 
substitutability from the point of view of the 
consumer for OTC products. In the case of pre-
scription drugs, it would depend therefore on 
the point of view of the prescribing doctors who 
742. In the Rewe/Billa and Kesko/Tuko cases 
the Commission stated, in line with previous 
practice, that there is an overall market for food 
retailing which comprises all the retail stores 
with a typical range of food and non-food daily 
consumer products excluding specialized shops. 
In food retailing there are different types of dis-
tribution systems which differ according to 
breadth and depth of product ranges and to size 
of shops. There are competitive relations 
between these types of distribution systems. 
143. On the procurement market in food retail-
ing, i.e. daily consumer goods, where the food 
retailers are on the demand side and the produ-
cers are on the supply side, the Commission 
took the view in the Rewe/Billa case that it may 
be necessary to distinguish between the demand 
for different groups of products which are par-
tly distributed by different distribution chan-
nels. In the Kesko/Tuko case, the Commission 
confirmed this approach, and considered that 
from the demand-side point of view each prod-
uct group constitutes a separate relevant market. 
In this case it was also stressed that producers of 
goods other than food had other distribution 
channels at their disposal. 
2. Relevant geographic market 
144. While assessing the proposed concen-
tration between Rewe/Billa and Kesko/Tuko, 
the Commission also had to deal with the geo-
graphical definition of retail markets in food 
retailing and daily consumer goods. From the 
direct point of view of the consumer, the rel-
evant geographic markets are local markets in 
which the companies concerned have their retail 
outlets. These markets can be defined in the 
Commission's view as markets covering a circle 
with a radius of approximately 20 car minutes. 
However, an assessment limited to these local 
markets is considered inappropriate if a large 
number of local markets affected by the con-
centration are so closely interlinked that they 
overlap and thus cover a larger region or even — MERGER CONTROL 
the entire territory of a Member State. In this 
context it is necessary to take into account that 
the competitive relations between the large 
retail chains are not limited to local competi-
tion, but take place on a much wider geograph-
ic dimension. This can be seen for example 
through the largely centralized decisions taken 
by the large retail chains about the product 
ranges on offer. 
3. Dominance assessment 
3.1. Single dominance 
145. The Commission addressed the issue of 
single dominance in the consumer goods sector 
in the Kimberly-Clark/Scott case. It came to the 
conclusion that the concentration would lead to 
a dominant position of the merged entity on the 
UK and Irish markets for toilet paper, kitchen 
paper and handkerchiefs/facial tissues. The 
finding as to Kimberly-Clark/Scott's post-mer-
ger dominance was based on the parties' high 
shares of UK/Irish tissue products' sales and 
production capacity and on the competitive 
strength of the parties' brands, Kleenex and 
Andrex, numbers 1 and 2 in the UK and Ireland. 
The parties' control of the two leading brands, 
which are essential brands for retailers to stock, 
coupled with their position as the leading sup-
plier of private label products and overall mar-
ket strength, combined to create a dominant 
position. In particular, the Commission consid-
ered that after the merger there would no longer 
be sufficiently strong interbrand competition, 
which is an essential competitive dynamic in 
the UK/Irish tissue markets. Tied sales and mar-
keting policy, linking branded and private label 
products on the one hand and the two major 
brands on the other, would likely lead to anti-
competitive behaviour resulting from the cre-
ation of a dominant position. These concerns 
were finally removed by the parties offering a 
complex divesture package including both pro-
duction capacity and brands. 
3.2. Duopolistic dominance 
146. The Commission decided to oppose the 
proposed merger of Gencor's and Lonrho's plat-
inum mining interests, finding that the merger 
would create a position of duopolistic domi-
nance in the worldwide platinum and rhodium 
markets. It is estimated that most of the global 
platinum and rhodium reserves are controlled 
by only four suppliers: the Anglo-American 
Platinum Corporation (Amplats), Impala Plat-
inum, Lonrho Platinum Division (LPD) and the 
Russian producer from the Noril'sk mine in 
northern Siberia. In 1995, these four suppliers 
accounted for almost 90% of total sales of plat-
inum and rhodium. The platinum and rhodium 
markets presented many of the characteristics of 
an oligopolistic market: 
— On the demand side, there is moderate 
growth, demand is inelastic (relative 
to price) and there is insignificant counter-
vailing buyer power. Buyers are therefore 
highly vulnerable to potential abuse. 
— The supply side is highly concentrated with 
high transparency for a homogeneous prod-
uct, mature production technology, high 
entry barriers (including high sunk costs) 
and producers with financial links and mul-
ti market contacts. 
The main elements of competition in recent 
years have been the expansion of LPD and 
Russian sales from stocks partly motivated by 
its currency needs. The present merger would 
have led to the elimination of LPD as a com-
petitor; furthermore, Russian stocks are expec-
ted to be depleted in the near term. The Com-
mission's investigation demonstrated that 
Amplats and Impala/LPD would have had no 
incentive to compete after the merger. 
3.3. Demand-side power 
147. Demand-side power can be of relevance to 
the assessment of concentrations from two 
points of view. It can limit supplier power and 
can therefore act as a counterweight. It can also 
lead, where a dominant position results on a 
market, to the creation of buying power vis-à-
vis suppliers. For this reason, it may also be 
necessary to assess concentrations from the 
point of view of whether they lead to a domi-
nant market position on the demand side. In the 
Rewe/Billa case, the Commission explained that 
the demand-side power of a retail company is 
determined by the degree to which a produ-
cer needs to sell his products via a retail com-
pany. However, in the context of merger con-
trol, the key issue is not the possible depend-
ence of single individual suppliers. What is 
decisive is the extent to which suppliers have on 
average the possibility to substitute supplies to 
the retailer in question by supplies to other buy-
ers. In this respect, in the Rewe/Billa and 
Kesko/Tuko cases, the Commission made three 
broad statements. The demand-side power 
depends essentially on the market share which 
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the retailer has on the retail market. However, it 
is also necessary to take into account that 
demand-side power expressed through the mar-
ket share in food retailing can have different 
consequences for certain groups of products, 
depending on whether other distribution chan-
nels exist. Finally, countervailing power could 
stem from the market position of certain brands 
indispensable for the retailer. 
D — The media 
148. In recent years, there has been a significant 
increase in the number of cases in the media 
sector dealt with by the Commission under the 
Merger Regulation. 
Until recently, the notified concentrations con-
cerned mainly joint ventures which focused on 
a national media market. The critical cases were 
related mainly to alliances of national players 
resulting in a competition problem on a specific 
national market or in a specific European 
region. Lately, there has been a trend towards 
cross-border alliances in the TV sector with a 
European-wide perspective. These alliances are 
to a great extent complementary in terms of 
national markets where the parties are active. 
They may, however, lead to a substantial change 
in the TV landscape in the EU. The Bertels-
mann/CLT case is an example of this type of 
concentration. By this operation UFA, the hold-
ing company for the television, film and radio 
activities of Bertelsmann, and the CLT. group 
will merge into a joint venture, thereby creating 
a leading European player in free-access TV. 
The concentration was cleared by the Commis-
sion given that there is an overlap in the TV 
activities of the parties only in Germany, where 
CLT/UFA faces strong competition from the 
commercial TV channels linked to the Kirch 
group. 
149. As reported last year,' in recent years there 
have been prohibition decisions in three media 
cases. One of these prohibition decisions con-
cerned the Dutch TV joint venture Holland 
Media Groep (HMG) between RTL, Veronica 
and Endemol. HMG was prohibited in Septem-
ber 1995 because of the vertical integration 
between the leading Dutch TV producer and the 
leading Dutch commercial broadcaster and the 
horizontal integration of three general-interest 
channels resulting in a dominant position on the 
TV advertising market. In 1996 the concentra-
tion could, however, be cleared in a substan-
tially modified form. The complete withdrawal 
of the TV producer Endemol from HMG and 
the proposed transformation of RTL5 from a 
general-interest channel into a thematic channel 
removed the competition problems in both the 
TV production market and the TV advertising 
market. 
750. In July 1995, Telefonica and Sogecable 
(Canal Plus Spain) agreed to merge their activi-
ties relating to the supply of services to opera-
tors of cable, audiovisual and television services 
into ajoint venture, Cablevision. This joint ven-
ture also had indirect effects on the voice tele-
phony and data communications markets. At the 
time, the companies concerned considered the 
operation to be of a purely national dimension 
and no notification was made to the Commis-
sion. On 1 March 1996 the Spanish Government 
authorized Cablevision as a concentration with 
a national dimension. The operation was com-
pleted and Cablevision had been active on the 
market for several months. However, the Com-
mission took the view that the operation 
required notification under the Merger Regula-
tion, given that the undertakings concerned 
whose turnover should be taken into account 
were, on the one hand, Telefonica and, on the 
other, Canal Plus Spain, to whose turnover 
should be added that of Canal Plus France and 
the Prisa group (both, in the Commission's 
view, jointly controlling Canal Plus Spain with 
25% of the holdings each). 
On 29 March the Commission sent a statement 
of objections in accordance with Article 18 of 
the Regulation to Telefonica and Canal Plus 
Spain. This was to give the undertakings con-
cerned the opportunity of replying to the Com-
mission's objections, prior to the possible adop-
tion of decisions based on Article 8 (including 
previous interim measures) and Article 14 of the 
said Regulation because of Cablevision's failure 
to notify the Commission and because it had 
implemented the operation. The latter sanction 
procedure under Article 14 is following its 
course. 
The parties finally submitted a notification on 
31 May. The Commission decided to initiate an 
in-depth investigation of the operation because 
of serious doubts about its compatibility with 
the common market. The Commission stated in 
XXVth Competition Report, points 132-134. — MERGER CONTROL 
particular that the concentration could, on the 
one hand, lead to foreclosure effects by pre-
venting the entry of new competitors into the 
market for services to operators of cable, audio-
visual and television services and, on the other, 
delay the effects of the forthcoming liberaliza-
tion of the market for voice telephony in Spain. 
On 4 November the Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations delivered an opinion on the case 
stating that the concentration had a Community 
dimension, and that it should be declared 
incompatible with the common market because 
it caused the creation or strengthening of domi-
nant positions of Telefonica and Canal Plus 
Spain in several markets in Spain in the field of 
cable infrastructures and services, pay-TV and 
voice telephony. Three days later Telefonica and 
Canal Plus Spain announced the demerger of 
Cablevision, which henceforth would be under 
100% control of Sogecable, and the revocation 
of the strategic alliance between the two com-
panies. 
757. This operation also gave rise to a court 
case. In July the President of the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) decided to reject the request 
from Sogecable for interim measures by declar-
ing the application inadmissible.' Sogecable 
asked the Court to decide, inter alia, that the 
Commission should not take any final decision 
on the compatibility of the concentration with 
the common market or impose any fines on the 
undertakings before the Court could rule on the 
validity of the Commission's earlier 'decision' 
that Cablevision was a concentration with a 
Community dimension within the meaning of 
the Merger Regulation. 
The President of the Court ruled that, in the 
context of interim measures, it was not possible 
for the Court to take a decision that would 
impede the Commission in the exercise of its 
powers of investigation and sanction immedi-
ately after the commencement of an adminis-
trative procedure and before the Commission 
had adopted the provisional or definitive deci-
sions that the parties wanted to avoid. More-
over, if the plaintiff's application were allowed, 
the judiciary would not be performing the role 
of controlling the Commission, but would 
rather be replacing the Commission in the exer-
cise of its administrative functions. The granti-
ng of interim measures in the context of an 
administrative Commission procedure would 
only be possible under exceptional circum-
stances, evidence of the existence of which had 
to be furnished by the parties. 
E — Referrals under Articles 9 
and 22 
752. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Merger Regu-
lation, the Commission may refer a notified 
concentration to the competent authority of a 
Member State on its request if, on a distinct 
market in the Member State concerned, the 
concentration threatens to create or strengthen a 
dominant market position. 
753. The Commission decided that the public 
bid by Gehe for Lloyds Chemists should be 
referred to the UK competition authorities for 
further investigation. Both Gehe and Lloyds are 
large players in the UK business of pharmaceu-
tical wholesaling and retailing. At the time of 
the Gehe bid, Lloyds was already subject to a 
bid by UniChëm, another leading British phar-
maceutical wholesaler/retailer, which did not 
fall under the Merger Regulation and which had 
already been referred by the UK competition 
authorities to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC). Referral of the 
Gehe/Lloyds case to the UK authorities there-
fore presented the advantage of allowing both 
bids to be examined by the same regulatory 
authority in a coordinated timeframe. 
154. The Commission also decided to refer the 
RWE/Thyssengas and Bayernwerk/lsarwerke 
cases to the Bundeskartellamt with a view to the 
application of German national competition 
law. RWE Energie AG intended to acquire a 
share of 50% in Thyssengas GmbH from 
VIAG's subsidiary Bayernwerk AG. As a coun-
termove, Bayernwerk AG was to acquire 
RWE's share in Isarwerke GmbH. Both of the 
proposed concentrations fell within the scope of 
the EC Merger Regulation and were therefore 
notified to the Commission. The electricity and 
gas markets in Germany are still currently char-
acterized by a system of geographic monopo-
lies. Thyssengas is a supplier of gas piped over 
a long distance, whose supply area covers the 
western part of North Rhine-Westphalia. RWE, 
one of the leading German electricity compa-
nies, has shares in a number of local energy sup-
pliers of towns and cities, which are located in 
the supply area of Thyssengas and are supplied 
with gas by the latter. Bayernwerk is an energy 
producer whose supply area covers most of 
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance of 12 July 
1996 in Case T-52/96 R Sogecable SA ν Commission (not yet 
reported).  51 Bavaria. The holding company Isarwerke is the 
majority shareholder of Isar-Amperwerke AG, a 
regional energy supplier. Because of the threat 
of a strengthening of dominant market positions 
in regional gas and electricity markets, the Bun-
deskartellamt requested referrals in both cases. 
In both of these cases the possible competition 
problems concerned regional markets within 
Germany. The Commission therefore regarded 
it as appropriate to refer the cases back to the 
Bundeskartellamt for further investigation. 
security interests connected with the production 
of or trade in arms, munitions and war material 
as long as the concentration does not adversely 
affect conditions of competition for products 
not intended for specifically military purposes. 
In its decisions in both cases, the Commission 
followed its previous practice by assessing the 
civilian activities involved in the concentrations 
('dual-use technology').
1 
755. The Commission's examination of the 
acquisition of Tuko by Kesko, both Finnish 
companies active in the sale of daily consumer 
goods in Finland, was initiated following a 
request from the Finnish Office of Free Compe-
tition, in the absence of which the Commission 
would have had no jurisdiction to deal with the 
case since the requisite turnover thresholds set 
out in the Merger Regulation are not attained by 
the parties concerned. However, in the latter 
event a Member State is entitled under Article 
22 of the Regulation to request the Commission 
to examine the case. The detailed investigation 
showed that the operation created a dominant 
position which significantly impeded effective 
competition on the retail and cash and carry 
markets for daily consumer goods in Finland. 
Moreover the operation affected intra-EC trade 
through its influence on the importation of 
daily consumer goods into Finland, and the cre-
ation of barriers to entry by potential competi-
tors from other Member States. The Commis-
sion therefore prohibited the concentration. 
F — Legitimate interests of 
Member States and application 
of Article 223 of the EC Treaty 
756. Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation 
(legitimate interests of Member States) was 
applied in the Sun Alliance/Royal Insurance 
case, where, alongside the Commission's com-
petition assessment of the proposed merger, the 
UK authorities were considering the change of 
control in the light of the requirements of insur-
ance legislation. In so doing, they were exer-
cising their right under Article 21(3) of the 
Merger Regulation to protect the UK's legiti-
mate interests with regard to prudential rules. 
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757. In the GEC/Thomson-CSF (II) and British 
Aerospace/Lagardère cases, the Commission 
took the view that Article 223(1 )(b) of the EC 
Treaty could apply. This provision gives a 
Member State the right to protect its essential  XXIVth Competition Report, point 336. — MERGER CONTROL 
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53 IV — STATE AID 
A — General policy 
158. The increasing number and complexity of 
aid cases examined by the Commission and the 
evermore active involvement of interested par-
ties prompted the Commission to undertake an 
in-depth review of the most effective method of 
controlling aid and improving the transparency 
and legal certainty of its procedures. The review 
is based on the Commission's own experience, 
including that acquired in other competition 
fields, on recent case-law of the Court of Justice 
and on the analyses submitted by representa-
tives of the Member States and industry. The 
Industry Council meeting on 14 November dis-
cussed State aid on the basis of a document pre-
pared by the Irish Presidency and a Commission 
policy paper concerning Article 94 of the EC 
Treaty. It came to the unanimous conclusion 
that the control of State aid requires a sustained 
effort to improve the legal certainty, predictabil-
ity and consistency of Commission decisions 
and, to that end, encouraged the Commission to 
submit proposals to it under Article 94 along the 
lines developed in the policy document. 
759. The Commission continued in 1996 to 
impose strict discipline whilst maintaining a 
balance between, on the one hand, compliance 
with the rules and principles of State aid and, on 
the other, the contribution made by some aid to 
the objectives of other Community policies. Its 
activities can be grouped under three main 
headings: 
1. Strict control of aid to certain 
sectors 
760. Certain sectors such as the synthetic fibres, 
motor vehicle, shipbuilding, steel and coal 
industries, for which the Commission has 
adopted specific substantive and formal rules, 
continued to be particularly strictly monitored 
because of the effects of aid on the market con-
cerned. Given the traditional problems of struc-
tural overcapacity and the very strong intra-
Community competition in these sectors, aid 
that is not strictly controlled and limited could, 
instead of solving a particular problem, simply 
result in difficulties being transferred from one 
firm to another, or from one region or country to 
another. This is why the Commission: 
— again set out its a priori negative position 
with regard to employment aid targeted at 
certain sectors in a notice on the monitoring 
of State aid and reduction of labour costs;' 
— in a new notice on de minimis aid, continued 
to exclude certain sectors from the benefit of 
this rule;
2 
— extended a series of instruments which had 
expired in order to maintain specific control 
in the fields concerned and in some cases 
avoid a legal vacuum. A new code on aid to 
the synthetic fibres industry,·
1 a new Council 
Regulation on aid to shipbuilding
4 and a new 
steel aid code
5 were thus 
adopted. 
The Commission also continued to keep a close 
watch on individual cases. Thus, it concluded 
that aid connected with a capacity increase in 
the Volkswagen Sachsen case was incompatible 
with the common market. On the other hand, it 
authorized aid accompanying a reduction in 
production capacity for Santana Motor SA 
(Suzuki vehicles, Spain), Mercedes-Benz Lud-
wigsfelde (Brandenburg), Ford Motor (Birm-
ingham, West Midlands), La Seda de Barcelona 
and Allied Signal Polymers GmbH (Thuringia). 
2. Clarification of rules 
767. In order to ensure that its decisions are 
transparent and straightforward, and that Mem-
ber States are treated equally, the Commission 
continued to publish and update the texts con-
taining its criteria for assessing aid under Arti-
cles 92 and 93 of the Treaty. Thus in 1996 it 
adopted: 
— a notice on de minimis aid
6 which extends 
the scope and simplifies the procedures for 
implementing that rule; 
— new Community guidelines on State aid for 
small and medium-sized enterprises
7 which 
introduces the possibility of aid for intangi-
ble investments in the form of technology 
transfers and applies to aid for SMEs, 
according to the new Community defini-
tion;
8 
OJC 1,3.1.1997, p. 10. 
OJ C 68, 6.3.1996, p. 9. The sectors are those covered by the 
ECSC Treaty, shipbuilding, transport, agriculture and fisheries. 
The other sectors are therefore eligible under the de minimis 
rule. 
OJC 94, 30.3.1996, p. 11. 
OJL251, 3.10.1996, p. 5. 
OJL338, 28.12.1996, p. 42. 
OJC 68, 6.3.1996, p. 9. 
OJC 213, 23.7.1996, p. 4. 
Commission recommendation of 3 April 1996 concerning the 
definition of small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ L 107, 
30.4.1996, p. 4.  55 56 
a framework for State aid to firms in 
deprived urban areas' which takes a 
favourable view of certain aid measures 
aimed at encouraging investment and job 
creation through the development of small 
businesses in rundown neighbourhoods; 
a communication on aid elements in land 
sales by public authorities
2 which defines a 
series of principles making it possible to 
determine rapidly whether any State aid is 
involved in publicly owned land sales to the 
private sector. 
3. Implementation of means of ensuring 
the effectiveness of existing rules 
762. The higher number of negative or partially 
negative final decisions ordering the repayment 
of illegal and incompatible aid confirms the 
Commission's determination to enforce compli-
ance with the rules and principles of State aid. 
The statistics show a marked increase in the 
number of negative (or partially negative) final 
decisions in 1996 in cases under the EC Treaty 
(12 against 6 in 1995) and under the ECSC 
Treaty (12 against 3 in 1995). Furthermore, the 
number of decisions ordering the repayment of 
aid granted in breach of the Treaty rose sharply 
in 1996.
1 The Commission takes the view that 
national laws or regulations cannot prevent 
decisions from being carried out. Thus it adop-
ted a negative final decision in respect of an 
Italian scheme extending the law on the extra-
ordinary administration of firms in difficulty to 
cover firms whose insolvency arises from the 
obligation to repay unlawful aid. 
763. The Commission also continued its work 
on other texts which may be adopted in 1997, 
for example codification of the rules on region-
al aid, revision of the guidelines concerning the 
motor vehicle industry, guidelines on short-term 
export credit insurance, a multisectoral frame-
work on regional aid for major investment proj-
ects, and studies on aid in the textile industry 
and on systemic risks in banking. A multilateral 
meeting took place in May with experts from 
the Member States and the European Free Trade 
Association Surveillance Authority which 
examined the question of the codification of 
regional aid and the need to retain the frame-
work for aid to the textile and clothing industry. 
764 The Commission continued its efforts to 
facilitate access to information: Volume IIA 
'Competition law in the European Communities 
— Rules applicable to State aid' is now avail-
able in English, on-line via the Internet in a reg-
ularly updated version. It finalized a user's 
guide to the rules in Volume IIB 'Explanation of 
the rules applicable to State aid', to be pub-
lished in early 1997. Lastly, it published a com-
pendium of negative final decisions taken in the 
period 1964-95. 
765. In July the Commission adopted a notice 
on the method for setting the reference and dis-
count rates
4 used to calculate the grant equiv-
alent of various forms of aid. In future, they will 
be based on the average rate of yield on State 
bonds on the secondary market, harmonized by 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI), multi-
plied by a premium specific to each Member 
State. This method avoids the principal disad-
vantages of the previous method, namely the 
variety of definitions and the difficulty of col-
lecting data on the rates every month. A study is 
also under way to check the current level of the 
premium on the EMI rates and the possibility of 
taking account of other medium-term rates of 
yield. 
Β — Concept of aid 
766. For a measure to be regarded as aid that is 
subject to the principle of incompatibility with 
the common market set out in Article 92( 1 ) of 
the EC Treaty, it must satisfy four criteria: it 
must provide the firm with an advantage; it 
must be granted by the State or through State 
resources; it must have particular characteris-
tics, i.e. it must favour only 'certain undertak-
ings or the production of certain goods'; lastly, 
it must affect trade between Member States. 
The four conditions are cumulative, i.e. if one of 
them is not satisfied, Article 92 is not applic-
able. 
The decisions taken in 1996 removed some of 
the uncertainties surrounding the concept of aid 
which various parties involved in the control of 
State aid continued to encounter. The way in 
which State aid is defined is of vital importance 
as, although it is solely for the Commission to 
determine whether derogations may be made 
SEC(96) 1706/2. 
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from the principle of incompatibility of aid, 
defining a measure as State aid directly or indi­
rectly affects a large number of players: first, 
the national courts and tribunals that have juris­
diction to decide on actions to determine the 
existence of State aid and, if necessary, whether 
it was granted in breach of the Treaty (in 1995, 
the Commission published a notice' encourag­
ing the national courts to make use of their pow­
ers concerning State aid and inviting them to 
cooperate with it in order to facilitate their task: 
see the Commission notice on cooperation 
between national courts and the Commission in 
the State aid field); second, the Member States, 
required as they are to notify the Commission of 
any plans to amend or introduce State aid; and 
lastly, recipient firms, required as they are to 
check whether the measure from which they 
benefit constitutes aid and, if so, whether the aid 
complies with the formal and substantive condi­
tions applicable, as legitimate expectation can­
not replace retroactively the normal diligence 
which all economic operators must display in 
checking the lawfulness of aid granted to them. 
1. Advantage to a firm 
the outcome of a bidding procedure, which must 
be open and sufficiently advertised, and cases 
where there was no such procedure. In the for­
mer case, if the successful bid was the best or 
only offer, the Commission will assume that no 
aid was contained in the sale, the latter neces­
sarily having taken place at the market price. In 
the second case, the Commission will ask an 
independent expert to establish the minimum 
value of the land: if the land is subsequently 
sold at that price or a higher price, the sale will 
not normally be regarded as containing an ele­
ment of aid. 
769. As regards privatizations, the Commission 
continues to apply the principle that there is no 
aid when shares are sold to the highest bidder 
following an open and unconditional bidding 
procedure. In the absence of such a procedure, 
the case must be notified to enable the Com­
mission to decide whether aid is present and, if 
so, whether it is compatible with the common 
market. The privatization of Belgacom and 
British Energy, where the Member States con­
cerned transferred to the new owners all the lia­
bilities as well as the assets of the firm, was 
regarded as not containing aid. 
767. The Court and the Commission have con­
sistently held
2 that the concept of aid to a firm 
must be viewed in the broadest possible sense. 
Irrespective of the form it takes, a measure must 
be regarded as State aid under the Treaty if it 
gives the firm in question an economic or finan­
cial advantage which it would not have enjoyed 
in the normal course of events and which 
reduces the charges it would otherwise, have 
borne.' However, as the Financing of Por­
tuguese Radio and Television case confirms, 
compensation for the extra costs connected with 
public service obligations is not in itself a State 
aid. Similarly, the Commission confirmed its 
position that the public financing of infrastruc­
ture — in the case in point transport and energy 
or water distribution — at certain industrial sites 
in Austria did not involve any aid provided the 
utilization of the infrastructure was open to all 
the firms in those areas without discrimination. 
Furthermore, tax increases that are lower for cer­
tain products were regarded as tax deductions 
and thus equivalent to State aid, even if the rate 
had increased across the board for everyone, as 
in the case of the Danish waste-water tax law. 
76& In November the Commission adopted a 
notice on the possible aid content of sales of 
publicly owned land to the private sector.
4 A dis­
tinction is made between cases where the sale is 
According to the principle of neutrality pro­
vided for in Article 222 of the EC Treaty in rela­
tion to the system of public or private property 
ownership in the Member States, privatization 
cannot justify the granting of aid or be imposed 
as a condition of compatibility. However, where 
firms in difficulty are concerned, privatization 
may make it more credible that a firm will 
return to long-term viability. Thus, in the case of 
Head Tyrolia Mares (HTM), the Commission 
considered that the privatization of the company 
following an injection of ECU 118 million by 
its public parent, and subsequent sale for ECU 
0.7 million, contained State aid which it never­
theless approved owing, in particular, to the 
conditions imposed. 
770. The principle of a private investor in a 
market economy is often used in order to deter­
mine the presence of State aid in cases where 
public authorities transfer funds to public or 
OJC 312, 23.11.1995, p. 8. 
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than the recipients would find on the market in 
normal circumstances.' On the basis of this 
principle, the Commission considered that the 
repeated loans, capital injections and debt write-
offs enjoyed by Breda Fucine Meridionali 
would not have been available to a firm with 
private owners and therefore constituted State 
aid. As the aid was intended only to ensure the 
industrial survival of the firm, without any 
compensatory benefits, the Commission de-
cided to prohibit it. 
In other cases, however, public measures were 
not regarded as State aid. The Commission con-
cluded that the sale to the private sector of 
British Coal Enterprise (BCE), a subsidiary of 
the public British Coal Corporation (BCC), at a 
price below the nominal value of BCE's debts 
to BCC. did not contain State aid. BCE had no 
own capital and had also undertaken a number 
of social measures to promote employment; 
BCC could not therefore expect that the sums 
owed to it by BCE should be totally reimbursed 
within a reasonable, foreseeable period. The 
Commission therefore concluded that, inas-
much as the sale had been the outcome of a 
transparent and non-discriminatory bidding pro-
cedure and that the highest bid had been chosen, 
BCC had acted like a private investor whose 
primary aim was to maximize profits. In the 
Servóla SpA case, the acquisition of a minority 
stake of 35% in the capital of the private steel 
company Servóla by two public holding compa-
nies (Friulia SpA and GEPI) was not regarded 
as containing State aid. In view of the com-
pany's healthy economic, financial and indus-
trial position and prospects
2 and the legal condi-
tions governing the acquisition, the latter was 
deemed to have taken place in accordance with 
the criteria adopted by a private operator mak-
ing a similar investment under normal market 
conditions. 
against the French Government in order to 
examine in closer detail the extent to which the 
provision of premises and staff, the transfer of 
customers and promotional and advertising 
measures taken by the parent company, the Post 
Office, a public undertaking, could constitute 
State aid. The Court of Justice considered, in its 
judgment in Syndicat français de l'Express 
international (SFEI) ν la Poste, that the provi-
sion of logistical or commercial support without 
a fair counter-concession by a public undertak-
ing to a private subsidiary engaged in an activ-
ity open to free competition constituted State 




3. Specificity of a measure 
172. In order for a measure to be regarded as 
State aid, it must assist only certain firms or cer-
tain products.
5 Thus, although measures of 
economic, tax or general social policy may give 
a competitive edge to firms in the country 
implementing them, they are not covered by the 
competition rules on State aid as they constitute 
general measures which may be subject to the 
Treaty provisions on the approximation of laws. 
The distinction between these two concepts is 
difficult to establish in advance according to 
universal criteria. The Commission is accord-
ingly endeavouring to refine the definition 
inductively on the basis of actual cases it deals 
with. In Maribel bis/ter. the Commission con-
sidered that the additional reduction in social 
security contributions provided for in the Bel-
gian law in question constituted State aid as it 
was restricted to firms chiefly engaged in those 
industries most exposed to international compe-
tition. In a similar vein, the Court of Justice 
upheld the Commission's position in Kimberly-
Clark Sopaliif and found that, in order for a 
measure to be described as general, it was nec-
essary in particular that the State should have no 
2. Origin of resources 
5 S 
777. The financial or economic advantages 
enjoyed by a firm must be granted by the State. 
in the broadest possible sense, or through State 
resources.' Cross-subsidization between a pub-
lic company operating on a non-competitive 
market and one of its subsidiaries operating on 
a market where there is free competition may 
constitute aid granted through State resources. 
In the Société Française de Messagerie Inter-
nationale (SFMiyChronopost and Sécuripost 
cases, the Commission, in response to several 
complaints, initiated the Article 93(2) procedure 
See in particular Cases C-305/89 Italy ν Commission [1991] 
ECR 1-1603 and C-234/84 Belgium ν Commission [1986] ECR 
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discretionary power enabling it to vary the 
application of the measure according to such 
considerations as the choice of recipient, the 
amount or the conditions of the intervention. 
The fact that the measure in question was in 
principle available to all firms, sectors or 
regions but was limited by the possibility for the 
State to refuse to grant it, even on the sole basis 
of objective conditions defined limitatively by 
the laws and regulations, was sufficient for the 
measure to be deemed aid. 
• 
The Commission also clarified the distinction 
between aid and general measures in its notice 
on monitoring of State aid and reduction of 
labour costs.' It states there that national labour 
cost reduction measures are not covered by Arti-
cle 92( 1 ) of the EC Treaty where, despite being 
targeted at certain categories of worker (e.g. 
low-wage earners), they apply to all firms, or 
where they concern activities not involving trade 
between Member States (e.g. local services). 
was not affected inasmuch as the tax exemption 
for existing firms was limited to small firms 
carrying out purely local activities or falling 
below the de minimis threshold. 
774. Finally, on a more general level, the Com-
mission confirmed this year, in its new notice on 
de minimis aid,
2 that it considered that very 
small amounts of aid do not have much impact 
on trade between Member States. All aid of less 
than ECU 100 000 per firm over a period of 
three years, with the exception of export aid, 
will be regarded as not subject to Community 
control and need not therefore be notified to the 
Commission. 
C — Compatibility of aid with the 
common market: developments 
and trends 
1. Sectoral aid 
4. Distortion of competition and effect 
on intra-Community trade 
775. The last condition that must be met if a 
measure is to be considered aid is that it affects 
competition and intra-Community trade. Aid 
that favours certain firms to the detriment of 
others is almost automatically regarded as dis-
torting competition. The Commission thus con-
sidered in Tourisme social en Belgique that 
grants to associations organizing leisure activi-
ties aimed at affording underprivileged persons 
access to tourism infrastructure could distort 
competition in the hotel trade. Apart from their 
social role of promoting low-budget tourism 
and holidays for workers, the centres also oper-
ate traditional hotels which are in direct compe-
tition with others in the same category. In Insti-
tut Français du Pétrole (IFP), on the other 
hand, the parafiscal charge levied on certain 
petroleum products and paid to IFP did not con-
stitute State aid to the latter (as it was a public 
non-profit-making establishment) or to the 
firms benefiting from the results of the research, 
as there was no discrimination in access to the 
results. As the facts of the case rebutted the pre-
sumption of discrimination according to which 
a parafiscal charge 'necessarily' benefits nation-
al firms in particular, the measure did not lead to 
any distortion of competition. 
1.1. Sectors subject to specific rules 
1.1.1. Shipbuilding 
775. On 27 September' the Council decided 
that, since the OECD agreement on normal 
competitive conditions in commercial ship-
building and ship repair had not entered into 
force due to delays in US ratification, the sev-
enth Directive on aid to shipbuilding
4 should be 
prolonged ad interim until 31 December 1997 at 
the latest. If the agreement has still not entered 
into force by 1 June 1997 the Commission will 
put forward appropriate proposals to enable the 
Council to decide on future policy before 31 
December 1997. 
Against this background the Commission de-
cided to keep the common production aid ceil-
ing at 9% for large vessels and 4.5% for vessels 
costing less than ECU 10 million and for con-
versions. 
7 76. The most important individual case exam-
ined by the Commission this year concerns the 
diverting of aid intended for the former East 
German shipyards MTW and Volkswerft to 
their parent Bremer Vulkan AG. Having initi-
ated proceedings in February, the Commission 
As regards the impact of aid on intra-Commu-
nity trade, in the Zone franche Corse and Pacte 
de relance pour la ville cases the Commission 
concluded in part that intra-Community trade 
OJC 1,3.1.1997. p. 10. 
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Council Directive 90/684/EEC, as last amended by Directive 
94/73/EC.  59 is now closely examining the 'spillover' proce-
dure and the possibility of re-establishing the 
aid in accordance with the conditions on which 
it was authorized. 
As regards non-ECSC areas, one case
4 was 
examined in the metal tube production field. 
1.1.3. Coal 
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777. The financing of ships in Denmark in the 
period 1987-93 was also examined. In addition 
to authorizing aid under Article 4( 1 ) of the sev-
enth Directive for the period from 1 January to 
31 December in the various Member States, the 
Commission also approved restructuring aid in 
France and Italy. Under Article 4(7) of the 
Directive — which concerns aid granted in the 
form of development aid — 18 cases were 
approved, of which three in Germany, six in 
Spain and nine in the Netherlands. The proce-
dure provided for in Article 92(3) was initiated 
in respect of an application from the Spanish 
Government under Article 4(3) of the Directive 
for a derogation from the three-year period 
between signature of the contract and delivery 
of the ship. Lastly, a partly negative decision 
was taken in respect of a French law on the 
application of tax-reduction measures to invest-
ments in overseas departments, where they 
apply to shipbuilding. 
1.1.2. Steel 
778. During 1996 the Commission continued to 
be vigilant in applying the fifth steel aid code.' 
The Commission adopted 19 partially negative 
or negative decisions, for example Alti Forni e 
Ferriere di Semola, Breda Fucine Meridionali 
and Forges de Clabecq. With regard to the 
'Bresciani' cases in Italy, the Commission 
decided to authorize 33 aid cases and not to 
authorize aid in 10 cases. Where aid had already 
been paid in breach of rules of procedure, it also 
ordered the recovery of the aid.
2 
The close monitoring of eight Article 95 ECSC 
aid cases
1 was maintained with half-yearly 
reports being submitted to the Council. 
The fifth steel aid code expired at the end of 
1996. In December the Commission adopted a 
new steel aid code to cover the period until the 
ECSC Treaty expires in July 2002. It brings the 
rules on State aid for research and development 
and on aid for environmental protection into line 
with the revised Community framework on State 
aid for research and development and the 1994 
Community guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection respectively. Although in the 
latter case extensive limitations were imposed, 
the Commission allows aid for partial closures 
and aligns the procedural rules of the steel aid 
code on new developments in the EC. 
779. Decision No 3632/93/ECSC
5 of 28 
December 1993 establishes the Community 
rules on State aid to the coal industry covering 
the period from 1994 to 2002. In accordance 
with Article 2(2) of the Decision, Germany 
abolished its 'Kohlepfennig' levy on 1 January 
1996. This leaves Spain as the only Member 
State that has not yet complied fully with the 
Community rules. 
180. On 20 March, the Commission authorized 
the United Kingdom to grant financial assis-
tance for 1996 totalling ECU 455.5 million 
(GBP 378 million) to cover inherited liabilities. 
7S7. On 30 April, the Commission authorized 
Germany to grant financial assistance for 1996, 
totalling ECU 5 498.7 million (DEM 10 454.6 
million), in compensation to the electricity gen-
erators under the fifth Electricity-from-coal 
Law of 12 December 1995 for maintaining the 
underground workforce in the mines ('Berg-
mannsprämie'), for the supply of coal and coke 
to the Community steel industry, and to cover 
the exceptional costs of a number of coal under-
takings relating to inherited liabilities and 
restructuring. In addition, the Commission 
authorized additional aid of ECU 1 508.5 mil-
lion (DEM 2 826.9 million) for 1995 for the 
supply of coal and coke to the Community steel 
industry and to cover the exceptional restructur-
ing costs of a number of coal enterprises. In 
assessing the aid, the Commission nevertheless 
recognized that the reduction in costs, of the 
order of 3.6% between 1992 and 1995, was 
inadequate and confirmed the need for a firm 
approach to capacity reduction. 
7S2. On 30 April the Commission authorized 
France to grant aid for 1996 totalling ECU 
681.9 million (FRF 4 415 million) to cover 
operating losses, inherited liabilities resulting 
from the modernization, rationalization and 
restructuring of the coal industry and for 
research and development. 
Commission Decision 3855/91/ECSC of 27 November 1991. 
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183. On 30 April the Commission also author-
ized Spain to grant financial assistance amount-
ing to ECU 884.6 million (ESP 141 377 mil-
lion) for 1996, and amounting to ECU 867 mil-
lion (ESP 141 316 million) for 1995. The aid is 
intended to cover operating losses by coal 
undertakings, exceptional welfare aid paid to 
workers who lose their jobs as a result of 
restructuring, the technical costs of closing 
down mining installations, for research and 
development projects and for environmental 
protection. Moreover, Spain was also author-
ized to grant additional financial assistance for 
1994 totalling ECU 65.2 million (ESP 10 362 
million) to cover operating losses by coal 
undertakings. In authorizing the aid for 1996, 
the Commission noted that Spain is bringing its 
aid mechanism into line with the provisions of 
Article 2(2) of Decision No 3632/93/ECSC by 
31 December 1996 at the latest. 
184. On 29 May the Commission authorized 
Portugal to grant financial assistance totalling 
ECU 1.8 million (PTE 345.95 million) for 1995 
and 1996, to cover the compensation to be paid 
to workers who have lost their jobs as a result of 
the closure of the last Portuguese mine. 
demonstrated in the Volkswagen Sachsen case. 
Several notifications concerned regional aid in 
conjunction with other types of aid (innovation, 
environment, training, etc.), for example the 
MCC-Swatch case, where the Commission took 
account not only of the contribution to regional 
development but of the highly innovative nature 
of the project and the fact that the proposed 
environmental investments went well beyond 
statutory requirements in this area. 
787. The Suzuki Manzanares decision produced 
a more specific definition of the motor vehicle 
industry. According to the framework, the 
motor vehicle sector includes the manufacture 
of engines but excludes all parts and accessories 
for motor vehicles and engines. In view of the 
possible changes in the prices of components, 
the small part played by Manzanares in the total 
net cost of the engines and the fact that no sub-
assembling takes place on site, the Commission 
agreed to regard the plant as a components fac-
tory which is thus not covered by the frame-
work on State aid to the motor vehicle industry. 
Thus the aid granted to Suzuki Manzanares was 
examined solely in the light of the normal crite-
ria applicable to regional aid. 
1.1.4. Motor vehicle industry 
785. In 1996 the Commission took 20 decisions 
in this sector and made several general contri-
butions in the form of communications or stud-
ies with the aim of bringing the framework on 
State aid to the motor vehicle industry into line 
with the main developments in the industry. A 
communication on the motor vehicle industry, 
which also discusses utilization of production 
capacity in the Union, was adopted by the Com-
mission in June in the form of a decision. The 
Council resolution of November concerning the 
communication asked the Commission to pur-
sue its efforts to improve the transparency of 
State aid rules and ensure that the aid authorized 
did not entail distortion of competition. Lastly, 
with the support of independent consultants, the 
Commission initiated an analysis of the condi-
tions for the application and the effectiveness of 
the framework on State aid to the motor vehicle 
industry. The Commission will decide by the 
end of 1997 on future methods of controlling 
aid in this sector. 
786. The decisions concerning regional devel-
opment aid, which formed a majority of the cas-
es, confirmed that the principle of equivalence 
between the amount of aid granted and the lev-
el of regional handicaps had been complied 
with where production capacity was created, as 
788. The motor vehicle sector continues to be 
affected by structural overcapacity in Europe. In 
order to prevent surplus production capacity 
from further distorting competition, the Com-
mission, if necessary, studies the impact of a 
project on capacities in the sector in the member 
countries of the Union. In practice, a 'top-up' of 
3% of the eligible regional investment is auth-
orized where the recipient of the aid does not 
create extra production capacity in a saturated 
market segment. In the case of MCC-Swatch, a 
top-up was allowed because the special charac-
teristics of the new Smart car will create a new 
production segment on the vehicle market. The 
experts consulted considered, in addition, that 
the Smart would have a limited impact on exist-
ing market segments. It should be noted that in 
cases such as Mercedes-Benz Spain and Opel 
Portugal, the question of top-up did not arise as 
the intensity of the regional handicaps, as 
assessed in the cost/benefit analysis, was greater 
than the intensity of the aid proposed by the 
Member State. 
789. As regards restructuring aid, the Commis-
sion decided to terminate the Article 93(2) pro-
cedure against aid granted to Mercedes-Benz 
for the restructuring of a truck manufacturing 
plant at Ludwigsfelde (Germany). The Com-
mission concluded that the part of the aid repre-
senting 51.8% of the restructuring costs, i.e. an  61 62 
intensity that was in proportion to the cut in pro­
duction capacity, complied with the motor vehi­
cle framework and the guidelines on rescue and 
restructuring aid and could therefore be auth­
orized. On the other hand, it took a negative 
decision in respect of the amount of aid equal to 
the difference between the real value of the truck 
firm, FBG, on the market and the price fixed for 
the sale of the latter to Mercedes-Benz by the 
Treuhandanstalt. The Commission required that 
part of the aid to be recovered, and interest paid 
from the date of the sale, i.e. 1 January 1994. In 
the case of Santana Motor SA, after examining 
the restructuring plan drawn up in April 1995 
with a view to restoring the viability of the firm, 
the Commission decided to terminate the proce­
dure initiated in January 1995 in respect of the 
aid planned, and already partly granted, by the 
Spanish authorities. The cut in production 
capacity and the aid intensity were in proportion. 
The Commission therefore authorized the two 
loans and the social aid for redundant workers 
contained in the measure in question. 
790. At the international level, the agreements 
signed or in the process of being signed with the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe allow 
the Commission to investigate the conditions 
under which State aid is granted outside the 
Union. Thus the Daewoo and General Motors 
cases are being studied in cooperation with the 
Polish authorities. 
797. Some Commission decisions provide 
expressly for assisted projects to be followed 
up. Essentially, the aim is to validate invest­
ments, and the numbers of jobs created or safe­
guarded, and to check, possibly on site, the 
limits on installed production capacity. The 
NedCar, Seat Barcelona and Fiat Mezzogiorno 
cases are examples of active monitoring by the 
Commission. 
1.1.5. Synthetic fibres industry 
792. Since 1977 aid to this industry has been 
subject to supplementary control through the 
code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry. Fol­
lowing reports carried out by an independent 
consultant in 1995, and the views expressed by 
Member States and ESA, the Commission 
informed Member States by letter dated 25 Jan­
uary of its decision to introduce new measures 
to control State aid to this sector.' The new code 
came into effect on 1 April and all Member 
States agreed to the notification obligations 
imposed therein on the basis of Article 93( 1 ) of 
the EC Treaty. The code is valid for three years. 
Under the previous code, regional investment 
aid was authorized only if the investments 
assisted led to a significant reduction in capac­
ity. Under the new code, the state of the market 
is a key consideration in the assessment of pro­
posals to award regional aid. Aid may be 
authorized for projects when there is a structural 
shortage of supply of the relevant product, pro­
vided the aid will not lead to a significant 
increase in capacity. However, the new code 
also limits the aid which may be authorized. 
Larger firms, i.e. firms that are not SMEs, are 
unable to receive investment aid of more than 
50% of the applicable aid ceiling. SMEs may 
receive aid of 75% or 100% of that ceiling 
depending on the state of the market concerned, 
the effect on capacity and the innovative nature 
of their products. 
193. In this transitional year, the Commission 
dealt with an unusually low number of State aid 
cases in the synthetic fibres industry. The most 
notable case concerned the final conditional 
decision taken in April in respect of unnotified 
restructuring aid granted by the Spanish author­
ities to a synthetic fibres producer La Seda de 
Barcelona (LSB). In this case the aid was auth­
orized, on condition an annual report was sub­
mitted, since it would result in an overall net 
reduction of 25% in LSB's total production 
capacity. The reduction was regarded as 'signif­
icant' within the meaning of the code, in partic­
ular in view of the company's likely long-term 
viability, and its location in an area affected by 
serious industrial decline. 
1.1.6. Textiles and clothing 
794. At the multilateral meeting held in May 
with the Member States, the Commission pre­
sented the results of the study that had been 
commissioned on the need for maintaining a 
specific framework in this industry. The study 
concluded that the sectoral framework should 
be abolished and the industry became subject to 
the same regime as all the others, possibly under 
a new, horizontal framework. As a large major­
ity of Member States (ll out of 15) were in 
favour of abolishing it, and in view of the posi­
tion of the Court of Justice,
2 it was necessary to 
find a solution combining the requirements of 
legal certainty and the need to maintain specific 
monitoring of this sector. The Commission 
finally decided to await the result of a forth­
coming multilateral meeting at the beginning of 
1997, at which a final decision on whether or 
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not to introduce a multisectoral framework 
would be taken. 
1.1.7. Transport 
795. In 1996 the number of transport aid cases 
dealt with by the Commission remained rela-
tively unchanged compared with 1995, a year 
which saw an increase of more than 40% in the 
number of such cases (48 decisions adopted by 
the Commission in 1996). This is partly the 
result of the constant opening-up of the trans-
port market and the increase in competition in 
this sector, together with the progress of the sin-
gle market for transport services. Under the cir-
cumstances, the control of State aid is of partic-
ular importance to ensuring that fair conditions 
of competition are maintained between public 
or private enterprises. 
796. In the field of air transport, the Commis-
sion continued to maintain strict control of State 
aid. Most of the national airlines were recapital-
ized and subjected to restructuring plans. The 
Commission therefore gave priority to control-
ling the implementation of these plans and ver-
ifying that all the conditions laid down in the 
decisions authorizing aid for the restructuring of 
the airlines were effectively complied with. 
— On 31 January, the Commission raised no 
objections in respect of the plan of the Span-
ish-owned holding company Teneo to invest 
ESP 87 billion in the national airline Iberia. 
The Commission regarded this investment as 
a normal commercial transaction which sat-
isfies the market economy investor prin-
ciple. The Commission, in assessing the 
amount of capital injection into Iberia pur-
suant to the market investor principle, in-
sisted on a rate of return in excess of 30%. 
This high rate includes a premium for the 
specific risk of an investment in Iberia (e.g. 
the company's restructuring plan is not fully 
implemented). The capital injection is lim-
ited to redundancy payments and a reduction 
in excessive gearing. Funds from the capital 
injection may not be used in any way that 
impedes the Iberia cost reduction pro-
gramme or brings about a significant change 
in its overall price strategy and fleet 
capacity. 
— On 30 April, the Commission reopened the 
Article 93(2) procedure in respect of restruc-
turing aid to be paid in instalments to 
Olympic Airways. Greece must abstain from 
paying the second instalment of aid pending 
the Article 93(2) procedure. The aid was 
authorized in October 1994 under certain 
conditions. While Olympic Airways is lar-
gely meeting the objectives of the restructur-
ing programme, the Commission is con-
cerned that Greece is not fully complying 
with a number of conditions. In particular, 
Greece seems to have granted further aid to 
Olympic and to have interfered in the man-
agement of the airline to an extent which 
goes beyond its role of shareholder. 
— On 24 July, the Commission raised no objec-
tions in respect of the payment of the third 
and last instalment, amounting to FRF 5 bil-
lion, of the FRF 20 billion State aid to Air 
France. The Commission considered that the 
restructuring progress and the results already 
achieved by Air France were satisfactory. In 
spite of the additional restructuring measures 
adopted by the company to cut its operating 
costs further, the Commission considered 
that there was uncertainty due to the fact that 
the restructuring period had not ended at the 
time the decision was taken and that some of 
the new restructuring measures ('the pact for 
competitiveness and growth') had not yet 
been fully approved. In order to control the 
development of the restructuring of Air 
France, the Commission decided to block an 
amount of FRF 1 billion out of the FRF 5 bil-
lion of the third instalment. The French Gov-
ernment will submit a report by 1 March 
1997 at the latest, setting out the actual 
results achieved by Air France and the new 
restructuring measures. The Commission 
will verify by 31 March 1997 the informa-
tion transmitted. Should the Commission 
have no objections, the FRF 1 billion will be 
incorporated into Air France's equity. 
— On 27 March, the Commission raised no 
objections in respect of the payment of the 
third instalment of State aid to TAP. It con-
cluded that the airline had successfully 
implemented its restructuring plan during 
the period under review, and that Portugal 
had strictly complied with the conditions set 
out in the decision. However, the Commis-
sion insisted on TAP increasing its efforts to 
improve efficiency to match the greater pro-
ductivity gains achieved by its competitors. 
797. In the maritime transport sector, the Com-
mission communication 'Towards a new mar-
itime strategy' reassesses Community maritime 
policy. Briefly, it concluded that, although the 
objective of improving safety and achieving 
international open markets and fair competition 
would help to reduce distortion of competition,  63 64 
whilst efforts in training and employment pol-
icy and in research and development would 
enhance the competitiveness of the EC shipping 
sector, support measures may nevertheless be 
required for the present to maintain and to 
develop the Community's shipping industries. 
Among other things, therefore, the Commission 
will issue revised State aid guidelines on ship-
ping, which should be available in early 1997. 
798. In 1996, the Commission authorized vari-
ous aid schemes aimed at making Community 
shipping lines more competitive in relation to 
third-country fleets: 
— On 21 February, for example, the Commis-
sion raised no objections in respect of an aid 
scheme proposed by the United Kingdom 
Government for a special tax measure for 
shipowners, extending the period allowed 
for reinvesting excess allowances in replace-
ment vessels. 
— On 2 October and 6 November, the Commis-
sion raised no objections in respect of two 
German aid schemes extending or modifying 
previously approved measures: a special 
depreciation scheme for ships — including 
second-hand tonnage ships — which will be 
in force until the end of 1999 and financial 
contributions for the year 1995 to ship-oper-
ating companies aimed at encouraging 
shipowners to keep their vessels under the 
German flag and to promote training. 
— On 20 March, the Commission authorized 
several measures notified by the Dutch Gov-
ernment aimed at reducing the costs involved 
in employing Dutch nationals on board 
Dutch vessels, and at reducing the tax burden 
on shipping companies established in and 
operating from the Netherlands by allowing 
them to choose between two methods of tax-
ation, i.e. taxation of profits at the normal 
rate or taxation on the basis of tonnage. 
— On 22 April, the Commission authorized 
French tax proposals concerning maritime 
co-ownership aimed at encouraging the reg-
istration of vessels under the French flag. 
The scheme, which allows a tax deduction 
for the acquisition of shares in vessels, is 
limited to investments made before 31 
December 2000. 
— On 17 July, the Commission finally approved 
a scheme, against which it had initiated pro-
ceedings in 1995, concerning restructuring 
aid for the French company CGM, subject to 
certain conditions imposed until completion 
of the company's privatization in order both 
to prevent aggressive market tactics and 
avoid keeping loss-making activities afloat. 
The Commission considered that the aid 
made an effective contribution to the radical 
restructuring and eventual viability of the 
company. 
799. In the ports sector, the Commission contin-
ued to examine complaints about public assis-
tance for certain ports in several Member States. 
It also decided on 12 June to extend the Article 
93(2) procedure initiated in July 1993 in respect 
of measures adopted subsequently by the Italian 
authorities within the framework of the restruc-
turing of the ports sector. 
200. In the road transport sector, and with 
increasingly intense competition between oper-
ators in the different Member States, the Com-
mission took a firm attitude in 1996 to State aid 
measures, in particular by concluding ongoing 
assessment procedures: 
— Having studied at great length the question 
of restructuring aid for road transport in 
Italy, the Commission, faced with contradic-
tory information, decided on 30 April to 
require Italy to send it all the documents, 
information and data needed to examine the 
compatibility of the aid with the common 
market and to suspend immediately the pay-
ment of any fresh aid pending the termina-
tion of the Article 93(2) procedure. The Ital-
ian authorities subsequently withdrew the 
measures incompatible with Article 92(1), 
and a final decision was taken by the Com-
mission on 20 November. 
— Again with regard to Italy, the Commission 
adopted a negative final decision on 22 
October against a tax credit scheme for road 
hauliers applied by the Italian authorities to 
the tax years 1993 and 1994. The aid, re-
garded as operating aid by the Commission, 
will have to be repaid. This decision is in 
line with that adopted in 1993 for the fiscal 
year 1992 which is the subject of an action 
before the Court of Justice brought against 
Italy in 1995 for failure to implement the 
Commission's decision. 
— On 29 May the Commission initiated the 
Article 93(2) procedure against a Spanish 
Government scheme to provide aid for the 
purchase of commercial vehicles, in view of 
its doubts as to the compatibility of the 
measure with the common market. IV —STATE AID 
On the other hand it authorized on 7 Febru-
ary the extension of a series of measures 
aimed at restructuring the Spanish road 
transport sector by improving its competi-
tiveness and reducing existing overcapacity. 
The measures are applicable on the same 
terms as those authorized by the Commis-
sion in 1992. 
207. With regard to rail transport, in July the 
Commission adopted its White Paper on a strat-
egy for revitalizing the Community's railways 
which deals in particular with financing of the 
railways and sets out the principal guidelines 
which the Commission will follow when 
analysing aid in this field. The Commission's 
aim is gradually to arrive at a system where the 
only public financing of railways will be in the 
form of financing for infrastructure or compen-
sation for public service obligations, or where it 
is part of an overall restructuring plan aimed at 
restoring the financial viability of the firm. In 
the meantime, the Commission continued to 
examine aid cases on the basis of the rules in 
force: 
— On 30 March the Commission decided not to 
object to the aid proposal notified by the UK 
authorities for financing the construction, 
maintenance and management of CTRL, the 
rail infrastructure for the high-speed train 
between London and the Channel Tunnel. 
The Commission considered that the State 
resources did not constitute aid within the 
meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty. 
— On 18 December the Commission author-
ized the financing of the investments in the 
TGV infrastructure in Belgium. The meas-
ures are aimed, on the one hand, at financing 
the construction of the Belgian section of the 
Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-Lon-
don line, one of the 14 priority projects in the 
development of the trans-European networks 
and, on the other hand, at the acquisition of 
the specialized rolling stock. 
202. In the area of inland waterways, the struc-
tural reorganization aimed at reducing existing 
overcapacity by scrapping vessels, provided for 
in Council Regulation (EEC) No 1101/89 of 27 
April 1989, is to gain fresh impetus following 
the adoption by the Council on 19 November 
1996 of Regulation (EC) No 2254/96 organiz-
ing extensive additional scrapping. Overcapac-
ity will be cut by some 15% in the period 1996-
98 and will be part-financed in 1996 by the 
Community, the Member States concerned and 
the trade. No Community financing is planned 
for 1997 and 1998. The new Community meas-
ures on the structural reorganization of inland 
waterways are an important measure accom-
panying the gradual liberalization of the water-
way transport market which was the subject of 
Directive 96/75/EC adopted by the Council on 
19 November 1996. 
203. In 1996 the Commission authorized sev-
eral aid measures intended to facilitate, in the 
Member States concerned, capacity cuts, the 
restructuring of the inland waterways sector and 
the development of the latter on the transport 
market. 
204. With regard to combined transport, the 
Commission authorized the Austrian Govern-
ment on 27 March to grant loans at preferential 
rates for investments in combined transport 
infrastructure in order to promote the transfer of 
goods carriage from road to rail or inland water-
way. 
1.1.8. Agriculture 
205. After publication at the beginning of 1996 
of a new framework for research and develop-
ment concerning all sectors, including agricul-
ture, ' the Commission adopted a modification 
of this document which clarifies and redefines 
its policy on such aid in the agricultural sector. 
After entry into force of the modification, the 
framework will, in certain circumstances, allow 
public financing of up to 100% in the agricul-
tural sector. Cases which do not satisfy these 
conditions are to be examined under the other 
rules of the framework. 
206. In order to verify compliance with its pol-
icy on publicity aid in agriculture, the Commis-
sion now asks Member States to submit samples 
of the logos, trade marks and slogans which 
they plan to use. Previous experience has shown 
that assurances given by the Member States are 
not sufficient to guarantee compliance with 
mandatory Community rules in this field. 
207. The Commission is contemplating a modi-
fication of its current practice concerning agri-
cultural safeguard aid. A key issue in this debate 
is whether operators in agriculture should be 
given different treatment from other operators 
and, if so, what special treatment would be jus-
tifiable. In order to obtain the views of the 
Member States, the Commission organized a 
meeting with them. Irrespective of the outcome 
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of the present discussions, the Commission will 
continue to apply its existing practice in regard 
to agricultural safeguard aid until a new policy 
line is determined and communicated to the 
Member States. 
208. As before, the Commission will continue 
to oppose any State aid relating to support 
measures that would be liable to upset the Com-
munity market machinery and which, as operat-
ing aid, would not have any lasting effect on the 
development of the sector in question. 
1.1.9. Fisheries 
209. In 1996 the Commission registered 50 new 
aid schemes and 12 cases that were not notified 
or were notified late. 
It decided not to object to the aid in 68 cases, of 
which three were started in 1994, and 26 in 
1995. It also decided to initiate the Article 93(2) 
procedure in respect of two aid measures, one 
Italian and the other Spanish. In the same pe-
riod, the Commission decided to terminate the 
procedure with a positive decision in respect of 
aid to Denmark notified in 1995. It also decided 
to take a negative decision in respect of a Ger-
man aid measure notified in 1995. 
1.2. Specific sectors not subject to special 
rules 
1.2.1. Financial sector 
270. The position set out by the Commission in 
the XXVth Competition Report,' namely, that the 
substantive and procedural rules concerning 
State aid should apply to banking, although 
account should be taken of the particularities of 
this sector, was confirmed by a group of experts 
composed of former central bank directors. The 
Commission is aware that the banking sector is 
particularly sensitive and the national authori-
ties should take great care to ensure that serious 
difficulties in a major institution do not spread 
through the financial links between firms in this 
sector and provoke a systemic crisis. 
277. The Crédit Lyonnais decision of 26 July 
1995
2 thus constitutes an important precedent in 
the sector as it confirmed the full applicability 
of the State aid rules to banks. It also introduced 
the principle that the counter-concessions which 
must be offered in order to compensate com-
petitors for the distortions caused by the aid 
must be greater if the radical solution of a statu-
tory winding-up is out of the question as such a 
solution, although feasible in the case of an 
industrial firm, would be more difficult or inad-
visable in the case of major banks owing to the 
disproportionately negative effects it could have 
on other financial institutions and the payment 
system, even if the OECD countries have mon-
itoring bodies whose aim is to prevent such 
crises. 
This case had a number of repercussions in 
1996. First, the Commission's 1995 decision 
was the subject of two appeals to the Court of 
First Instance, one presented by Crédit Lyon-
nais, which it subsequently withdrew, and the 
other by Société Générale. The CFI has not yet 
given its judgment. Second, in September, the 
Commission decided to approve an urgent grant 
of FRF 3.9 billion to Crédit Lyonnais and to 
examine any future restructuring aid. The 
approved measures are essentially aimed at pre-
venting Crédit Lyonnais from announcing 
losses that are large enough to affect the French 
banking sector. The measures are strictly con-
servatory, aimed at maintaining the status quo 
until the Commission takes a formal decision on 
new restructuring measures for the bank. From 
this point of view, the approval of urgent aid 
does not prejudice the Commission's final deci-
sion concerning new restructuring aid. 
272. Lastly, the Commission recorded sharp 
increases in the number of State aid cases in the 
financial sector in 1996. It approved, after 
deeming them compatible with the common 
market, the aid grants to the financial institu-
tions Comptoir des Entrepreneurs (specializing 
in real estate) and GAN (insurance). It decided, 
however, to initiate the Article 93(2) procedure 
in respect of aid granted to other financial insti-
tutions such as Société Marseillaise de Crédit, 
Crédit Foncier de France, SDBO, Crédit Lyon-
nais and Banco di Napoli. 
1.2.2. The audiovisual sector 
213. The Commission received several com-
plaints and was the subject of several actions for 
failure to act in the audiovisual field. In the 
Financing of Portuguese State Radio and Tele-
vision case, the Commission took a positive 
decision after conducting a study of the Por-
tuguese audiovisual sector. It decided that the 
system of financing Portuguese State broadcast-
ing did not rank as State aid as the assistance 
was subject to a counter-concession, i.e. the 
provision of non-competitive services: coverage 
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of the entire national territory, supply to the 
autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores, 
maintenance of audiovisual archives,' coopera-
tion with countries where Portuguese is the offi-
cial language, provision of air time for religious 
broadcasts, operation of an international chan-
nel, financing of a public theatre and maintain-
ing of offices and correspondents in places 
where private channels are not available. As 
analytical accounting had been introduced, the 
Commission was able to determine that the pub-
lic financing of the channels did not exceed the 
costs of their obligations. 
1.2.3. The postal sector 
274. The liberalization of the postal market — 
which would give competitors access to the net-
works of the national postal operators for non-
letter post — is progressing slowly. A degree of 
liberalization, however, already exists which 
allows alternative postal operators to enter the 
markets for express post, parcel post and direct 
mail. The Commission is in the process of 
assessing several complaints concerning the 
postal operators in Belgium, France and Ger-
many. The complainants allege that the national 
postal operators are cross-subsidizing their 
competitive activities with revenues from the 
monopoly letter post sector. Although in some 
files considerable progress has been made and 
two procedures have been initiated,' this has not 
yet resulted in a final decision in any of the 
cases. 
2. Horizontal aid 
2.1. Research and development 
215. The implementation of the new framework 
for State aid for research and development 
(R&D) adopted at the end of 1995 and pub-
lished in 1996
2 resulted in a reduction in the 
number of notifications concerning the refi-
nancing of existing schemes and in the approval 
of a number of notified schemes on the ground 
of their compatibility with the framework. In 
applying the framework to four cases, Olivetti 
SpA, SGS Thomson, Philips and Océ, the Com-
mission expressed serious doubts that the aid 
was needed as an incentive, since at first sight 
the project appeared to constitute a natural busi-
ness operation and did not go beyond a normal 
R&D effort; it therefore decided to initiate the 
Article 93(2) procedure. The other R&D cases 
studied by the Commission did not raise any 
particular difficulties. 
2.2. Employment 
216. In the first full year of application of the 
guidelines on employment aid, the Commission 
addressed appropriate measures to Sweden con-
cerning two recruitment and employment aid 
schemes. The cases are typical of the policy the 
Commission intends to follow in this area, in 
particular by taking a series of measures in 
order to help fulfil the objective of a net creation 
of stable employment. Thus, in the first case, 
the aid should be better targeted on the most dis-
advantaged unemployed persons and should be 
granted only for jobs left vacant by voluntary 
departures; in the second case, aid should be 
given only when new jobs are created. In both 
cases, the Swedish authorities were asked to 
reduce the original scope which was too broad 
and, among other things, to ensure that the jobs 
created are stable, either by means of contracts 
of indefinite duration and training, or by main-
taining newly created jobs for a minimum peri-
od. Similarly, the Commission authorized Den-
mark to set up a system of aid for the recruit-
ment of the unemployed under the guidelines on 
employment aid. 
2.3. Environment 
217. As planned, the Commission carried out a 
review before the end of 1996 on the function-
ing of the guidelines on State aid for en-
vironmental protection
3 over the last three 
years. Its review revealed, in general, the large 
number of positive Commission decisions in the 
area, which reflects the high level of compli-
ance with the framework rules by the Member 
States responsible for preparing and notifying 
aid plans. The Commission had serious doubts 
only in regard to two cases, prompting it to ini-
tiate the Article 93(2) procedure: Cellulose du 
Rhône et de l'Aquitaine and Hoffmann La 
Roche. The review confirmed that aid to pro-
ductive investment in the manufacture of en-
vironmentally sound products does not enjoy 
exemption under the guidelines in view of the 
considerable distortions of competition which 
production aid may entail for competitors on the 
same market; secondly, the application of the 
guidelines established the principle that only the 
extra costs of investment for environmental 
improvements are covered by the guidelines. 
Thirdly, it is for the Member States to demon-
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on the environmental standards in force if the 
firm is to benefit from higher aid intensities, the 
exact amount of the increase depending on the 
positive externalities of the investment; lastly, 
the exception that is made for waste treatment 
and environmental taxes from the prohibition 
on operating aid was confirmed in the GAV 
case. 
In the light of the conclusions of the overall 
assessment of the application of the guidelines, 
the Commission decided it was advisable to 
wait until they expired at the end of 1999 before 
making any necessary amendments. 
2.4. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
218. In April the Commission adopted a new 
version of its Community guidelines on State 
aid for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).
1 It confirmed its favourable view of 
certain State aid for SMEs inasmuch as they are 
a factor of social stability and economic 
dynamism but are, compared with large firms, 
faced with a series of handicaps liable to 
impede their development. The new text also 
introduces certain amendments to the preceding 
guidelines, in particular under the impetus of 
the White Paper on growth, competitiveness 
and employment: the definition of an SME was 
based on that adopted at Community level in the 
Commission recommendation
2 concerning the 
definition of SMEs in Community policies; in 
addition, its favourable view was extended to 
cover intangible investment aid in the form of 
technology transfers. It is also worth noting the 
growing interest being shown by many SMEs in 
intangible investments. Lastly, the de minimis* 
rule was separated from the guidelines and now 
forms a separate text concerning all enterprises. 
However, SMEs continue to be the main bene-
ficiaries of the de minimis rule. 
2.5. Rescue and restructuring aid 
219. The Commission continued in 1996 to 
apply the criteria of the Community guidelines 
on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty adopted by the Commission on 27 
July 1994.
4 
the company's difficulties can be found. The 
guidelines allow for rescue aid to be granted 
during a limited period of time, normally only 
up to a period of six months. Given that rescue 
aid is often necessary to relieve a troubled enter-
prise from its acute problems while an appro-
priate restructuring plan is being drawn up, the 
Commission normally takes a positive view and 
authorizes such aid provided that the criteria 
comply with the guidelines. 
Restructuring aid is, on the other hand, subject 
to strict conditions. Such aid must be linked to a 
restructuring plan in order for the long-term via-
bility of the company in difficulties to be 
restored within a reasonable period of time. 
Moreover, such aid should normally be a one-
off operation, so that further aid is not subse-
quently required. 
220. In this context, it is worth noting that the 
Commission has started to reflect on the impact 
of non-compliance by Member States with the 
State aid rules when dealing with enterprises in 
difficulty. It has emerged in certain cases that 
contrary to Commission decisions, illegally 
awarded incompatible aid has not been recov-
ered (or has been recovered only to a limited 
extent) from the beneficiaries which, having 
encountered severe financial problems, have 
been put into liquidation. 
2.6. Underprivileged urban areas 
221. In October, following the notification by 
France of the 'Urban renewal pact' ('Pacte de 
relance pour la ville'), the Commission stated 
that it would take a favourable view in principle 
of aid to deprived urban areas by adopting a 
specific framework on the subject. The existing 
Community framework, whether in respect of 
aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, aid 
to employment or regional aid, did not allow the 
particular geographic and socio-economic situ-
ation of these areas to be taken properly into 
account. Yet some financial assistance from the 
State may be necessary owing to the structural 
handicaps and the extra costs of setting up busi-
nesses in such areas. 
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Albeit often linked to similar kinds of situations 
when an enterprise is facing severe difficulties, 
rescue aid and restructuring aid show basic dif-
ferences. Rescue aid temporarily maintains the 
position of a firm that has suffered from a sub-
stantial deterioration in its financial position 
while long-term solutions aimed at overcoming 
OJC 213, 23.7.1996. p. 4. 
Commission recommendation on the definition of small and 
medium-sized enterprises of 3 April 1996. OJ L 107, 30.4.1996. 
OJC 68. 6.3.1996. p. 9. 
OJC 368. 23.12.1994, p. 12. IV — STATE AID 
The new text is based on social and economic 
considerations inasmuch as the aim of the aid in 
question is to help to reduce or even to resolve 
a variety of problems (employment, develop-
ment, etc.) affecting certain urban areas. As 
such, it forms one of the priorities of the White 
Paper on growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment and is within the terms of reference of the 
Community URBAN initiative. 
In the guidelines, the Commission states that it 
will take a favourable a priori view of State aid 
which helps to develop deprived urban areas, 
provided that it satisfies certain conditions. 
Thus, in order to ensure maximum effectiveness 
of the measures introduced whilst maintaining a 
competitive balance and respect for the general 
interest, general conditions have been imposed 
as to the eligibility criteria applicable to the 
areas, the beneficiaries of the aid and the form 
and intensity of the authorized aid. Examples of 
these conditions are as follows: the total nation-
al population covered by these areas will nor-
mally be limited to 1 %; the aid will be limited 
to small enterprises (under 50 employees); at 
least 20% of the jobs created will be reserved 
for persons residing in the deprived urban area; 
lastly, the maximum intensity of the aid is fixed 
at 26% net of the investment or at ECU 10 000 
per job created. 
The Commission considers, furthermore, that in 
a number of cases, the public measures will not 
be covered by the Community competition laws 
as trade between Member States will not be 
affected. It has therefore established a list of 
activities which, owing to their traditionally 
local and non-transnational nature, should fall 
outside the scope of these rules. 
effective use of limited budgetary resources. As 
regards aid intensity, the Commission sees to it 
that the difference between the ceilings in the 
different regions is maintained according to 
their macroeconomic situations. As regards the 
new Member States, the Commission paid equal 
attention to new schemes and the amendments 
which, in accordance with the accession agree-
ments, were made to schemes in force at the 
time of accession in order to bring them into 
line with Community rules in 1997. Thus, the 
transport aid scheme in Finland and Sweden 
was analysed in the light of the Commission 
communication of 20 December 1994' which 
lays down special rules for areas with a low 
population density. 
The Commission also examined the compatibil-
ity with the Treaty of the measures provided for 
in the single programming documents relating 
to Community Structural Fund assistance in the 
Objective 2 regions in the period 1997-99. In 
addition to this particular aspect, the Commis-
sion pursued its efforts to check the compatibil-
ity of Structural Fund assistance with the com-
petition rules under Articles 92 and 93 of the EC 
Treaty. 
At a multilateral meeting on 15 May the future 
guidelines concerning regional aid were dis-
cussed. While meeting the need for codification 
in this area that is due to the multitude of exist-
ing texts, the draft document also includes new 
rules, some of which have emerged in Commis-
sion policy in recent years, and should help to 
strengthen cohesion between, on the one hand, 
competition policy with regard to State aid and, 
on the other, the activities of the Structural 
Funds. 
3.1. A specific case: post-Treuhandanstalt 
3. Regional aid 
222. Apart from its regular monitoring of aid 
schemes, the Commission continued its analysis 
of the map of regions eligible for regional aid 
and the relevant aid rates. It approved new maps 
for Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany 
and is continuing its work with regard to Den-
mark and Italy. With a view to strengthening 
economic and social cohesion, the analysis 
essentially concerns two aspects: geographic 
cover and aid intensity. With regard to the for-
mer, the Commission's aim is to reduce the per-
centage of population covered which should 
enable a greater concentration of aid, thus 
improving its financial effectiveness, limiting 
its impact on competition and making more 
223. The Commission again confirmed that it 
did not intend to extend the old 'Treuhand' 
scheme. The normal notification rules are 
applicable as from 1 January 1996. The Com-
mission acknowledges that the new Lander con-
tinue to have problems of adjustment, essen-
tially due to the consolidation of a large number 
of firms that were part of the massive privatiza-
tions. The Commission does not intend to delay 
the process as State aid is a tool for facilitating 
Changes to the method for the application of Article 92(3)(c) 
of the EC Treaty to regional aid, OJ C 364, 20.12.1994, p. 9, 
point 6.  69 70 
readjustment. The number of cases and the 
urgency of some of them remain a problem. The 
Commission considered, however, that the 
number of cases was now sufficiently small to 
be able to move to a more detailed level of legal 
and economic analysis of each case. It believed 
that cases could in future be dealt with on the 
basis of existing legal instruments. Organiza-
tional changes were able to satisfy the problems 
posed by the number and urgency of cases. In 
particular, the Commission set up a task force to 
deal with cases and adopted rules of procedure 
for rapid processing. 
Apart from the usual problems of development 
also facing the other Member States, adaptation 
in the new Länder poses three particular prob-
lems for aid policy: 
— The management of privatization contracts 
by the Bundesanstalt für vereinigungsbe-
dingte Sonderaufgaben (BvS). This system 
is necessary because in most privatization 
contracts, ties between the BvS and investors 
continue well after privatization. Each year, 
some 3 000 contracts must be adapted. Most 
adaptations are not caught by Articles 92 and 
93 of the EC Treaty, although some of them 
may be regarded as aid and must be notified. 
However, in minor cases involving SMEs, a 
system of exceptions was proposed to sim-
plify the process and is awaiting approval. 
As the BvS is endeavouring to terminate the 
management of contracts, this activity will 
gradually disappear. The BvS should have 
completed its work by the end of 1998.' The 
German Government systematically informs 
the Commission, in accordance with Article 
5 of the EC Treaty, of all changes to con-
tracts. The Commission is thus able to check 
whether or not there is any aid. 
— Secondly, completion of the remaining pri-
vatizations by the BvS or the BMGB (Betei-
ligungsManagement-Gesellschaft Berlin 
GmbH, another successor to the Treuhand). 
The BvS and BMGB are making a particular 
effort to privatize the remaining 40 firms. 
For obvious reasons, the last privatizations 
can cause difficulties with regard to Com-
munity State aid policy. Potential investors 
in companies that have been 'for sale' for a 
long while will often be attracted only with 
the help of aid measures. In practice, there-
fore, virtually all the remaining privatiza-
tions will be subject to the notification 
requirement. The Commission analyses most 
of the cases on the basis of its guidelines on 
State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in 
difficulty. When it is convinced that the restruc-
turing plan will lead to the recovery of the firm 
without distorting competition, it usually 
approves the aid unless it is covered by one of 
the sectoral frameworks. In that case, the Com-
mission applies its sectoral rules. Several deci-
sions have authorized amounts of aid that seem 
very large in relation to the size of the firm. This 
is due to the financing over a long period of the 
business of the firm by means of loans. The 
amounts provide for debt write-offs. Financial-
ly speaking, there are few links between the 
activity of the new, privatized firm and that of 
the old firm which benefited from the aid. 
— Thirdly, the rescue and restructuring of spe-
cific firms ('Auffanglösungen') where the 
privatization has failed or where a simple 
corrective measure taken under the contract 
was not sufficient to restore the viability of 
the company. Where the firm encounters 
serious difficulties, it is not rare for either the 
entire company or a part of its assets to 
return to the BvS portfolio. New owners 
must therefore be found for the firm or, more 
frequently, for part of it. Depending on the 
circumstances, these acquisitions may be 
accompanied by aid measures. In certain 
cases, the acquirer may be satisfied with a 
classic investment aid under a regional 
scheme; in others, more substantial restruc-
turing efforts are required. The latter cases 
are analysed on the basis of the guidelines on 
State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty. It is worth noting that the Sket 
case falls into this category. 
4. Direct investments abroad 
224. Although the Commission regards export 
aid, i.e. aid related to the volume of products 
exported, as being contrary to the common mar-
ket on the basis that it does not promote any 
Community objective and leads to unjustified 
distortions of competition, a type of aid for what 
is generally referred to as 'direct investments 
abroad' is becoming increasingly widespread 
and has prompted the Commission to formulate 
an appropriate policy. The Commission is cur-
rently developing its position on a pragmatic 
basis as it needs a sufficient number of cases in 
Some 600 contracts a month are being terminated out of a total 
of 38 000. IV — STATE AID 
order to have the breadth of experience to allow 
it to define generally applicable principles. 
Direct investments abroad result from a firm's 
desire to develop new business outlets by 
investing and selling on foreign markets rather 
than by exporting. Investment generally takes 
the form of setting up a joint venture or a 
subsidiary abroad, either by acquiring shares or 
purchasing a local firm. Whilst such aid is cer-
tainly State aid, it may in certain cases, apart 
from its effects on the competitiveness of Com-
munity industry and the development of coop-
eration with third countries, promote other 
Community objectives such as the development 
of SMEs. It is possible, on the other hand, that 
such aid could run counter to the objective of 
economic and social cohesion inasmuch as it 
could encourage the siting of subsidiaries or 
production plants in third countries, to the detri-
ment of investment within the Union. 
227. In November 1995 the Commission pub-
lished a notice on cooperation between national 
courts and the Commission in the State aid 
field. The notice seeks in particular to encour-
age courts to exercise their powers and compa-
nies to make use of the legal remedies available 
under domestic law. Only two requests for con-
sultation of the Commission were lodged in 
1996 under the notice. 
The Commission plans in 1997 to collect 
detailed information on the treatment given 
hitherto to State aid cases in national courts. 
The review will concern both the application of 
the direct effect of the 'standstill' clause con-
tained in Article 93(3) and any disputes relating 
to compliance with final decisions. It will seek 
in particular,to identify the types of problems 
faced by third parties in national courts. 
In three final decisions taken in June concerning 
aid for direct investment abroad, the Commis-
sion decided to apply the existing rules for aid 
to SMEs irrespective of the location of the 
investments and to assess aid to large firms on a 
case-by-case basis. 
D — Procedures 
225. In 1996 the Commission took several deci-
sions ordering a Member State to recover aid 
from recipients that had been granted in breach 
of the rules of procedure and which it had 
deemed incompatible with the common market. 
The decisions confirmed the precarious nature, 
for all recipients, of aid granted unlawfully and 
the need for firms to be vigilant when accepting 
aid. The system of a priori monitoring of aid is 
intended to prevent the implementation of aid 
that is incompatible with the common market 
and to protect competitors from the effects of 
such aid. 
226. The Court again examined the role of the 
national courts in safeguarding the rights of 
competitors of the recipients of illegal aid. It 
also specified that, save in exceptional circum-
stances, determining that an aid is unlawful 
should lead to its recovery in accordance with 
national procedures. Furthermore, national 
courts are not required to wait for the Commis-
sion to come to a decision on the compatibility 
of the aid in order to take the necessary 
measures.  71 E — Statistics 
228. Over the year, the Commission registered 
553 notifications of new aid measures or 
changes to existing aid measures and 91 cases 
of unnotified aid.' In the same period, it decided 
in 373 cases not to raise objections. In 43 cases 
it decided to initiate the procedure provided for 
in Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty or in Article 
6(4) of Decision 3855/91/ECSC. This detailed 
analysis procedure resulted in 14 positive final 
decisions, 23 negative final decisions and three 
conditional final decisions. Lastly, the Commis-
sion decided to propose appropriate measures 
under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty in respect 
of four existing aid measures. 
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1 These figures do not include aid cases in agriculture, fisheries, 
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73 V — INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
A — Central and Eastern Europe 
1. Opinions on accession 
229. At the request of the European Council 
(Madrid, 15 and 16 December 1995), the Com­
mission prepared opinions on the accession of 
each of the associated countries (Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Esto­
nia). The opinions include a detailed assessment 
of the measures adopted by those countries in 
order to develop effective competition policies. 
2. Implementing rules 
230. The implementing rules for antitrust with 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
were officially accepted by the Association 
Councils on 31 January, 27 February and 16 
July respectively. 
In the field of State aid, an agreement on the 
proposed rules with the Czech Republic, Hun­
gary and Estonia was reached at a technical 
level and the texts were transmitted to the 
Council for approval. 
Among these rules are clauses requiring that 
each of the associated countries should adopt: 
— national rules on the granting of State aid; 
— a supervisory authority responsible for 
enforcing those rules and with effective 
power to obtain information. 
3. Technical assistance 
231. The technical assistance provided by the 
Commission together with the authorities of the 
Member States was more closely focused than 
in the past on supporting the development of a 
State aid policy, either through advice and train­
ing provided in situ or through training courses 
in the Commission or in Member States. 
This year was the first time that the four-week 
joint training course, held annually in Brussels 
and the Member States, for some 40 young civil 
servants from associated countries has focused 
equally on antitrust and merger policy, on the 
one hand, and State aid policy, on the other. 
A start was made to compiling an inventory of 
State aid granted in various forms in the asso­
ciated countries. 
Consultations were also initiated on putative aid 
which was incompatible with the Europe Agree­
ments (e.g. export aid) or liable to be incompat­
ible with them (certain aid for industries to 
which guidelines apply). 
Lastly, all aspects of cooperation between the 
EU and the associated countries were discussed 
at the second annual conference of heads of 
competition authorities which, following the 
1995 Visegrad Conference,
1 was held this year 
in Brno at the invitation of the Czech auth­
orities; for the first time, senior officials from 
the authorities responsible for monitoring State 
aid were invited to participate. 
Β — United States 
1. Application of the Cooperation 
Agreement 
232. Following the Council's approval of the 
Agreement between the European Community 
and the Government of the United States, rela­
tions with the US competition authorities have 
been significantly strengthened. 
In many cases, information was exchanged 
(within the limits permitted by the national rules 
on confidentiality). Moreover, the competition 
authorities consulted each other in the analysis 
of cases and possible remedies and endeavoured 
to coordinate procedures when they were both 
investigating the same cases. In some cases, the 
competition authorities were able, with the 
agreement of the businesses concerned, to 
exchange information obtained during their 
investigations, which made for more effective 
cooperation. 
In addition, the Commission and the US 
antitrust authorities had regular exchanges of 
views, in particular at the bilateral, high-level 
meeting held in Washington on 16 October 
dealing with various aspects of the competition 
policies pursued by both parties and other mat­
ters of common interest. 
On 8 October the Commission adopted a report 
to the Council and the European Parliament on 
the application of the Agreement over the 
period from 10 April 1995 to 30 June 1996. 
Such reports will henceforth be published 
annually. 
XXVth Competition Report, point 221.  75 2. Development perspectives 
233. The Commission, collaborating closely 
with the competition authorities of the Member 
States, began work with a view to tightening up 
bilateral cooperation. 
Two possibilities were explored: 
— to extend information exchange with the 
competition authorities of certain third coun-
tries (primarily the United States authorities, 
with whom close cooperation already 
exists); this would enable competition policy 
to be implemented more effectively, with the 
rights of the parties, particularly the con-
fidentiality of information handled, being 
fully secured; 
— to reinforce 'positive comity' procedures. 
With this in view, the Council adopted on 25 
October a negotiating brief for the reinforce-
ment of certain provisions contained in the 
Agreement with the United States. The 
negotiations pursued on this basis should 
result in an agreement on when and how a 
competition authority should normally defer 
or suspend the application of its competition 
rules (if this discretion is open to it under 
national law) in order to allow the competi-
tion authority of the other party, proceeding 
under its own rules, to terminate distortions 
of competition affecting the interests of both 
parties. 
234. On 17 June the Council also gave the Com-
mission a negotiating brief for an agreement 
with the United States establishing a common 
airspace so that the two parties' airlines can 
engage freely in their activities in the European 
Community and the United States on the basis 
of commercial principles ensuring conditions of 
fair and equivalent competition. It is envisaged 
that the application of competition rules, in 
addition to other regulatory aspects, will be dis-
cussed in the negotiations. The establishment of 
stronger cooperation with the United States 
authorities, in particular concerning the control 
of alliances between airlines, may follow from 
the negotiations. 
trade order: Strengthening international cooper-
ation and rules',
1 the Commission proposed in a 
communication to the Council dated 18 June
2 
that the World Trade Organization should set up 
a working group which would be responsible 
for initial work on the development of an inter-
national framework of competition rules. 
Following this initiative, which was approved 
by the Council and supported by several other 
States, a decision was adopted by the Singapore 
Conference on 11 December '[to] establish a 
working group to study issues ... relating to the 
interaction between trade and competition pol-
icy, including anti-competitive practices, in 
order to identify any areas that may merit con-
sideration in the WTO framework'. Discussions 
can begin early in 1997 but, as proposed by the 
Commission, these will be exploratory discus-
sions and not negotiations. Negotiations are 
seen as a possibility only, after the group's two-
year term of office expires, if there is a wide 
consensus within the WTO. 
The discussions within the WTO do not pre-
clude continued cooperation both in the OECD 
and at bilateral level, but it is important to initi-
ate discussions within the WTO so as to get the 
developing countries to introduce competition 
rules. Furthermore, the discussions will be car-
ried on in close cooperation with the WTO and 
the OECD. The working group will have to take 
account of the important work, previous, cur-
rent and future, carried out in those bodies. 
236. In concrete terms, the Commission con-
siders that the discussions should focus on the 
following points: 
— an undertaking by all WTO members to 
develop active domestic competition struc-
tures; 
— the identification and adoption of common 
competition principles at international level 
(most harmful practices); 
— the creation of the means of cooperation 
between competition authorities; 
— the adapting of the WTO rules for the settle-
ment of disputes to the competition area. 
WTO 
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1. Trade and competition 
235. On the basis of the report of the group of 
experts entitled 'Competition policy in the new 
Usually known as the Van Miert report. 
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2. State aid 
237. Following the adoption in 1995 of the Joint 
Notification and Reporting Procedure, an 
improvement was seen in the reporting of State 
aid and subsidies during 1996. In fact, a grow-
ing number of Member States computerized the 
transfer of such information to the Commission. 
3. Access to the Japanese market in 
photographic film and paper 
238. On 13 June the United States requested the 
WTO to initiate consultations concerning 
access to the Japanese market in photographic 
film and paper. 
Part of the procedure concerns practices in 
restraint of trade. The actions of the Japanese 
competition authorities which are complained 
of include tolerating, or indeed promoting, the 
anti-competitive practices observed in this field. 
The practices complained of are alleged against 
Fuji (vertical imposition of selling prices, abu-
sive practices concerning targeted discounts, 
exclusive dealing agreements and horizontal 
agreements on prices) and against various pro-
fessional associations (pressure on distributors 
to make them refrain from promotional activ-
ities). 
The Community asked to be associated in these 
consultations. 
within the Commission to ensure that the com-
petition dimension is taken into account when 
other Community policies are developed. 
240. At the end of the year the OECD also initi-
ated work on the reinforcement of international 
cooperation against cartels; this work covered 
the implications of more extensive information 
exchange between competition authorities 
along the lines of those carried out within the 
Community. 
2. State aid 
241. Finally, with respect to State aid, the Com-
mission took part in the OECD's working party 
on public support measures and contributed to 
the successful completion of the OECD report, 
'Public support to industry'. 
E — Other developments in 
international relations 
1. Mediterranean countries 
242. The new agreement on customs union with 
Turkey came into effect at the beginning of 
1996. It contains detailed binding rules on com-
petition policy and forms the basis for close 
cooperation between the Commission and the 
Turkish authorities. 
D — OECD 
1. Committee on law and competition 
policy 
239. The OECD's work, in which the Commis-
sion took an active part, extended to various 
issues concerning categories of business opera-
tions (application of the competition rules to 
'essential infrastructures', SMEs, the liberal pro-
fessions and enterprises holding a dominant 
position) and industries (application of the com-
petition rules to telecommunications, electricity, 
broadcasting, motor vehicle distribution, etc.). A 
round-table conference, attended by a number of 
senior judges, was also held on the courts' appli-
cation of the competition rules. Lastly, the Com-
mission participated in a large-scale study by the 
OECD of the role of 'competition advocate' 
played by the various competition authorities; 
among the findings of the study was that, regard-
ing the Community, DG IV plays an active role 
243. Negotiations on association agreements 
with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian 
Authority and Algeria are under way. Like the 
Euro-Mediterranean agreements already con-
cluded, for example with Morocco on 26 Febru-
ary and the interim agreement with Israel which 
entered into force on 1 January, these agree-
ments should contain provisions on the align-
ment of competition rules. This entails the 
development of technical assistance activities 
for those countries. 
2. Japan 
244. The annual bilateral meeting between DG 
IV and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
was held in Brussels on 29 October. The two 
parties discussed the principal developments in 
legislation and the application of the competi-
tion rules. The meeting also covered various 
issues concerning bilateral relations.  77 3. Latin America tion (involving Mercosur). Lastly, significant 
agreements have been or are being negotiated 
245. Relations with Latin American competi- by the EU with countries in the region and with 
tion authorities intensified during 1996. This Mercosur; the development of closer links 
came about, on the one hand, through the devel- heightens the need for greater cooperation on 
opment of competition policies in this region competition. With this in view, new contacts 
(all the major countries have adopted competi- were made, in particular with Brazil, Argentina, 
tion rules and established authorities respon- Mexico and Peru (and the Andean Pact coun-
sible for their enforcement) and, on the other, tries), 
through the development of regional coopera-
78 VI — INFORMATION POLICY 
246. During 1996 the Commission continued its 
information campaign on competition policy, 
employing various channels. 
First of all, it has issued press releases on com-
petition-related issues. 
In addition, DG IV, in cooperation with the 
Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, published a number of reference 
works on competition law and continued to 
bring out the EC Competition Policy Newslet-
ter; issued three times a year and with a current 
print-run of 30 000 copies, this journal forms a 
leading source of information in the field. 
Moreover, since July, DG IV has been placing 
information concerning European competition 
policy on Europa, the European Union's World 
Wide Web server (site: http://europa.eu.int). 
Europa contains information on the activities of 
the Union's institutions, and DG IV's homepage 
may be accessed through the section dealing 
with the European Commission's activities. DG 
IV's homepages contain information on the 
main aspects of competition policy, namely 
antitrust, mergers, liberalization, State aid and 
international aspects. Under each of these head-
ings, the user can find sections containing press 
releases published in the previous two weeks, 
acts published in the Official Journal in the pre-
vious month, the full texts of current legislative 
provisions and a list, with references, of Com-
mission decisions and of judgments delivered 
by the European Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance. Separate sections set out 
speeches given and articles published by the 
Member of the Commission with special 
responsibility for competition policy, the Direc-
tor-General of DG IV and DG IV officials, pre-
vious issues of the EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter, the Annual Report on Competition 
Policy, an updated list of Community publica-
tions on competition available to the public, 
plus other documents of interest, links with the 
websites of other national and international 
competition authorities, etc. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the Directorate-
General for Competition (DG IV) has an infor-
mation unit responsible for responding to ques-
tions from the public by providing the appropri-
ate documents or information. The replies to 
requests for information usually take the form 
of standard letters referring to the publications 
mentioned above and to DG IV's homepages on 
Europa. 
79 OUTLOOK FOR 1997 
247. At the request of the European Parliament 
and in keeping with its policy of transparency, 
the Commission has decided to include in its 
annual report a chapter on future policy and ini-
tiatives which it intends to take in the year 
reported on. 
248. The underlying objective in the field of 
competition policy in 1997 will be to secure 
effective competition within the single market 
for the benefit of European consumers and citi-
zens and contribute to the competitiveness of 
European industry. This objective is reflected in 
all of the proposals and actions that will be pur-
sued in 1997: the need for a substantive 
approach based on a sound assessment of the 
market, reducing regulatory costs and effective 
monitoring of sectors newly opened to competi-
tion. 
1. Legislative priorities 
249. With respect to horizontal actions, seven 
areas of priority policy development can be 
identified. 
250. First, the Commission will continue and 
intensify the process begun in 1996 of ensuring 
that the Community's competition policy is 
applied taking full account of the rapidly evolv-
ing nature of the market place. As markets inte-
grate, both in the EU and globally, it is vital that 
this evolution be reflected in the substantive 
approach taken by the Commission. Thus, the 
adoption and publication of a Green Paper on 
vertical restraints in EC competition policy has 
opened a wide-ranging debate on the manner in 
which the Commission's policy in this area 
should be revised. 
257. With respect to liberalization, the second 
priority area, the main task will be to follow up 
the Directives adopted in the telecommunica-
tions sector in recent years, and in particular the 
full competition Directive adopted in 1996. The 
Commission will ensure that these Directives 
are fully and effectively implemented by the 
Member States, pursuant to Articles 86 and 90, 
in order to prepare a swift opening of voice tele-
phony to competition on 1 January 1998. 
252. Third, the Commission will continue the 
process of modernizing procedural rules and 
simplifying and increasing the transparency of 
its policy. For example, it will commence an 
examination of the simplification of the proce-
dure for oral hearings. It will also pursue the 
preparation of measures to improve the existing 
implementing rules in the air transport sector, in 
particular with respect to air transport between 
the EU and third countries. Furthermore, it will 
continue its work on guidelines for market def-
inition applied in competition policy. Finally, as 
the Commission's practice regarding restric-
tions ancillary to concentrations has evolved 
since 1990, when the existing notice was adop-
ted, it is intended to carry out a comprehensive 
review with the aim of revising the existing 
notice. 
253. The ongoing structural difficulties facing 
Europe, in particular with respect to employ-
ment, makes the continuation of the policy of 
strictly limiting aid to those projects of real 
interest for the EU of vital importance. In addi-
tion to the resultant case work, particular efforts 
will be made in this area during 1997 towards a 
more efficient and transparent control as well as 
increased legal certainty. Proposals to the Coun-
cil are envisaged under Article 94, on the one 
hand, to enable the Commission to define cate-
gories of aid exempted from the notification 
procedure and, on the other hand, to lay down 
procedural rules. Also envisaged for adoption 
by the Commission are the codification of 
regional aid rules and the multisectoral frame-
work on regional aid for major investment proj-
ects. New texts will need to be adopted to 
replace the shipbuilding Regulation and the car 
framework Regulation expiring in 1997. Final-
ly, a communication is also envisaged on short-
term export credit insurance. 
254. The fifth priority area concerns the decen-
tralized application of the Community competi-
tion rules. It is expected that the final text of the 
notice on cooperation between the Commission 
and the national competition authorities will be 
adopted in early 1997. The effective implemen-
tation of this notice in practice will be an impor-
tant priority for the Commission. 
255. Sixth, in international cooperation the 
Commission will continue its efforts on three 
main priorities: 
— preparation for enlargement and ongoing 
actions to promote antitrust instruments and 
policies in the CEECs through technical 
assistance; in 1997, the main emphasis will 
be put on the development and enforcement 
of rules on State aid compatible with the EC 
rules and adapted to the particular circum-
stances of the economies in transition; 
— cooperation in antitrust with our main trade 
partners, with the completion of negotiations 
with the United States on a new cooperation  81 agreement, which will reinforce the existing 
provisions on 'positive comity'. Moreover, 
an agreement on cooperation with Canada is 
to be concluded in 1997; 
— promotion of effective competition policies 
all over the world through discussions in the 
working party set up by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore (December 1996) 
and in the framework of the OECD. 
256. Finally, in line with its objective of reduc-
ing regulatory costs for European industry to 
the minimum possible while maintaining an 
effective enforcement system, the Commission 
will concentrate available resources on cases of 
major legal, economic or political interest for 
the EU. In order to do so, the Commission 
intends to revise the de minimis notice. The 
intention is to widen the scope of the notice by 
focusing more closely on the economic conse-
quences of agreements. Depending on com-
ments, particularly of Member States and of 
other interested parties such as economic and 
professional organizations and consumers on 
the Commission's draft notice, final adoption of 
a revised notice is envisaged in 1997. 
2. Enforcement policy 
257. Contrary to most sectors of Community 
action, in the competition field the main area of 
the Commission's work concerns case work. In 
1997 the Commission will continue to concen-
trate on the effective treatment of notifications, 
complaints and ex officio proceedings regarding 
Articles 85, 86 and 90, mergers and State aid. 
258. With respect to the application of Articles 
85 and 86, the identification, prohibition and 
fining of cartels represent the Commission's 
highest priority. A major challenge in this field 
is the allocation of the necessary resources to 
investigate known cases within short time limits 
and to uncover other cartels. At the beginning of 
1997 there were active investigations into 14 
cartels, most of which cover all or a large part of 
the Community. 
The Community approach of outlawing private 
restrictions of parallel trade between Member 
States, and fining companies infringing this rule 
severely, has made a major contribution to the 
single market process and continues to play a 
major role in its completion. The Commission 
will continue, therefore, to pursue actively such 
arrangements. 
As the single market develops, the Commission 
is already beginning to receive an increasing 
number of complaints concerning attempts by 
dominant firms to prevent the entry or expan-
sion of new or fledgling market entrants into 
'their' markets. This trend is likely to continue 
with the entry into force of the various liberal-
ization measures taken by the Community in the 
telecommunications, transport and energy sec-
tors. Such cases, many of which are based on 
Article 90 together with Article 86, include 
complex issues such as access to networks and 
to infrastructure of incumbent dominant opera-
tors, long-term exclusive supply arrangements 
and strategic alliances. 
259. The vigour and complexity of merger and 
acquisition activity associated with globaliza-
tion, restructuring and rationalization reveal 
few signs of falling off and so a further signif-
icant increase in cases to be appraised, several 
with in-depth, second-stage investigations, are 
expected in 1997. All cases must be dealt with 
within the imperative deadlines fixed in the 
Merger Regulation and a formal decision must 
be taken. It is further expected that in 1997 pro-
cedural adaptations will be brought to a conclu-
sion, so that formal decisions under Article 66 
of the ECSC Treaty are adopted in a streamlined 
manner similar to decisions under the Merger 
Regulation. 
260. Finally, in relation to State aid, the increase 
in the number of new cases and decisions 
between 1993 and 1995 was not confirmed in 
1996. However, the growing complexity of 
these cases has been reflected by a 150% rise in 
the number of negative decisions. This confirms 
the need for Article 94 proposals allowing the 
Commission to concentrate its resources on the 
more complex cases, exempting the more rou-
tine ones from the requirement of notification. 
The complexity of cases is linked both to prob-
lems of compatibility and to the sectors con-
cerned, which include the banking sector, indus-
tries in structural crisis (shipbuilding) as well as 
gradually liberalized industries presenting prob-
lems of cross-subsidization from reserved to 
competitive activities. 
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